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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Global-Change Scenarios - Their Development and Use

A scenario is a description of potential future conditions produced to inform decision-making under uncertainty. Scenarios can help inform decisions that involve high stakes and poorly characterized uncertainty, which
may thwart other, conventional forms of analysis or decision support. Originally developed to study military and security problems, scenarios are now
widely used for strategic planning and assessment in businesses and other
organizations, and increasingly to inform planning, analysis, and decisionmaking for environmental issues, including climate change.

Scenarios can serve many purposes. They can help inform specific decisions, or can provide inputs to assessments, models,
or other decision-support activities when these activities need specification of potential future conditions. They can also provide various forms of indirect decision support, such as clarifying an issue’s importance, framing a decision agenda, shaking
up habitual thinking, stimulating creativity, clarifying points of agreement and disagreement, identifying and engaging needed
participants, or providing a structure for analysis of potential future decisions.

SCENARIOS FOR CLIMATE CHANGE: FIVE TYPES
Developing a scenario exercise involves many design choices, of which the most important involve choosing the few key uncertainties to represent in alternative scenarios. Five types of scenarios have been developed to address different aspects of
the climate-change issue; these are distinguished by where they fall along a simple linear causal chain extending from the
socio-economic determinants of greenhouse-gas emissions through the impacts of climate change as shown in Figure ES-1.
(This figure does not represent the complete causal structure of the climate issue, which has many linkages and feedbacks.
Rather, this simple structure only illustrates how scenarios have been used to fit within the simplest and most prominent
causal pathway of the issue.)

SOCIOECONOMIC
CONDITIONS
• population
• GDP
• energy system
• industry
• technology
• agriculture,
land-use

EMISSIONS
• greenhouse gases
• aerosols
• other drivers,
e.g. land-cover
change

ATMOSPHERE
& CLIMATE

IMPACTS

• carbon cycle
• temperature
• precipitation
• humidity
• soil moisture
• extreme events

• sea level rise
• fresh water
• ecosystems
• agriculture
• human health
• property,
infrastructure

Figure ES-1.
Scenarios of
anthropogenic
climate change:
simple linear causal
chain
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Emissions Scenarios for Climate Simulations:
Emissions scenarios present future paths of
greenhouse-gas emissions or other climate
perturbations. A major use of these is to
provide needed inputs to climate models.
Such scenarios may specify simple arbitrary
perturbations of emissions or concentrations
(e.g., doubling atmospheric CO2), or timepaths reflecting specified assumptions for
evolution of socio-economic drivers such as
population, economic growth, and technological change.
Emissions Scenarios for Exploring Alternative
Energy/Technology Futures: Another use
of emissions scenarios involves specifying
an environmental or emissions target, arbitrarily or based on normative or political
goals, to examine what patterns of socioeconomic change, energy resources, and
technology development are consistent with
the target and/or what interventions might
be needed to meet it. Such scenarios have
examined conditions for stabilizing atmospheric CO2 concentration at various levels
and the implications of stabilizing radiative
forcing for multi-gas reduction strategies.
Climate-Change Scenarios: Climate scenarios
specify potential future climate conditions
to inform assessments of impacts, vulnerabilities, and adaptation options, and inform
decision-making for adaptation or mitigation.
They can be produced by arbitrary perturbation of present conditions, by using climates
from elsewhere or the past as a proxy for potential future climate in a given location, or
by climate-model simulations driven by some
specified scenario of future emissions.
Scenarios of Direct Biophysical Impacts, e.g.,
Sea Level Rise: Scenarios can specify alternative trajectories for some important
form of climate impact that influences many
other impacts. For example, scenarios of sea
level rise can capture the most important impact pathways in many coastal regions, including the large uncertainties associated
with potential loss of continental ice sheets
in Greenland and Antarctica.
Multivariate Scenarios for Impact Assessment:
Assessing climate-change impacts requires
not just considering climate in isolation, but
other linked changes and stresses, including
both environmental and socio-economic
2

trends. The factors that influence particular
impacts and vulnerabilities are likely to
be widely variable, and may include
demographic, economic, technological,
institutional, and cultural characteristics.
Consequently, scenarios may have to be generated in an exploratory manner in the context of attempting to assess specific local
and regional impacts.

SCENARIOS
FOR CLIMATE CHANGE:
MAJOR EXAMPLES
The report reviews four major exercises producing or using scenarios for climate-change
applications. The examples include national
and international activities, produced by different sets of actors for different purposes.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) has produced three sets of scenarios of
21st-century greenhouse-gas emissions, of which
the most ambitious and important were produced for the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) between 1997 and 1999. SRES
produced four qualitative storylines on which
six “marker” scenarios were based – one model
quantification of each storyline plus two technological variants of one storyline that stressed
fossil-intensive and low-carbon energy supply
technologies – each produced by a different
energy-economic model. Other models’ replications of each other’s marker scenarios plus a
few additional explorations yielded 40 scenarios
in total. These scenarios highlighted several insights, including the ability of alternative paths
with similar emissions in 2100 to differ widely
in their interim pathways and thus in atmospheric concentrations; the ability of alternative
technological assumptions alone to generate as
wide a range of emissions futures as substantially divergent socio-economic pathways; and
the fact that similar emissions paths can come
from widely different combinations of underlying socio-economic factors and so pose distinct
mitigation problems. A widely publicized critique of the SRES scenarios alleged over-estimation of future emissions growth due to the
metric used to compare incomes in rich and
poor nations, but the overestimation was later
found to be insignificant. More serious and illuminating challenges associated with these
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scenarios concerned how to balance and integrate qualitative and quantitative scenarios; how
to use and how much to coordinate multiple
models to generate the most useful insights; and
whether, when, and how it is appropriate to assign explicit probability judgments to alternative scenarios or associated ranges of
quantitative variables.
The US National Assessment was a comprehensive assessment of potential impacts of climate change and variability on the United
States, focusing on major regions and sectors
(agriculture, water, human health, coastal areas
and marine resources, and forests). The National Assessment needed scenarios of 21st-century US climate and socio-economic changes.
For climate scenarios, it relied principally on
climate-model scenarios produced by the UK
Hadley Centre and the Canadian Centre for Climate Modeling and Analysis, each driven by a
single emissions scenario, with statistical downscaling based on detailed local conditions and
present patterns of fine-scale climate variation.
Other proposed types of climate scenario, including historical scenarios and inverse methods to probe for key vulnerabilities, were less
used. For socio-economic scenarios, a novel approach was proposed that combined specified
scenarios for a few key national-level variables
such as population and economic growth, and a
common process to elaborate and document additional socio-economic assumptions as needed
for specific regional and sector analyses. The
National Assessment was criticized for relying
on just two climate-model runs and one emissions scenario, although these choices were dictated by time limits and availability of
climate-model runs. Limited use was made of
the socio-economic approach, principally due
to time limits and communication problems.
The UK Climate Impacts Programme (UKCIP)
provides common datasets, tools, and support,
including scenarios, for climate-impact assessments for UK regions and sectors by researchers and stakeholders. The program
produced climate scenarios in 1998 and 2002,
all based on the Hadley Centre climate models,
and socio-economic scenarios in 2001. The
program stresses building a sustained assessment capability by acting as a motivator, resource, and light coordinator with little central

authority over separate assessments. The reliance on climate scenarios from just one family of climate models may pose risks of
incomplete representation of key uncertainties.
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA)
examined the status, present trends, and longerterm challenges to the world’s ecosystems, including climate change and other stresses. One
of the assessment’s four working groups constructed scenarios of global ecosystems to 2050
and beyond, largely independently of the group
examining current status and trends. All assessment components used a common conceptual framework, which distinguished indirect
drivers of ecosystem change (e.g., population
and economic growth, technological change,
policies and lifestyles), direct drivers (e.g., climate change, air pollution, and land-use and
land-cover change), ecosystem indicators,
ecosystem services, measures of human wellbeing, and response options. The Scenarios
group applied this framework to characterizing
potential ecosystem stresses in 2050, with more
limited projections to 2100. The four scenarios
were based on two dimensions of uncertainty:
degree of globalization, and predominance of
proactive vs. reactive response to ecosystem
stresses. The qualitative storylines underlying
these scenarios were more richly developed than
in other climate-change scenario exercises.
Concerns with these scenarios pertained to the
degree of integration and consistency among
qualitative and quantitative scenario components; risks of logical circularity within scenarios; and unexplained similarity of projected
ecosystem effects among scenarios.

SCENARIOS
FOR CLIMATE CHANGE:
CHALLENGES AND
CONTROVERSIES
Scenarios and Decisions
Scenarios can inform climate-change mitigation
and adaptation decisions, but most uses so far
have had relatively indirect connections to such
decisions. Although there is no single global
climate-change decision-maker, scenarios can
inform the many decision-makers with diverse
responsibilities that will affect and be affected
by climate change. Three groups of decision3
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makers with distinct information needs can be
distinguished: mitigation policy-makers, who
are mostly but not exclusively national officials;
impacts and adaptation managers, including national officials and others who are responsible
for particular climate-sensitive assets, resources, or interests; and energy resource and
technology managers, who include owners, developers, and investors in energy resources and energy-related capital stock and new technologies.
A key issue in creating scenarios for all
decision-makers is how to represent decisions
within scenarios. In general, decisions by the
scenario user should be explicitly examined relative to baseline conditions specified in scenarios, while decisions by others outside their
control should be treated like any exogenous uncertainty. The issue is most important in the
treatment of mitigation decisions: scenarios to
inform mitigation should allow explicit examination of the entire relevant range of mitigation
decisions, while scenarios to inform impacts
and adaptation should specify the likely range
of mitigation efforts – usually yielding a narrower range of emissions futures than is considered in scenarios to inform mitigation.

Executive Summary
bearing on high-stakes policy decisions, but such
attempts to restrict scenarios should be resisted,
principally through prominent communication of
the reasoning, assumptions, and treatment of particular uncertainties underlying scenarios.

Scenario Development Process:
Expert-Stakeholder Interactions
Scenario developers must decide how and how
much to involve scenario users and stakeholders
in scenario development. In other fields – where
users are clearly identified – relatively few and
homogeneous, intensive collaboration between
scenario developers and users or their representatives is desirable. Close user involvement is
also advantageous in developing scenarios for
climate change, but potential users of these scenarios are more numerous and diverse, may not
be clearly identified, and may have contending
material interests in the scenarios’ content or
use. This situation calls for delicate decisions
about participation and representation to keep
scenarios tuned to practical users’ needs while
keeping the development process small enough
to be manageable.

Communication of Scenarios
Scenarios in Assessments
and Policy Debates
In climate-change assessments, scenarios can
provide required inputs to other parts of the
analysis and help to organize multiple components of the assessment. When scenarios are
used in a prominent assessment, they may subsequently be adopted in planning or decisionsupport processes outside the original
assessment. Scenarios can also help frame public and policy debate, in part by providing an aggregate metric of the issue’s severity. They
consequently may gain prominence in contentious policy debates, and so become subject
to political attempts to influence their content and
political criticism based on their perceived implications for policy action. The unavoidable
judgments underlying construction of scenarios
provide opportunity for partisan efforts to make
scenarios policy prescriptive, and for claims that
only certain scenarios are plausible (e.g., highor low-emissions scenarios, depending on the
critic’s motivation). These claims are unavoidable, since scenarios represent key uncertainties
4

Climate change scenarios must be communicated to multiple audiences with diverse interests and information needs. In addition to the
scenarios’ content, sufficient information must
be provided about the process and reasoning by
which the scenarios were developed, to allow
users to scrutinize the underlying data, models,
and reasoning; judge their confidence in the
scenarios; and have opportunities to critique the
scenarios and suggest alternative approaches.
Effective communication can help engage
a broad user community in updating and improving scenarios. Open communication of the
decisions, assumptions, and uncertainties underlying scenarios is likely to both increase
users’ confidence that the scenarios have reasonably represented current knowledge and key
uncertainties, and help them develop alternatives if they are unconvinced.

Global-Change Scenarios - Their Development and Use

Consistency and Integration
in Scenarios
Scenario developers should strive for internal
consistency. At one level, this means avoiding
clear contradictions with well-established
knowledge and not moving inadvertently outside bounds of historical experience – although
such sharp departures from experience may be
useful if pursued intentionally to examine lowprobability risks or broaden decision-makers’
perceptions. Perceptions of internal consistency
or coherence in scenarios ultimately rest on subjective judgments, which pose well-known risks
of bias if not carefully structured and controlled.
Potential inconsistencies grow when scenario
exercises use multiple models and attempt to
harmonize them, particularly when some key
quantities are externally specified for some
models and calculated within others. Attempting to avoid such inconsistency by standardizing
model outputs, however, can carry more serious
risks by obscuring interpretation of results and
precluding use of model variation to illuminate
uncertainty. Attempts to connect qualitative and
quantitative aspects of scenarios have been particularly challenging for pursuit of consistency.
Different narrative scenarios often reflect different assumptions about how the world works,
which correspond more closely to different
model structures than to parameter variation.
Better integrating the two approaches will require developing ways to connect narrative scenarios to model structures, rather than merely to
target values for a few variables that models are
then asked to reproduce.

Treatment of Uncertainty
in Scenarios
A scenario exercise can represent a few key uncertainties by variation among scenarios. Extreme economy is required in choosing which
uncertainties to represent, what variation (including potential extremes) to represent for each,
and how to combine them in a manageable number of scenarios. Complex narrative scenarios
pose special problems in representing and communicating uncertainty, usually addressed by
seeking underlying structural uncertainties –
e.g., deep societal trends such as globalization
or values shifts – that are judged to influence
many other factors of concern. The most promi-

nent controversy in treatment of uncertainty in
scenarios has concerned whether or not to explicitly assign probabilities to scenarios or associated ranges of quantitative outcome
variables. The debate rests in part on different
views of the typical contents of scenarios, since
subjective probabilities can readily be assigned
to ranges of one or two quantitative variables.
Explicit probability assignment in such simple
cases offers clear benefits for assessing alternative choices and avoids the risk of users assigning their own, perhaps less informed,
probability judgments. Assigning probabilities
to rich multivariate scenarios, particularly if
these include narrative elements, is much more
problematic, since there is no clearly defined interval “between” such scenarios and their
boundaries are not clearly defined.

CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
Use of Scenarios
in Climate-Change Decisions
• Scenarios can make valuable contributions
to climate-change decision-making. There
is a big gap between the use of scenarios in
current practice and their potential contributions, but interest in using scenarios is increasing.
• Scenarios of global emissions and resultant
climate change are required by many diverse
climate-related decision-makers, but beyond
these common requirements decision-makers’
needs from climate-change scenarios are
highly diverse.
• Impacts and adaptation managers include
both national officials and others responsible
for more specific domains of impact. They
need climate-change scenarios, driven by
specified global emissions scenarios, to represent potential climate-related stresses on
their areas of responsibility, plus other environmental and socio-economic information
at appropriate scales. Their combined needs
– for centrally produced climate scenario information, associated tools and support, and
a capability to develop and apply additional
scenario information related to their responsibilities – suggest the need for a cross-scale
organizational structure to provide scenario
information.
5
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• Mitigation policy-makers, who are mainly
but not exclusively national officials, need
scenarios of global and national emissions
trends, resultant climate change, and aggregate impacts. In addition, they need scenario
information about the potential policy environment for their choices, including alternative scenarios of other nations’ mitigation
strategies, international mitigation decisions,
and implementation and compliance. In
some cases, they can usefully employ targetdriven scenarios for backcasting analysis.
Mitigation decisions require scenario development capacity at the national level.
• Scenarios for mitigation decisions should include a wide range of baseline emissions assumptions and should not pre-judge the
likely level of mitigation effort, while scenarios for impact and adaptation managers
should be based on emissions assumptions
that include the range of mitigation interventions they judge likely.
• Energy resource and technology managers,
who are mainly private-sector actors, primarily need scenarios that represent alternative
policy regimes over the 30- to 50-year time
horizons relevant for investment and technology-development decisions. Scenarios
of emissions and climate change may provide background, but do not capture the
most important uncertainties for these
decision-makers.

Use of Scenarios
in Climate-Change Assessments
• Large-scale, official assessments are currently the main users of scenarios and will
likely remain major users. Scenarios in assessments mostly support further analysis,
modeling, and assessment. They can also
help frame the climate issue for the public
and policy-makers. Presentation of scenarios in assessments leads to additional unforeseen uses.
• Scenarios contain unavoidable elements of
judgment in their production and use. This
makes them vulnerable both to attempts at
bias and to partisan attack. The most productive response lies in transparency about the
process, reasoning, and assumptions used to
produce scenarios, which can both help limit
6
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bias in scenario production and focus subsequent argument on underlying uncertainties.

What Should Centrally Provided
Emissions and Climate Scenarios
Look Like?
• Centrally provided scenarios of emissions
and resultant climate change should be
global in scope, with major climate-relevant
emissions and other perturbations specified
at least for major world regions. They
should have a time horizon of a century or
longer, with interim results at roughly
decadal resolution.
• Centrally provided scenarios of global emissions and climate change can help inform
mitigation and adaptation decisions at national and sub-national scales, but such decisions require additional information at
these scales.
• Emissions scenarios of several types are
needed to serve diverse uses, including alternative baselines, alternative levels of incremental stringency of mitigation effort,
and specified future targets to support backcasting and feasibility analysis. Some emissions scenarios should be coupled to explicit
scenarios of wide-ranging alternative socioeconomic futures, but this is not necessary
for all uses. Scenarios should reflect various explicit degrees of coordination, including simple fully standardized scenarios for
evaluating and comparing downstream models, multi-model scenarios using common
input assumptions, and non-standardized
scenarios to explore alternative assumptions
or meet specific user needs.
• Some scenarios of socio-economic conditions should include qualitative and quantitative elements and sustained analytic efforts
to link the two. These elements can provide
a vehicle to explore major historical uncertainties with large implications for climate
change and vulnerability; provide a logical
structure to connect assumed trajectories for
multiple variables; and provide guidance to
other analysts or users to extend scenarios by
elaborating additional detail. Alternative qualitative and narrative elements should be linked
not just to alternative parameter values in
quantitative models, but also to alternative
forms of causal relations and model struc-
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tures.

Scenario Process:
Developer-User Interactions
• There is value in close collaboration between scenario developers and users, particularly at the beginning and ending stages of
a scenario exercise.
• The ease of achieving such collaboration
and its value are likely to be greater when
scenario users are clearly identified, few in
number, and similar in their interests
and perspectives.

Communication of Scenarios
• Effective communication of scenarios is essential, in forms useful to audiences of diverse interests and technical skills. In
addition to scenario contents, communication should include associated documentation, tools, and support.
• Transparency of underlying reasoning, assumptions, and major uncertainties is crucial. Such transparency is necessary to
support the credibility of scenarios, to alert
potential users to conditions under which
they might wish to use or modify them, and
to inform criticism and improvement
of scenarios.

Consistency and Integration
in Scenarios
• Any scenario should be internally consistent
in its assumptions and reasoning, to the extent this can be established.
• In scenario exercises that use multiple models to explore potential uncertainties in future conditions, consistency among models
should be pursued primarily through coordination of inputs, not outputs, except when
coordinated outputs represent common
goals for policy evaluation.
• Transparency in reporting scenario and
model differences as well as underlying assumptions and reasoning can help mitigate
the effects of inconsistencies among scenarios.

Treatment of Uncertainty
in Scenarios
• More explicit characterization of probability judgments should be included in some
future scenario exercises than has been practiced so far. Means available to express
these judgments are of widely varying specificity, ranging from agreed terminology to
explicitly quantified probability distributions. All such judgments should include
explicit acknowledgement of their inevitable
subjective elements and appropriate caveats.
• Explicit probability judgments are easiest to
produce and least controversial in scenarios
generated using quantitative models of climate change or specific impact domains.
These can be conditioned on specific assumptions for socio-economic inputs such as
emissions, and can represent explicitly and
quantitatively the effects of specified variation in initial conditions or unknown parameter values. These devices are also available,
although in less widespread use, in economic
models used to project emissions.
• Including explicit probability judgments is
likely to be most useful when key variables
are few, quantitative outcomes are needed,
and potential users are numerous and diverse. It is likely to be least useful when scenarios specify multiple characteristics,
including prominent qualitative elements;
when the purpose is sensitivity analysis or
heuristic exploration; and when potential
users are few, similar, and known.
• Because of their large and diverse set of potential users, centrally provided scenarios of
global emissions and climate change should
attempt to include some explicit probability
judgments for ranges of key quantitative
outputs, including global emissions and
global-average temperature change. These
should span a wide range of judged uncertainty on these variables, e.g., 95 to 99 percent. Providing such explicit likelihood
statements lets users choose whether to use
them or not.
• Scenario exercises should give more attention to low-probability, high-consequence
extreme cases, such as loss of a major con7
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tinental ice sheet or changes in meridional
ocean circulation. With these, it is especially
crucial to be explicit and transparent about
the reasoning and assumptions underlying
each scenario, including developers’ judgments of relative likelihoods.

Expanding and Sustaining Capacity
for Production and Use of Scenarios
• Present scenario capacity is inadequate. To
help fulfill these presently unmet needs, the
CCSP should establish a program to:
• Commission scenarios for use in assessments and decision-support activities.
• Disseminate scenarios with associated
documentation, tools, and guidance
materials.
• Commission various groups to evaluate
scenarios and their applications, and to
develop improved methods.
• Archive results and documentation
related to all these tasks, to provide
historical perspective and institutional
memory for future scenario-related activities.
• Design and management conditions of this
new program should include six elements.
• The program should build and maintain
strong connections with outside relevant
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expertise, and analytic and modeling capability.
• The program should integrate and balance goals and criteria related to scientific and technical quality, and those
related to utility and relevance to users.
• The program should be insulated from
political control.
• The program should strive for maximum
transparency in its own activities, in addition to demanding it from activities it
supports.
• The program will require the authority
and resources necessary to articulate and
promulgate standards for transparency,
consistency, and quality control.
• The program will require adequate sustained resources level of effort.

INTRODUCTION

Global-Change Scenarios - Their Development and Use

Introduction

This report examines the development and use of scenarios in global climate change applications.
It considers scenarios of various types – including but not limited to emissions scenarios – and
reviews how they have been developed, what uses they have served, what consistent challenges
they have faced, what controversies they have raised, and how their development and use might
be made more effective. The report is Synthesis & Assessment Product 2.1b of the US Climate
Change Science Program. By synthesizing available literature and critically reviewing past experience, the report seeks to assist those who may be conducting, using, or commissioning scenarios related to global climate change.
Scenarios are used to support planning and decision-making when issues have deep or poorly
characterized uncertainty and high stakes, often accompanied by long time horizons. These conditions apply to the major decisions about how to respond to global climate change. As scientific
research advances our knowledge of the climate’s present state and trends, its patterns of variability, and its responses to external forcings, we are gaining an increasingly clear view of risks that
may be realized late this century or beyond. These future risks are linked to near-term socio-economic trends and decisions in both public and private sectors. Some near-term decisions – such
as investment in long-lived capital equipment, new resources, or new technologies in the energy
sector – can influence long-term trends in the emissions contributing to climate change. Other
near-term decisions – such as investment in water resources infrastructure or coastal development – can influence how adaptable and how vulnerable future society will be to the impacts of
climate change.

9
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Despite pervasive
uncertainties, people
must make near-term
decisions related to
climate change that
have long-term
consequences,
including potential
irreversibilities.

10

Although such decisions are being made now,
making them responsibly requires considering
their potential consequences over the longer
term, including associated uncertainties. This
requires thinking about the future conditions
that will shape their consequences, not just next
month or next year but 10, 30, 50, or 100 years
in the future – longer periods than the horizon of
conventional methods of planning or analysis.2
Attempting to describe potential future conditions over this long time horizon presents a
seeming paradox. On the one hand, conditions
this far in the future, and the factors and actors
that may influence them, are deeply uncertain.3
On the other hand, we have a great deal of
knowledge that can help make informed assumptions about future conditions, even over
such long horizons. This includes well-established
scientific knowledge about physical, chemical,
and biological processes; more weakly, relatively well-established causal mechanisms in
economics, sociology, and politics; and more
weakly still, certain seemingly robust empirical
patterns of historical change in population, economics, and technology. All of these give some
guidance to support judgments about future
conditions that are more or less likely, virtually
certain, or virtually impossible. In some ways
we might be highly confident that the future will
resemble the present, e.g., in the radiative properties of atmospheric trace gases. In others, we
might judge it likely that future conditions will
lie within some envelope extrapolated from
present and past trends, e.g., in projecting rates
of change in fertility, mortality, or labor productivity. Still other areas, such as the development and social consequences of major
technological advances, or large-scale political
events such as wars, political realignments, or
epidemics, may hold more fundamental uncertainties. In some cases, such uncertainties may

2

Morgan et al. 1998.

3

Lempert et al. 2006.
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be adequately represented as wider distributions
of recognized uncertain quantities. In others,
they may represent events whose character or
even possibility we have not yet imagined.
Despite pervasive uncertainties, people must
make near-term decisions related to climate
change that have long-term consequences, including potential irreversibilities. Scenarios are
tools to help inform these decisions by gathering
and organizing relevant knowledge, organizing
associated uncertainties, and structuring and disciplining associated speculation. This report assesses experience to date in developing and using
scenarios for global climate change.
Early climate-change debates mainly concerned
scientific questions such as whether and how
the climate is changing, how much change is
caused by human activities, and how sensitive
the climate system is. Scenarios did not figure
prominently in these debates. But as advancing
climate science has increasingly shifted the debate from confirming and describing the climate-change problem toward deciding what to
do about it, the need for long-term decision-support tools like scenarios has increased, as have
the scrutiny and criticism these have attracted.4
In a contentious public-policy area like climate
change, controversy over scenarios is to be expected: scenarios are a method to structure and
communicate the most important uncertainties,
and conflicting judgments about uncertainties
are a major source of disagreements over what
to do. Consequently, we expect the trend of scenarios’ increasing prominence and contentiousness to continue – particularly for emissions
scenarios, since these are the relevant metric of
human environmental burden and the point of
most contested proposed intervention.

4

See, e.g., Lomborg 2001; Michaels 2003b; Castles
and Henderson 2003a, b; UK House of Lords 2005.
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In this report, we try to cast some light on current and coming debates over climate-change
scenarios. These debates presently exhibit basic
confusion about the definition, purposes, and
potential uses of scenarios. We aim to provide
clarification and practical advice to two related
audiences: those conducting assessments or
analyses that develop or use scenarios; and
those commissioning, using, and interpreting
such assessments or analyses. For the first
group, we seek to provide an organized summary of relevant experience in similar efforts,
discussion and clarification of key choices and
challenges, and – to the extent present knowledge allows – practical guidance about pitfalls,
challenges, and opportunities in particular approaches. For the second group, we seek to provide guidance on what to ask for, how and how
much to participate in its production, how to interpret the results, and what questions to ask.
Because the charge of this report is unlike those
of other Synthesis and Assessment products, the
approach we have taken to producing it is necessarily different as well. We were tasked with
reviewing, interpreting, and evaluating experience with scenario methods in global climate
change applications. This is not a narrowly focused question, and there is not a well-developed scientific literature on which we can draw
for answers. While we have reviewed the existing literature on scenarios, most of it concerns
scenarios in other decision domains than global
climate change. In addition, we have examined
several major scenario exercises in global-change
applications. In this, we have drawn on published
materials, both from the exercises themselves and
from commentary and criticism, as well as documentary materials and records, interviews with
participants and users, and the experience and
judgments of team members.

Our review of this experience has not been entirely independent, since members of this writing team were involved as participants,
reviewers, and critics in two of the scenario exercises we review, the IPCC SRES process and
the US National Assessment. While we have
drawn on the experience of these team members, we have attempted to limit the risk of idiosyncratic interpretations and bias by drawing on
other sources as well and by engaging all team
members in developing our summary and discussions of these exercises. Moreover, our purpose is not to either attack or defend these past
exercises, but to seek to understand the decisions made in conducting them, the factors that
influenced them, and the constraints under
which they operated, in order to assess their experience, identify successes and pitfalls, and to
the extent possible, provide guidance to advance
scenario methods for climate change and other
similar environmental issues. Because the experience we review does not provide a sufficiently
large or random sample to support strong scientific inference, the diagnoses, interpretations, and
recommendations we present rely on our collective judgment. We have endeavored to follow our
own advice, and be as transparent as possible
about the foundation and reasoning underlying
our conclusions and recommendations.

We aim to provide
clarification and
practical advice to two
related audiences:
those conducting
assessments or
analyses that use
scenarios; and those
commissioning, using,
and interpreting such
assessments or
analyses.

The report is organized as follows. Drawing on
the broader literature on scenarios – most of
which concerns domains other than climate
change – Section 1 introduces scenarios, sharpens their definition, and outlines a few major dimensions of variation and decisions that must
be made in developing a scenario exercise. Section 2 focuses specifically on scenarios for
global climate change, and outlines the types of
decisions that could use scenarios and the main
types of scenarios that have been developed for
this issue. Section 3 reviews four major expe-
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riences in developing and using global-change
scenarios. Section 4 discusses several issues that
have posed key challenges in climate-change scenarios and that are likely to require particular attention in designing new scenario exercises. In
addition to drawing on Section 3, this discussion
also makes use of briefer discussions of eight
other examples of global-change scenarios that
illustrate particular issues or challenges; these examples are presented as short boxes in Section 4.
Section 5 provides our conclusions and recommendations for future development and use of
global climate-change scenarios.
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Global-Change Scenarios - Their Development and Use

SECTION

1

Scenarios,
Their Characteristics
and Uses

1.1 DEFINING SCENARIOS

A scenario is a description of potential future conditions, developed to inform decision-making
under uncertainty. The decisions in question can be faced by individuals, groups, organizations, or
governments, and may pertain to any subject matter. While many writers on scenarios give no explicit definition, others have offered a wide range of definitions, often substantially more complex and
restrictive than this one. The published definitions gathered in Box 1.1 give a sense of both the
broad commonalities among many analysts’ conceptions and the significant differences among them.

BOX 1.1 Scenarios: a Sampling of Published Definitions.
A scenario is a coherent, internally consistent, and plausible description of a possible future state
of the world.5
A scenario is a story that describes a possible future. It identifies some significant events, the main
actors and their motivations, and it conveys how the world functions. Building and using scenarios
can help people explore what the future might look like and the likely challenges of living in it.6
Scenarios are images of the future, or alternative futures.They are neither predictions nor forecasts.
Rather, each scenario is one alternative image of how the future might unfold. A set of scenarios assists in the understanding of possible future developments of complex systems. Some systems, those
that are well understood and for which complete information is available, can be modeled with
some certainty, as is frequently the case in the physical sciences, and their future states predicted.
However, many physical and social systems are poorly understood, and information on the relevant
variables is so incomplete that they can be appreciated only through intuition and are best communicated by images and stories. Prediction is not possible in such cases.7
continued on next page

5

IPCC 2001b:149.

6

Shell International 2003.

7

Nakicenovic and Swart 2000:62.
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BOX 1.1, continued from previous page.

A climate scenario is a plausible representation of future climate that has been constructed for explicit use in investigating the potential impacts of anthropogenic climate change. Climate scenarios
often make use of climate projections (descriptions of the modeled response of the climate system
to scenarios of greenhouse gas and aerosol concentrations), by manipulating model outputs and
combining them with observed climate data.8
[Scenarios] are created as internally consistent and challenging descriptions of possible futures.
They are intended to be representative of the ranges of possible future developments and outcomes in the external world. What happens in them is essentially outside our own control.9
Scenarios are coherent, internally consistent and plausible descriptions of possible future states of
the world, used to inform future trends, potential decisions, or consequences. They can be considered as a convenient way of visioning a range of possible futures, constructing worlds outside the
normal timespans and processes covering the public policy environment.10
Scenarios are plausible, challenging, and relevant sets of stories about how the future might unfold.
They are generally developed to help decision-makers understand the wide range of potential futures, confront critical uncertainties, and understand how decisions made now may play out in the
future. They are intended to widen perspectives and illuminate key issues that might otherwise be
missed or dismissed. The goal of developing scenarios is often to support more informed and
rational decision-making that takes both the known and the unknown into account.11

The historical uses of scenarios for planning and
analysis lie in war games, exercises of simulated
conflict used for military training, planning, and
operational decision-making. The roots of war
games extend to antiquity, although the first formalized war games were developed for officer
training in 19th-century Prussia.12 In the 1940s
and 1950s, exercises resembling war games
began to be applied outside the purely military
domain, to study potential international crises
that included both high-level political decisionmaking and the potential for military conflict.
These exercises were informed by the then-new
field of game theory, which promised new formal insights into situations of conflict and
strategic decision-making,13 motivated by the
recognition that the new nuclear age had both
raised the stakes of international diplomacy and
created profound new uncertainties over how to
proceed. In these exercises, principally devel-
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8

IPCC 2001a:741.

9

van der Heijden 1996:5.

10

Berkhout et al. 2001:i.

11

MEA 2006:xvii.

12

Brewer and Shubik 1979.

13

Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944, Nash 1950.

oped at the Rand Corporation, scenarios were
sketches of challenging but plausible situations
to which participants had to respond, allowing
exploration of associated threats and opportunities. They adopted the term “scenario” from
film and theatre, where it denotes a brief sketch
of a story that includes only enough detail to
convey broad points of plot and character. As in
classic war games, scenarios in these exercises
served to help organizations and their leaders
prepare for novel, complex challenges that they
might not anticipate, and which – if they did
arise – would likely develop too fast to allow adequate reflection or analysis in real time.14
Over the past few decades, the use of scenarios
has moved outside the realm of military and
diplomatic activity. Beginning with strategic
planning at the Royal Dutch/Shell oil company,15 scenarios are now widely used for strategic planning, analysis, and assessment by

14

Levine 1964a,b; Schelling 1964; DeWeerd 1967,
1975; Brewer and Shubik 1979.

15

For relevant history, see Hausrath 1971, Shubik 1975,
Greenberger et al. 1983, Huss 1988, Schoemaker 1995,
Schultz and Sullivan 1972, Schwartz 1991, Shell International 2003.
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businesses and other organizations. They have
also figured increasingly prominently in planning, analysis, and policy debate for long-term
environmental issues, in particular global climate change. Because the total body of experience with scenarios provides useful insights into
their use in any particular domain, this section
elaborates the meaning, characteristics, and potential uses of scenarios in general. The next
section turns to their specific use for global environmental issues.

1.1.1 Distinguishing scenarios from
assessments, models, and analyses
Confusion is widespread in discussions of scenarios, because their form and usage are highly
diverse, and because writers’ uses of the term
are often imprecise and occasionally contradictory. Scenarios must be distinguished, on the
one hand, from assessments and various types
of decision support activity that often use scenarios; and, on the other hand, from other types
of statements about future conditions, such as
predictions, projections, or forecasts.
An assessment is any process that reviews and
synthesizes scientific or other expert knowledge
to provide information of relevance to policyor decision-makers.16 The most common methods of assessment are deliberations of expert
panels and formal models, but other methods
combine human deliberations with formal
analysis or modeling, including war games or
other simulation games, policy exercises,
political-military exercises, constructing future
histories, backcasting, and others.17 These methods may use specifications of potential future
conditions – i.e., scenarios – as inputs to or
components of their work. Scenarios may even
be essential for some of these methods. For example, a war or crisis gaming exercise needs a
scenario to specify the nature of the threat or crisis, while a formal model used to represent future development of some issue of concern needs
a scenario to specify future values of those inputs
not explicitly calculated within the model. But
these methods are broader than and distinct from

16
17

Parson 2003:9; Mitchell et al. 2006.
NRC 1996; Hausrath 1971; Brewer 1986; Shubik
1975; Svedin and Aniansson 1987; Schultz and Sullivan 1972; Jones 1985; Parson 1996, 1997.

scenarios. For example, models do not need scenario-based inputs when used to reconstruct past
conditions or study causal processes.
The distinction between assessments and scenarios is perhaps clearest in conventional assessments based on deliberations of expert
panels, such as the IPCC, US National Assessment, or Millennium Ecosystem Assessment
(MEA). Such assessments often construct representations of future development of an issue,
usually based on formal models. These representations require scenario-based inputs and
may produce outputs that are themselves used
as scenarios in other activities. But the scenario-related activities are frequently not the
central focus of the overall assessment, which
may examine many additional things, e.g., the
state of knowledge in particular scientific areas,
the status of and trends in particular environmental conditions, the evidence attributing particular environmental changes to human inputs,
or particular policy-relevant scientific questions. Assessments may also include evaluations of proposed actions or proposed criteria
for conducting such evaluations. Scenarios thus
may provide required inputs to assessments, but
are distinct from them.

Scenarios have figured
increasingly prominently
in planning, analysis, and
policy debate for longterm environmental
issues, in particular
global climate change.

1.1.2 Distinguishing scenarios from
projections, predictions, and
forecasts
Scenarios must also be distinguished from other
types of statements about the future, such as
predictions, projections, and forecasts. All of
these satisfy the basic definition above: they
are descriptions of potential future conditions
whose primary purpose in most cases is to support decisions. How can scenarios be distinguished? Examining the ways scenarios are
used and discussed by practitioners and researchers suggests four characteristics that distinguish them from other types of future
statements. Although these characteristics are
not essential, they are all more likely to be present in scenarios than in other types of future
statement, so they help to sharpen and delimit
the definition of a scenario.
First, scenarios are multi-dimensional: they describe multiple characteristics that collectively
make up a coherent representation of future
15
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conditions. To achieve this, scenarios assemble
and organize available knowledge, information,
and assumptions from diverse bodies of
research and expert judgment. The elements of
a scenario can be of diverse types: quantitative
or qualitative, precise or fuzzy, based on
well-established research or informed speculation. Effective scenarios integrate their diverse
elements in a way that is coherent, communicates a clear theme or organizing principle, and
avoids internal contradiction.
Effective scenarios
integrate their diverse
elements in a way that
is coherent,
communicates a clear
theme or organizing
principle, and avoids
internal contradiction.

Second, scenarios are schematic: that is, they
are multidimensional but not without limit.
Scenarios do not seek to describe potential
future conditions with complete precision or detail. Rather, they highlight essential characteristics and processes with enough detail that
knowledgeable observers perceive them as realistic and relevant, but not so much as to distract from large-scale patterns. Indeed, one
potential use of scenarios is to stimulate creative
thinking and insights, for which they must leave
something to the imagination. How much detail
and precision is appropriate is a judgment that
depends on the particular application.
Third, scenarios usually come in groups. To be
a useful tool to inform decision-making under
uncertainty, scenarios must represent uncertainty. This is most often done by providing
multiple scenarios, each presenting an alternative realization of uncertain future conditions.18
The number of scenarios depends on the application. Scenario exercises usually use between
two and seven, depending on the stakes of the
issue, the resources invested in the exercise, and
the depth of analysis devoted to each scenario.
The most frequently proposed numbers are
three or four.
Finally, scenarios tend to claim less confidence
than other types of future statements. Although
different authors’ usage is not consistent, “prediction” and “forecast” usually denote statements for which the highest confidence is
claimed. “Projection” denotes a less confident
statement, which may have some specified con-

18

16

Crisis-response exercises are often an exception, presenting one scenario at a time showing a novel challenge, to which participants must respond and which
is implicitly contrasted to the status quo.

Section 1 - Scenarios, Their Characteristics and Uses
fidence level and may be explicitly contingent
on specified assumptions about other future
conditions. Calling a future statement a “scenario” usually implies still less confidence and
more associated contingencies. Any use of a
scenario for serious planning or analysis does,
however, presume some minimal threshold of
likelihood. The situation described must be
judged likely enough to merit attention, and to
justify expending resources and effort to study
its implications and potential responses to it.
There may also be a time ordering among these
three types of statements – predictions or forecasts tend to describe nearer-term futures and
scenarios longer-term futures – but there are exceptions, and the meaning of near term and long
term depend on the particular context.

1.2. CREATING A
SCENARIO EXERCISE:
KEY CHARACTERISTICS
AND CHOICES
Beyond these general characteristics, scenarios
vary greatly in their use, production, and contents. Extensive scholarly effort has gone into
providing alternative scenario taxonomies.19
Scenarios can be distinguished, for example, by
whether they present a snapshot of a future state
or a dynamic account of changes over time to
reach that state; by their degree of complexity;
by the relative balance of deliberation and intuition versus formal analysis used in producing
them; or by their temporal and spatial scale.
The set of characteristics on which scenarios
could be sorted is long and open-ended, so we
make no attempt to provide an exhaustive list.
Instead, we summarize the main dimensions of
scenario variation in the form of a list of potentially open-ended design choices.

1.2.1 Variation among scenarios:
three basic dimensions
Three dimensions of variation, concerned with
the purpose of a scenario exercise, have farreaching implications for its design and use and
so merit separate discussion. First, the intended
use of a scenario exercise can vary from the
more predictive to the more exploratory or

19

See, e.g., Duncan and Wack 1994, Godet and Roubelat 1996, van Notten et al. 2003.
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heuristic. It is of course a fundamental error to
take a scenario’s illustrative description of potential future conditions as a confident prediction of what will actually happen – in our
terminology, to take a scenario as a projection or
even a prediction.20 Still, a scenario must be
judged likely enough to merit the attention of
busy people. Exploratory uses of scenarios may
presume only this low threshold, yet have great
value. For example, scenarios can be used to
probe and challenge the mental models, thought
habits, and unrecognized assumptions of
decision-makers; to clarify points of agreement
and disagreement; to identify and engage
needed participants; to provide a preliminary
structure for advance analysis of potential future decisions; or to seek insights into unrecognized opportunities, risks, causal linkages, or
uncertainties.21 Such insights can arise not just
from examination of uncertainties, but also
from meticulous critical examination of future
factors that are essentially certain (e.g., strongly
determined demographic trends such as the
aging of industrialized-country populations) or
even of present conditions whose significance
has been overlooked.22 Still, the predictive confidence accorded to scenarios is a matter of degree: carefully developed scenarios that are
judged to have captured the most important uncertainties may claim some moderate degree of
confidence, and reasonable distinctions may be
drawn between scenarios that represent conventional versus surprising futures, best and worst
cases, etc.
A related dimension of variation among scenario exercises is their proximity to decisionmaking.23 Scenario exercises may involve
actual decision-makers and seek to directly advise a specific, identified, near-term decision,
but more frequently their relationship to con-

20
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Several such errors are collected and discussed in
Bracken 1977, 1990; and Brewer 1990.

crete decisions and decision-makers is indirect.
Scenarios may be used for risk assessment, contingency planning, identification of potential
threats or actions to be considered, or early characterization of a poorly understood issue. In
such applications, exploratory uses dominate.
Scenario exercises that are closer to decisions
with significant stakes operate under very different requirements, usually driven by specific
user needs. Their uses tend to be more predictive – constrained by limits of available knowledge – so they might be expected, for example,
to provide more explicit and complete characterization of major uncertainties. They are also
likely to be more integrated with methods to
evaluate alternative choices and identify preferred ones.
A third basic dimension of variation concerns
whether scenarios are defined primarily normatively, on the basis of their perceived desirability or undesirability, or primarily on the basis of
their perceived plausibility or likelihood. Although all scenarios include both positive and
normative elements, it is important to keep as
clear as possible which elements are included
based on perceived likelihood or plausibility
and which because of perceived desirability or
undesirability. The most frequent use of explicitly normative scenarios involves constructing some hypothetical future state primarily on
the basis of its desirability. Such a future might
be constructed to embody participants’ general
intuitions about desirable social trends, or to
achieve specific environmental, development,
or other goals.24 The scenario exercise then consists primarily of backcasting – attempting to
construct paths that connect present conditions
to the specified future conditions, to examine
the feasibility of the target, and identify costs,
tradeoffs, and conditions associated with meeting it.25 Similarly, one can posit an undesirable
future state and then reason through conditions
associated with avoiding it. This approach is

Scenarios can be used
to probe and
challenge the mental
models, thought
habits, and
unrecognized
assumptions of
decision-makers; to
clarify points of
agreement and
disagreement; to
identify and engage
needed participants;
to provide a
preliminary structure
for advanced analysis
of potential future
decisions; or to seek
insights into
unrecognized
opportunities, risks,
causal linkages, or
uncertainties.

Brewer 1990.

22

Shell International 2001, 2003. For example, in a
1960s crisis exercise on a Soviet invasion of Iran, one
participant realized the local supply of jet fuel available to support a rapid US response was ten times
larger than had been thought, because kerosene – an
acceptable substitute – was used for domestic cooking
and heating (Schelling 1994).
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This dimension is presented by Van Notten et al. 2003
as “exploration” versus “decision support.”
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See, for example, the simple scenario exercise in
NRC (1999:161-176) that posited specific targets to reduce world hunger and greenhouse-gas emissions by
year 2050, or the scenarios of the Global Scenario
Group, which included some defined by specified
trends and others back-cast from normatively specified
targets for 2050 (Kemp-Benedict et al. 2002, Raskin et
al. 2002).
Robinson 1982, 2003.
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sometimes proposed to reduce the risks of hidden bias in construction of scenarios which, like
any decision support tool, can be misused to
provide support for a decision already made for
other reasons, rather than to inform a decision
not yet made. By bundling normative assumptions into the future target state or boundary
conditions, analysts hope to reduce their penetration into the subsequent instrumental reasoning about actions and conditions to reach the
target.26
But whether the
relationship of a
scenario exercise to
decisions is near or far,
direct or indirect, clear
understanding of its
focus and purpose is
important, and
infrequently achieved.

1.2.2 Developing scenarios:
main dimensions of choice
Table 1.1 extends the preceding discussion,
summarizing the main areas of variation and
choice involved in constructing a scenario exercise. This is a highly simplified representation of a complex set of choices. In any
particular scenario exercise some of these
choices may be made by default, without explicit consideration, perhaps because the preferred choice is obvious in context. Although
we present these choices in simple sequential
order, this is not necessary: choices might be
made in some other order, or iteratively adjusted. But while the process and sequence of
choices may be idealized, the set of choices is
not: creating a scenario requires explicit or implicit choices on all these dimensions.

Table 1.1. Idealized Sequence of Major Choices
in Scenario Development.
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The most basic choices in developing scenarios,
which include the three dimensions of variation
called out above, involve identifying the main
focus of the exercise: what issues are to be addressed or what decisions informed, for whom?
The decision to conduct a scenario-based exercise does not necessarily imply that these matters are clearly understood. The closer a
scenario exercise is to concrete decisions, the
more likely it is that these definitional issues
will be understood clearly, in part through discipline on the process imposed by the involvement of decision-makers. But most often, the
coupling of scenarios to decisions is relatively
weak.27 In some applications (e.g., corporate
strategic planning, responding to a novel military threat) the relevant decision-makers may be
clearly identified at the outset, but the issues to
be addressed and relevant choices may not be.
In other applications, scenarios may be developed to address some broad issue or concern
(e.g., climate change, emerging infectious diseases, or terrorism), but the potential users and
decisions to be informed might both be unspecified. But whether the relationship of a scenario
exercise to decisions is near or far, direct or indirect, clear understanding of its focus and purpose is important, and infrequently achieved:
many scenario exercises muddle through with
vagueness, confusion, or disagreement regarding the focus, purpose, and intended user of the
exercise. Clarifying the overall focus of a scenario exercise may require broad consultations
or scoping workshops involving many potentially interested decision-makers, other stakeholders, and analysts and researchers.

Main focus, framing, users, question(s) to be addressed
Process and participation
Key uncertainties to explore: how many, over what range
Narrative, quantitative, or both
Level of complexity (number of quantitative variables, detail of narrative)
Specific variables and factors to specify
Time horizon and spatial extent
Temporal and spatial resolution
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This approach does not preclude such misuse: if a
goal is strongly desired, scenarios are at risk of conscious or unconscious bias to make it look easy. Japanese war-games of the Battle of Midway provide striking
examples (Bracken 1977).

A second basic set of decisions concerns the
process by which scenarios are developed. Like
the focus of the exercise, decisions about the
process of developing scenarios often receive
little thought, or are not even explicitly recognized as choices, but are nonetheless highly
consequential. What expertise must be included
to ensure the scenarios adequately reflect the
best available scientific knowledge, data, and
models? What decision-makers, stakeholders,
or their surrogates must be involved to keep the
scenarios relevant, plausible, and credible? For
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E.g., note the predominance of scenarios on the “exploration,” rather than the “decision support” side in
the survey of Van Notten et al. 2003.
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scenario exercises that must integrate knowledge from diverse domains, individual participants’ knowledge, flexibility, and imagination
can be as important as the disciplines or stakeholder groups they represent. How intensively,
for how long, and by what means will participants interact? Will the process be open to outside observers or participants? How and when
will feedback on the scenarios be sought, and
how will it be used? How and to whom will results be communicated? And crucially, how
will the be process be led, and how will disagreements be resolved? With good leadership,
resolving differences in a scenario exercise can
be less arbitrary and more illuminating than in
other group tasks; when disagreements persist
after careful examination, they can be treated as
important uncertainties to be retained as alternative scenarios, not suppressed by picking a
winner, splitting the difference, or retreating to
vague language.
Whatever process is chosen, a series of substantive choices must be made about what goes into
the scenarios. The most important of these concern what key uncertainties will be explored, and
how much richness and detail should be included
in scenarios to illuminate these.
What uncertainties are to be explored, and how?
Many dimensions of uncertainty may be relevant to the issue being examined, but only a few
can be examined explicitly in any scenario exercise. Defining these is a crucial choice that
shapes much of what follows in a scenario exercise. For those uncertainties judged most important, alternative outcomes are usually
represented in alternative scenarios. For example, scenarios might present high- and lowgrowth futures, or alternative forms that a
competitive threat might take. Other uncertainties judged less crucial are usually suppressed
by presenting a single “best guess” or “reference case.” The few key uncertainties chosen
can be represented in the number and character
of scenarios, depending on the intended use. A
particular uncertainty might be represented by
high and low values of some quantity, or by a
reference case supplemented with high and/or
low variants. If two or more uncertainties interact, they can be represented by scenarios that
combine different outcomes of each: in the simplest form, two interacting uncertainties can be

represented by four scenarios, often illustrated
by a two-by-two matrix.28 Several alternative
scenarios might seek to span a plausible range
for some key quantitative variable, or present
distinct qualitative outcomes for a single uncertainty, e.g., three types of competitive threat, or
three political futures for a region in turmoil.
Alternatively, scenarios can represent plausible
extreme or “worst-case” scenarios, to assess the
robustness of decisions or strategies.
How rich and complex should each scenario be?
Defining scenarios as we have, as multivariate
Many dimensions of
but synoptic, still leaves a wide range of levels
uncertainty may be
of complexity to choose from. At one extreme,
relevant to the issue
scenarios may specify time-paths for just a few
being examined, but only
quantitative variables, or even just one. Such
a few can be examined
scenarios are common, e.g., in applications such
explicitly in any
as analyzing a firm’s profitability under alterscenario
exercise.
native scenarios for oil prices, or projecting tax
revenues under alternative scenarios of productivity growth and inflation, often in a standard
“high, middle, low” format. A scenario can accommodate more complexity by projecting additional quantitative variables, but as the
number of variables increases, so also does the
need for an organizing principle or gestalt to tie
them together in a non-arbitrary way.
At the other extreme, the core of a set of scenarios can be a set of rich, coherent narratives,
an approach frequently called the Shell approach.29 Each narrative, described principally
in text, reflects a distinct conception of how the
world might develop with a persuasive underlying causal logic. A narrative scenario can stand
alone but may also include specifications of important quantitative variables, e.g., of population or economic growth, consistent with the
broad causal logic underlying the scenario. The
narrative provides the context and explanatory
logic that tie together the time-paths of quantitative variables, although particular time-paths
are regarded as illustrating, not defining, the
scenario – i.e., a different scenario would present substantially different time-paths or relationships among them.

28

Alternative interpretations of this matrix structure are
discussed in van’t Klooster and van Asselt 2006.

29

Van der Heijden 1996; Wack 1985a,b; Schwartz
1991; Shell International 2003.
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The choice of how rich and complex to make
scenarios has far-reaching implications for the
process of developing the scenarios, what can
be done with them, and the uses they can serve.
The two extreme approaches imply large differences in how uncertainty is treated, what aspects
of the problem receive attention, and the relationship between scenarios and their users,
which we discuss for climate-change scenarios
in Section 4. Richer and more complex scenarios require more time and effort to develop,
whether based on quantitative models, narratives, or both. Complex, narrative-based scenarios may require many person-months of
development to become realistic, relevant, and
persuasive, with consistent relationships among
scenario elements. In return for the extra effort,
this approach allows great flexibility in the way
potential futures are described. Narratives can
convey different aspects of a future situation
with varying degrees of salience or specificity,
and they can compactly convey the tone or character of a future situation by allusion, where a
precise specification would appear arbitrary or
labored. The narrative approach avoids limiting the defining characteristics of a scenario to
any particular set of pre-specified variables, but
attempts to be alert to a wide range of potentially important characteristics and mechanisms
of causal influence. Proponents of this approach argue that a coherent narrative at the
core of a scenario is necessary to avoid arbitrariness in specifying multiple variables, and to
make the exercise useful to decision-makers:
“Most scenarios merely quantify alternative
outcomes of obvious uncertainties (for example, the price of oil may be $20 or $40 a barrel
in 1995). Such scenarios are not helpful to decision-makers”.30
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Wack 1985a:74.

Section 1 - Scenarios, Their Characteristics and Uses
The remaining substantive choices in specifying a scenario follow from the preceding largescale choices. They include specifying the time
horizon and spatial extent of the scenarios, deciding the particular elements to include, and
the temporal and spatial resolution at which scenario outputs are stated. Decisions about temporal resolution (e.g., hourly to multi-decadal)
and spatial resolution (e.g., regional, national,
continental scales) are particularly important
when – as is often the case in global-change applications – scenarios are produced or used by
quantitative models. Such models may have very
precise requirements for the specification and
resolution of inputs and outputs, creating the possibility for serious mismatches between what
users need or expect, and what scenario developers feel comfortable and competent providing.
This section has discussed the uses, types, and
characteristics of scenarios broadly, in any application area. The next section narrows the
focus to climate change and related areas of
global environmental change, summarizing the
types of scenarios that have been used and proposed, and that might be required, to explore
and inform decision-making in this area.

Global-Change Scenarios - Their Development and Use

SECTION

2

Scenarios in
Global-Change Analysis
and Decision Support

Analysts have tried to develop scenarios to support understanding of and decision-making for
global environmental issues, beginning with the global models of the mid-1970s and early assessment of acid rain and stratospheric ozone in the late 1970s to early 1980s.31 The reasons for using
scenarios in global change are similar to those that apply in other decision domains: high-stakes
decisions that must be made under deep uncertainty about the conditions that will determine
their consequences, the values at stake, or the relevant set of choices and actors. As in other domains, well-designed scenario exercises can provide a structure for assessing alternative choices
and help focus on the nature of the issue, the relevant choices and actors, the values that might
be at stake, and the types of research or analysis that might help clarify preferred choices.
For climate-change applications, scenario exercises have been conducted and sponsored by governments, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and collaborative groups.
While these have been diverse in form, details, and purposes, they have tended to focus more on
heuristic and exploratory uses than on supporting specific decisions. The boundaries of the climate-change issue are not sharply defined, however: climate change implicates and connects to
many other areas of policy, including energy, agriculture, hazard protection, and broad questions
of economic development. Consequently, there is substantial uncertainty about what all the relevant decisions, decision-makers, and potentially affected values are. While some decisions are
clearly of primary relevance to climate change, many other decisions that appear to be connected
have not yet incorporated consideration of climate change or even recognized the connection.
Reflecting these fuzzy boundaries of the issue, scenario exercises developed for climate change
have overlapped with other exercises primarily focused on ecosystems, energy, and broad issues
of world development. The fuzziness of the climate issue’s definition increases the challenge of
developing useful scenarios, but also increases the potential value of well-crafted and executed scenario exercises.
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See, e.g., Meadows et al. 1972, Barney 1981; summary of early ozone assessments in Parson 2003; and
summary history of scenarios in global-change applications in Swart et al. 2004. What was the earliest scenario work in global change depends, of course, on how
the boundaries of global change are defined. Kahn and
Wiener 1967 might be considered an early example.
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To date, most climaterelated uses of
scenarios have not
examined decisions
directly, but have been
embedded in larger
exercises of
assessment, modeling,
or characterization of
the issue.

Section 2 - Scenarios in Global-Change Analysis and Decision Support

The decisions most directly related to climate
change are conventionally sorted into two categories, mitigation and adaptation.32 Mitigation
consists of actions that reduce the human perturbations of the climate system, by reducing
net anthropogenic greenhouse-gas emissions.
Adaptation consists of actions to reduce the
harm or increase the benefit from climate
change and its impacts. Despite uncertainty
about the precise decision agenda, we can identify in general terms the type of information scenarios might provide that would be useful to each
type of decision.
Scenarios can help inform adaptation decisions
by characterizing the nature and severity of relevant potential impacts; identifying key vulnerabilities, particularly those that might not
otherwise have been recognized; identifying research or monitoring priorities that might give
advance warning about impacts, particularly
acute vulnerabilities; expanding the perceived
set of potential responses; and providing a
framework for evaluating alternative adaptation
measures. They may also help to clarify the
time structure of relevant decisions, identifying
those near-term decisions that might have important but under-recognized connections to future impacts and vulnerability.
Similarly, scenarios can help inform mitigation
decisions by characterizing the potential impacts of climate change and their severity, since
these provide the motivation for mitigation.
But, in addition, mitigation decisions can benefit from information about potential emissions
trends, which determine the nature of the challenge of limiting emissions; about potential
pathways of the extraction and depletion of current energy resources and development of new
ones; and about potential pathways of technological development. Mitigation decisions may
also benefit from scenarios representing the potential policy context in which they are made.
To date, most climate-related uses of scenarios have not examined decisions directly, but
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While this categorization has frequently been criticized for neglecting actions with overlapping effects
and the third category of direct interventions in the climate system (Schelling 1983, Keith 2000, Keith et al.
2006, Parson 2006), it remains a useful approximation
for most currently proposed responses.

have been embedded in larger exercises of
assessment, modeling, or characterization of
the issue. These uses have included formal
integrated-assessment models,33 comprehensive
assessments conducted by multi-disciplinary expert bodies (e.g., IPCC), and more narrowly focused assessment exercises targeting specific
aspects of the climate-change issue. In these
uses, scenarios represent components of the
climate-change issue that are required inputs to
an assessment or model.
The causal logic of the climate-change issue is
complex, including multiple two-way causal
links and feedbacks among socio-economic,
geophysical, and ecological systems.
Integrated-assessment models seek to represent
many of these linkages and feedbacks explicitly; Figure 2.1 shows a typical example of the
“wiring diagrams” that illustrate the increasingly dense linkages and feedbacks represented
in these models. But while such diagrams
might be taken to indicate that all relationships
are represented explicitly within the model – endogenously – this is not the case. All models of
the climate-change issue rely on scenarios to
specify some future quantities exogenously, and
in virtually all cases, scenario-specified inputs
are not modified to account for results of the
subsequent analysis: i.e., they are truly exogenous, and the causal logic does not close.
When scenarios are used to specify exogenous
inputs to a model of some aspect of the climatechange issue, the causal logic of the analysis can
be greatly simplified from that shown in Figure
2.1. Instead, the logic can be represented by a
simple linear structure that extends from human
activities to emissions to climate change to impacts. Figure 2.2 shows this highly simplified
structure. This representation is even more suitable for the uses of scenarios in other types of
global-change assessments, which have been organized around much simpler causal structures
than those that integrated-assessment models
seek to represent. Note that we are not claiming
this simple logical structure adequately represents the true structure of the climate-change
issue: only that it illustrates the ways that scenarios have been used to provide exogenous inputs
to global-change models and assessments.
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Weyant et al. 1996, Parson and Fisher-Vanden 1997.
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Figure 2.1. Wiring Diagram for Integrated Assessment
models of climate change. (Source:Weyant et al. 1996)
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This linear logical structure allows a simple,
practical categorization of five types of scenarios that have been developed for the climatechange issue. These types are defined by what
quantities they specify and what primary area
of analysis they provide input to. Their differences can be represented by where they cut the
causal chain in Figure 2.2, with the scenario
specifying quantities lying on one side of the
cut, and the assessment or other activity using
the scenario lying on the other side. The next
five subsections discuss these five types of climate-change-related scenarios in turn.

2.1. EMISSIONS SCENARIOS
FOR FUTURE CLIMATE
SIMULATIONS
Scenarios of greenhouse-gas emissions, sometimes including other human perturbations such

SOCIOECONOMIC
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• population
• GDP
• energy system
• industry
• technology
• agriculture,
land-use

as land-use change, are the best known type of
climate-change related scenario. Emissions
scenarios provide required inputs to model calculations of future climate change, as shown in
Figure 2.3. As the focus and intended use of climate-model studies have shifted over time, so
has the role of emissions scenarios. Early research studies examined the climate system’s response to potential (rather than projected)
emissions inputs in individual model studies or
standardized model comparisons. In such exercises, the purpose of a scenario is to provide a
known, consistent perturbation big enough to
generate an informative model response. Such
scenarios must be standardized, so differences
between model runs can be traced to scientific
uncertainties and model differences, but they
can be simple and arbitrary, making no claim to
being realistic. The earliest such scenarios
showed a “step-change” increase in atmospheric
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e.g. land-cover
change
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Figure 2.2.
Anthropogenic
climate change:
Simplified linear
causal chain.
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concentration of CO2 from its pre-industrial
value, to either two or four times that value.34
Models’ equilibrium responses to doubled CO2
provided a standard benchmark of model responsiveness, which has remained around the
range of 1.5 to 4.5°C for more than 20 years.
This range of modeled equilibrium responses to
a standardized perturbation does not predict actual climate changes under human perturbations, although it has often mistakenly been
taken as such.
The next generation of climate-model studies,
beginning in the early 1990s, specified a timepath of atmospheric concentrations rather than
a one-time perturbation. These studies for the
first time allowed comparison of models’ transient responses, by examining not just how much
the cimate changes, but how fast it changes. They
still used a simple, highly idealized standard scenario, most frequently a 1 percent per year increase in atmospheric concentration, expressed
as CO2-equivalent. Only two such transient
simulations had been conducted by the first
IPCC assessment (1990), but by the time of the
second assessment (1996), most modeling
groups had produced at least one.35
Since the mid-1990s, climate modelers have increasingly sought to produce realistic pictures
of how the climate may actually change, requiring a new approach to emissions scenarios.
Scenarios must now present well-founded judgments or guesses of actual future emissions
trends and their consequences for atmospheric
concentrations. The required emissions scenarios have been constructed either by extrapolating recent emissions trends, or, particularly for
Figure 2.3.
Emissions
scenarios for
climate
simulations.
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energy-related CO2, representing emissions in
terms of underlying drivers such as population,
economic growth, and technological change and
projecting these drivers using some combination of modeling and trend extrapolation.
Driven by such scenarios, climate models for
the first time can claim to be reasonable estimates of how the climate might actually change.
In addition, comparisons using multiple models
and emissions scenarios have allowed partitioning of uncertainty in future climate change into
roughly equal shares attributed to uncertainty in
climate science and models, and in emissions
trends.36 These comparisons have also allowed
estimation of the climate-change benefits from
specified emissions reductions.
As this shift occurred, advances in climate models – e.g., improved representations of atmospheric aerosols, tropospheric ozone, and
atmosphere-surface interactions – produced
mismatches between emissions scenarios and
the input needs of climate models. For example,
climate models now require emissions of several types of aerosols and reactive gases (principally the ozone precursors, hydrocarbons, CO
and NOx), explicit estimates of black carbon and
organic carbon, and some disaggregation of different types of volatile organic compound
(VOC) emissions. Moreover, because these
emissions act locally and regionally rather than
globally, they must be specified at the spatial
scale of a model grid-cell, about 150 sq. km.
Models of atmospheric chemistry and transport
then use these emissions to generate the concentrations and radiative forcings used by the
climate model. Since emissions scenarios often
do not provide the required detail, climate mod-
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e.g., Manabe and Wetherald 1967, Manabe and
Stouffer 1979.

36

Washington and Meehl 1989, Manabe et al. 1991,
IPCC 1996a.
Cubash et al. 2001.
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elers meet these input needs through various ad
hoc approaches.
Changes in standard emissions scenarios pose
challenges for maintaining comparability with
past model results. For example, the IPCC’s
IS92 scenarios projected that future SO2 emissions would roughly double, then stabilize,
while the later SRES scenarios projected sharp
decreases, giving 2100 emissions about
one-quarter the IS92 value. This change caused
significant increases in projected warming that
were not due to any changed scientific understanding. To help maintain backward comparability, many climate-model groups have
continued to run simulations using older standardized scenarios, to provide benchmarks for
comparisons both among current models and
between current and previous-generation models.

2.2. EMISSIONS SCENARIOS
FOR EXPLORING ALTERNATIVE
ENERGY AND TECHNOLOGY
FUTURES
In addition to providing needed inputs to climate models, emissions scenarios have also
been produced to examine alternative
socio-economic, energy, and technological futures, as shown in Figure 2.4. As in Figure 2.3
the content of the scenario is emissions, but the
scenario is now used to examine the socio-economic implications of alternative emission
paths, which lie upstream or to the left in the
causal chain. A scenario specifying a particular
emissions time-path can be used to explore what
patterns of demographic and economic change,
energy resource availability, and technology development are consistent with that trajectory.
SOCIOECONOMIC
CONDITIONS
• population
• GDP
• energy system
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• technology
• agriculture,
land-use

Content of Scenarios

Alternatively, scenarios can be used to examine
what changes in policies, technologies, or other
factors would be required to shift emissions
from some assumed baseline onto a specified
lower path, and to estimate the cost of such a
shift. To be used in this way, an emissions scenario might be specified arbitrarily, or might
specify some environmental target based on
normative criteria as discussed in Section 1.2.
Such scenarios have been most frequently used
to examine emissions trajectories that stabilize
atmospheric CO2 concentrations at specified
levels. More recent exercises have instead taken
stabilization of radiative forcing as the target, to
examine the role of non-CO2 greenhouse gases in
meeting stabilization goals.37
An important early example is the Wigley,
Richels, Edmonds (WRE) scenarios, which presented emissions pathways that stabilized atmospheric CO2 concentration at five levels,
ranging from 450 to 1000 ppm.38 Developed
heuristically from a simple model of the global
carbon cycle and two energy-economic models,
these scenarios illustrated the large cost savings
attainable by approaching stable concentrations
through emission paths that initially rise and
then decline steeply, rather than by beginning a
more gradual decline immediately.

Models’ equilibrium
responses to doubled
CO2 provided a
standard benchmark of
model responsiveness,
which has remained
around the range of
1.5 to 4.5˚C for more
than 20 years.

Several other sets of stabilization scenarios have
been proposed and used for similar explorations. For example, the Energy Modeling
Forum (EMF) has convened several multimodel scenario exercises focusing on emissions,
emissions constraints, and their socio-economic
effects. These have studied decision-making
under uncertainty, international distribution of
costs and benefits, the costs and benefits of the
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Figure 2.4.
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Use of Scenarios

37

38

de la Chesnaye and Weyant 2006, EMF 2006, CCSP
2007.
Wigley et al. 1997.
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Kyoto Protocol, the implications of potential future energy technologies and technological
change for emissions, and the implications of including non-CO2 gases and carbon sequestration
in mitigation targets and policies.39
In a recent scenario exercise of this type sponsored by the CCSP, three modeling teams constructed separate reference-case scenarios to
examine the implications of stabilizing radiative
forcing at levels roughly corresponding to CO2
concentrations of 450, 550, 650, and 750 ppm.
They examined the energy system, land-use,
and economic implications of moving to stabilization. This project explored the role of multiple gases and alternative multi-gas control
strategies in pursuing atmospheric stabilization.
These scenarios may also provide a basis for future analyses by the CCSP, the Climate Change
Technology Program (CCTP), or others.40

2.3. CLIMATE CHANGE
SCENARIOS
Climate scenarios describe potential future climate conditions (Figure 2.5). They are used to
provide inputs to assessments of climate-change
impacts, vulnerabilities, and associated options
for adaptation, and to inform decision-making
related to either adaptation or mitigation. Depending on their specific use, climate scenarios
may include multiple variables, such as temperature, precipitation, cloudiness, humidity, and
winds. They may describe these at spatial scales
ranging from the entire globe, through broad
latitude bands, large continental and sub-conti-

Figure 2.5. Climatechange scenarios.
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Three major types of climate scenarios are distinguished by how they are produced: incremental scenarios, analog scenarios, and
climate-model scenarios.42 Incremental scenarios change current conditions by plausible but
arbitrary amounts. For example, a region’s temperature might be warmed by 2, 3, or 4°C from
present conditions, or its precipitation increased
or decreased by 5, 10, or 20 percent. Such adjustments can be made to annual or seasonal averages, to finer-period measurements of current
conditions, or to the variability of temperature
or precipitation over days, months, or years.43
Like the simple emissions scenarios used for
climate-model comparisons, incremental climate scenarios are simple to produce but make
no claim to represent actual future conditions.
They are used for initial exploratory studies of
climate impacts and to test the sensitivity of impact models.
Analog climate scenarios represent potential future climates by the observed climate regime at
another place or time. A spatial analog imposes
the climate of one location on another, e.g., representing the potential climate of New York in
the 2050s by that of Atlanta today or that of Illinois in the 2050s by that of Kansas today.44 A
temporal analog imposes climate conditions observed in the past, in the historical record or earlier paleoclimatic observations, e.g., using the
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See, e.g., Weyant and Hill 1999; Weyant 2004; de la
Chesnaye and Weyant 2006; EMF 2006.
CCSP 2007.

nental regions, to climate model grid-cells or
finer scales. They may project these at time resolutions ranging from annual or seasonal averages to daily or even finer-scale weather.41
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IPCC – TGCIA 1999, Barrow et al. 2004.
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Mearns et al. 2001.
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e.g., Mearns et al. 1992, 1996; Semenov and Porter 1995.
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E.g., Kalkstein and Greene 1997.
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hot, dry period of the 1930s to study impacts of
potential future hot, dry climates.45 Like incremental scenarios, analog climate scenarios are
more useful for exploratory studies of the climate sensitivity of particular resources or systems than for projecting likely impacts. While
they represent climate states that are known to
be physically possible, they are limited as representations of potential future states since they
do not consider the changes in greenhouse-gas
concentrations that are the principal driver of
climate change.
Climate-model scenarios use computers to produce a physically consistent representation of
the movement of air, water, energy, and radiation through the atmosphere. Climate models,
also called General Circulation Models or
GCMs, approximate this calculation by dividing the atmosphere into thousands of grid-cells,
roughly 150 km. square in today’s models, with
a dozen vertical layers, treating conditions as uniform within each cell and representing finerscale processes by numerical relationships, called
“parameterizations,” that are defined at the scale
of a grid cell. Climate models are used to study
the present climate and its responses to past perturbations like variation in the sun’s output or volcanic eruptions, and to construct scenarios of
future climate change under any specified scenario of emissions and other disturbances.
Unlike incremental and analog scenarios,
climate-model scenarios use emissions scenarios as inputs. Model-based scenarios have a
greater claim than the other types to being realistic descriptions of how the climate might actually change, because they are based on
specified assumptions of future emissions
trends acting on modeled representations of
known physical processes. Even with a given
emissions scenario, model-based climate scenarios are uncertain. Since climate models are
driven by the radiative effects of atmospheric concentrations of relevant species, some of this uncertainty comes from the carbon-cycle and
chemical processes by which specified emission
paths determine concentrations and radiative forcings. Some of the uncertainty can be seen in the
slight differences among different runs of the same
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E.g., Rosenberg et al. 1993.

climate model, because the models are sensitive
to small differences in starting conditions. And
some of the uncertainty can be seen in differences
between calculations by different models, mainly
caused by differences in the computational methods they use to handle errors introduced by finite
grid-cells, and the parameterizations they use to
represent small-scale processes.
Just as modeling future climate change requires
specification of future emissions trends, assessments of future climate-change impacts require
specification of future climate change. Data
from a climate-change scenario might be used
as input to impact assessments of freshwater
systems, agriculture, forests, or any other
climate-sensitive system or activity. Impact
studies can use various methods, including
quantitative models such as hydrologic and crop
models, threshold analyses that examine qualitative disruptions in the behavior of climate-sensitive systems, or expert judgments that
integrate various pieces of scientific knowledge.

Just as modeling future
climate change
requires specification
of future emissions
trends, assessment of
future climate-change
impacts requires
specification of future
climate change.

As with all scenarios, the usefulness of climate
scenarios depends on how well they meet users’
information needs. The highly specific climatedata needs of impact analyses may not readily
be provided by climate-model outputs, or may
include results of whose validity climate modelers are not confident. For example, a common need of impact analyses is for data at
substantially finer scales than the relative coarse
grid of a climate model, which might have only
60 to 100 cells over the continental United
States. One advantage of incremental and analog scenarios is that they can typically provide
data at substantially finer scales. “Downscaling” techniques seek to combine the benefits of
model-based scenarios – physical realism and
explicit emissions-scenario drivers – and data at
finer scales. The two major approaches are
statistical downscaling and nested regional
modeling.46 Statistical downscaling involves estimating statistical relationships between
large-scale variables of observed climate, such
as regional-average temperature, and local variables such as site-specific temperature and
precipitation.47 These relationships are then assumed to remain constant under global climate
46

Giorgi et al. 2001.
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Wilby and Wigley 1997.
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change. A nested regional climate model provides an explicit physical representation of climate for a specific region, including local
factors such as mountain ranges, complex coastlines, and surface vegetation patterns, with initial and boundary conditions provided by a
GCM. Regional climate models can provide
projections at scales as small as 10 to 20 km.
Although downscaled results are anchored to
local features with well-understood climatic effects, downscaling introduces uncertainties beyond
those already present in GSM results.48

2.4. SCENARIOS OF DIRECT
BIOPHYSICAL IMPACTS:
SEA LEVEL RISE
Although climate-change scenarios can provide
inputs to studies of any impact, scenarios can
also be constructed of particularly important
forms of impact, such as sea level rise – one of
the more costly and certain consequences of climate warming (Figure 2.6).49 Changes in global
mean sea level as the climate warms can be calculated using a GCM with a coupled ocean and
atmosphere, which can simulate the transfer of
heat to the ocean and the variation of ocean temperature with depth. To construct sea level rise
scenarios for particular coastal locations,
model-derived projections of global mean sea
level rise must be combined with projections of
local subsidence or uplift of coastal lands, as
well as local tidal variations derived from historical tide-gauge data.
Sea level rise will increase circulation and
change salinity regimes in estuaries, threaten
coastal wetlands, alter shorelines through increased erosion, and increase the intensity of
coastal flooding associated with normal tides
and storm surge. Scenarios of sea level rise are
consequently needed to assess multiple linked
impacts on coastal ecosystems and settlements.
In specific locations, these impacts will depend
on many characteristics of coastal topography,
ecosystems, and land use – e.g., coastal elevation and slope, rate of shoreline erosion or accretion, tide range, wave height, local land use
and coastal protection, salinity tolerance of
coastal plant communities, etc. – in addition to
48
49
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local sea level rise.50
In addition to its gradual impacts, sea level rise
is subject to large uncertainties from the potential loss of continental ice sheets in Greenland
and West Antarctica. The consequences of these
events for global sea level rise are well known
because they can be calculated quite precisely
from the volume of the ice sheets – roughly 7
meters rise from complete loss of the West
Antarctic Ice Sheet and 5 meters from Greenland – but the probabilities of these events and
their likely speed of occurrence are both highly
uncertain. One recent study has suggested a
probability of a few per cent that the West
Antarctic Ice Sheet will contribute an additional
one meter per century beyond that calculated
from gradual warming.51
There are several reasons to call out sea level
rise from other climate-change impacts to be
represented in separate scenarios. First, sea
level rise is a powerful driver of other forms of
climate-change impact, probably the most important driver of impacts in coastal regions.
Since it is a direct physical impact of climate
change that can be described precisely and compactly, a sea level rise scenario is an efficient
way to transmit the most important information
about climate change to coastal impact assessments. Moreover, since sea level rise does not
depend on socio-economic processes and cannot be significantly influenced by human actions (other than by limiting climate change
itself), it may be reasonably treated as exogenous for purposes of impact assessment. For all
these reasons, sea level rise is a good proxy for
the most important causal routes by which climate
change will affect coastal regions.
Finally, because sea level rise is subject to large
uncertainties with known consequences but unknown probabilities, it is a useful variable for
exploratory analysis of worst-case scenarios in
long-range planning. Other forms of climate
impact might also merit being called out in separate scenarios: changes in snowpack in mountain regions, seasonal flow regimes in major
river basins, or the structure and function of
major ecosystem types. Based on present

Mearns et al. 2001, Giorgi et al. 2001.
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Burkett et al. 2005.

IPCC 2001a.
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Vaughan and Spouge 2002.
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SOCIOECONOMIC
CONDITIONS
• population
• GDP
• energy system
• industry
• technology
• agriculture,
land-use

Content of Scenarios

EMISSIONS
• greenhouse gases
• aerosols
• other drivers,
e.g. land-cover
change

ATMOSPHERE
& CLIMATE
• carbon cycle
• temperature
• precipitation
• humidity
• soil moisture
• extreme events

2.5. MULTIVARIATE SCENARIOS
FOR ASSESSING IMPACTS,
ADAPTATION, AND
VULNERABILITY
Many potentially important impacts of climate
change cannot be adequately assessed by considering only how the climate might change.
These impacts require multivariate scenarios
that include climate change and other characteristics likely to influence impacts. This is the
case, for different reasons, for both ecosystems
and socio-economic systems, although the nature of the multivariate scenarios that are required – i.e., the number and identity of the
characteristics that must be specified – will vary
widely among particular impacts.
Ecosystems are affected by climate change, but
also by many other changes in environmental
conditions that are influenced by human activities, such as nitrogen and sulfur deposition, tropospheric ozone and smog, and changes in
erosion, runoff, loadings of other pollutants,
land use, land cover, and coastal-zone characteristics. Consequently, realistic assessments of
potential future impacts on ecosystems require
specifying the most important forms of humandriven stresses jointly, not just climate.52
In addition, many important forms of climatechange impact depend not just on climate
change, its direct biophysical impacts such as
sea level rise, and perhaps other forms of environmental stress, but also on the nature of the
society on which these climate and other enviMEA 2005.

• sea level rise

OTHER
IMPACTS
• coastal erosion
• estuaries
• ecosystems
• property,
infrastructure
• fresh water

Figure 2.6.:
Scenarios of
direct biophysical
impacts: sea level
rise.

Use of Scenarios

knowledge, however, only sea level rise has
shown these characteristics strongly enough to
motivate construction of separate scenarios.

52

DIRECT
BIOPHYSICAL
IMPACTS

ronmental changes are imposed – e.g., how
many people there are; where and how they live;
how wealthy they are; how they gain their livelihoods; and what types of infrastructure, institutions, and policies they have in place.53
Assessment of climate impact on ecosystems
that are intensively managed for human use,
such as agriculture, managed forests, rangelands, and hydrologic systems, must consider
human management as a factor in impacts. The
non-climatic factors that influence these management decisions – e.g., changes in market
conditions, technologies, or cultural practices –
must be considered for inclusion in scenarios if
they are sufficiently important in mediating climate impacts.
In other domains, socio-economic factors can
mediate climate impacts by influencing vulnerability and adaptive capacity. No general model
of the socio-economic determinants of adaptive
capacity exists. Important factors are likely to
vary across specific types of impact, locations,
and cultures, and may include many demographic, economic, technological, institutional,
and cultural characteristics.
Some socio-economic characteristics that are
likely to be relevant for many impact assessments – e.g., the size and sometimes the age
structure of population, the size and sometimes
the sectoral mix of GDP – are normally generated in the course of producing emissions scenarios. Consequently, when current emissions
scenarios exist for the region for which an impact assessment is being conducted, it makes
sense to strive for consistency with them.54
Even for these variables, however, there may be
53

Parson et al. 2001, 2003; Arnell et al. 2004.
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Berkhout et al. 2001, citing UNEP 1994 guidelines.
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Figure 2.7:
Multivariate
scenarios for
impact assessment.

SOCIOECONOMIC
CONDITIONS
• population
• GDP
• energy system
• industry
• technology
• agriculture,
land-use

Content of Scenarios

EMISSIONS
• greenhouse gases
• aerosols
• other drivers,
e.g. land-cover
change

ATMOSPHERE
& CLIMATE

DIRECT
BIOPHYSICAL
IMPACTS

OTHER
IMPACTS

• carbon cycle
• temperature
• precipitation
• humidity
• soil moisture
• extreme events

• sea level rise
• fresh water
• ecosystems

• agriculture
• human health
• property,
infrastructure

Use of Scenarios

significant problems of incompatible spatial
scale. Impact assessments often examine
smaller spatial scales than emissions projections, so they may need these socio-economic
data at finer scale than is available. Downscaling future socio-economic projections has
proved challenging thus far. There is no generally accepted method for doing so, and several
research groups are exploring development of
alternative methods.55
In contrast to the few clearly identified aggregate characteristics needed to construct emissions scenarios, the socio-economic factors that
most strongly shape adaptive capacity and vulnerability for particular impacts may be detailed, subtle, and location-specific. It may not
even be clear what characteristics are most important before doing a comprehensive analysis
of potential causal pathways shaping impacts.
The most important characteristics may interact
strongly with each other or with other economic
or social trends, or may not be readily quantifiable. All these factors make the development
of socio-economic scenarios for impact assessment a much more difficult endeavor than constructing emissions scenarios.
Because scenarios are schematic, not all factors
that might be important for impacts can be included. Details are typically not included or
treated as merely illustrative. But particular details, which cannot be identified in advance,
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may be crucial determinants of vulnerability to
climate impacts.56 Impact assessments have responded to this dilemma in two broad ways.57
First, constructing scenarios of relevant socioeconomic conditions has been delegated to local
or regional teams with expertise in the impacts
being assessed, subject to constraints to maintain consistency with other assessments. Second, since local or regional scenario groups may
not have access to all knowledge relevant to understanding the main determinants of impacts,
more open-ended approaches have been employed – e.g., exploratory analyses that iterate
between considering particular characteristics
that might be important, examining their implications for impacts using the data and models
available, then re-assessing what variables are
most important.
This section has sketched a typology of globalchange scenarios and identified major types of
decision-makers who might use global-change
scenario-based information. The next section
turns to current experience with global-change
scenarios, summarizing the development, contents, and uses of four major exercises. Informed by these cases plus additional short
scenario examples presented in text boxes, Section 4 will summarize and discuss the major
challenges for making and using scenarios that
are raised by this experience, providing the basis
for the conclusions and recommendations presented in Section 5.
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Toth and Wilbanks 2004, Pitcher 2005.
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Berkhout et al. 2002.
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Berkhout et al. 2001, Parson et al. 2001.
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SECTION

3

Review of
Major Climate-Change
Scenario Exercises

In this section, we review experience to date developing and using scenarios for global climate
change applications. Because little literature on these activities yet exists, our selection of cases
has inevitably been both limited by time and resources at our disposal and reliant in part on the
knowledge and experience of team members. We discuss four exercises in detail, in an attempt
to cover the largest-scale and most important activities. Section 3.1 reviews the IPCC emission
scenarios, with particular detail on the most recent and important exercise, the Special Report
on Emissions Scenarios (SRES). Section 3.2 considers the US National Assessment, which developed and used scenarios of both climate and socio-economic conditions. Section 3.3 considers
the UK Climate Impacts Programme, which has also both developed and used scenarios, following a different approach from the US National Assessment. Section 3.4 reviews the ambitious
scenario-generating exercise conducted as part of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA),
in which climate change was one of several dimensions of stress considered on global ecosystems.
For each exercise, we consider only the development and use of scenarios, rather than examining the larger assessment processes of which the scenarios were part. We consider how the scenarios were developed, including both methods of reasoning and managerial process; how and by
whom they were used; and subsequent evaluations, when these are available. General issues and
challenges that emerge from these experiences are discussed in Section 4.
To provide more illustrative variation, we also provide shorter summaries of eight additional scenario activities, some of them related to the four we consider in detail. Presented in text boxes
throughout Section 4, these are intended to provide additional information to highlight particular issues. We have particularly sought experiences that illuminate potential relationships between
scenarios and decision-making.
All these scenario exercises represent early work in an immature field. Our aim is not to criticize particular exercises, but to seek insights from their experience into the general problems of
making useful global-change scenarios.
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3.1. IPCC EMISSIONS SCENARIOS
Since its establishment in 1989, the IPCC has
organized three exercises to develop scenarios
of greenhouse-gas emissions, of increasing
scale and complexity. For its first report,
IPCC’s Working Group 3 on “Response Strategies” included a sub-group on emissions scenarios. Four scenarios were produced but little
used in this assessment because of time limits
and because, with one exception, only doubledCO2 equilibrium climate-model runs were available at the time.58 The next exercise produced
six new scenarios, called IS92a through IS92f.59
These were the first global emissions scenarios
with a full suite of greenhouse gases and at least
some explicit calculation underlying each. The
IS92a scenario, one of the central scenarios in
this group, was used in climate-model comparisons conducted for the 1996 IPCC assessment,
along with the simpler transient scenario of 1
percent annual increase in equivalent-CO2 concentration and further equilibrium runs.60
The third and most ambitious IPCC scenario
process was established in 1997 and worked for
two years to produce the Special Report on
Emissions Scenarios (SRES).61 In part, this
process was established in response to two
widely circulated criticisms of the IS92 scenarios. The first of these criticized the 1992 scenarios for inconsistency with other published
scenarios of energy and carbon intensity for
major world regions; failing to reflect important
recent trends, including the collapse of the Soviet Union and increasing restrictions on sulfur
emissions worldwide; relying inappropriately
on a single model; and only being useful as climate-model inputs, not for other purposes such
as mitigation studies or supporting climatechange negotiations.62 The second criticized the

58

59
60
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The scenarios were mentioned in a 1-page Appendix
to the Working Group 1 report. The one non-equilibrium run available was a preliminary transient run
using 1 percent annual CO2 concentration increase.
See Mitchell et al. 1990, Bretherton et al. 1990, IPCC
1990.
Leggett et al. 1992.
The 1 percent scenario was similar to IS92a, but gave
total radiative forcing about 20 percent greater by 2100.
Washington and Meehl 1989; Stouffer et al. 1989;
Bretherton et al. 1990:180-182.
Nakicenovic and Swart 2000.

IS92a scenario for assuming increasing divergence in the per capita emissions of industrialized and developing regions, arguing that this
represented a strong bias in favor of already developed regions.63
In response, the 1996 plenary session of the
IPCC requested a new set of emissions scenarios. These new scenarios were to improve treatment of sulfur aerosols and emissions from
land-use change, and were not to rely on a single model or expert team, but instead to draw
on the existing literature and invite any group
with relevant expertise to participate in an
“open process.”64 They were also charged to
serve more uses than climate-model inputs,
such as supporting impact analyses, but to assume no new climate-policy interventions. Although not explicitly in the terms of reference,
it was also clearly understood that the scenarios
would address the criticism of the IS92 scenarios by focusing on convergent development
paths between North and South.
In January 1997 the IPCC established a writing team,
including members of several energy-economic
modeling groups and experts in related areas
such as population, technological change, and
scenario development methods. The process
ran under tight time pressure to provide preliminary scenarios by early 1998 for climate-model
runs in the IPCC Third Assessment.
Prior scenarios were compiled in a web-based
database,65 and any researcher was invited to
submit new ones. By mid-1998 the database
contained more than 400 scenarios. Most of
these projected only energy-related CO2 emissions, but they were highly diverse in their coverage and resolution, the variables included, and
their methodologies. The usefulness of these
scenarios in constructing new ones was limited
by several weaknesses, however. Many were incomplete, lacked documentation of inputs, or
made inconsistent assumptions. Few included
sulfur or land-use emissions, which were specif-
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Alcamo et al. 1995.
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Parikh 1992, 1998.
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Nakicenovic and Swart 2000: 324, Appendix I (terms
of reference).
Morita and Lee 1998.
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ically requested of the new scenarios. Many
were unclear on whether they assumed mitigation efforts, while the new scenarios were instructed to exclude them. Consequently, the
development of new scenarios had to proceed
largely independently of the collection of existing scenarios through the literature review and
open process.
Early on, participants decided to use narrative
scenarios in addition to quantitative models, and
to include experts in this approach on the writing team. This decision drew on recent successes using such scenarios for energy and
environmental applications,66 and responded to
the charge to make the scenarios more integrated and more broadly useful. Participants in
an April 1997 workshop chose two key uncertainties to explore in the scenarios: whether
world values would mainly stress economic
prosperity or balance economic and ecological
concerns (labeled “A” vs. “B” scenarios); and
whether the organization of economies and institutions would continue shifting toward global
integration, or reverse and move toward regional
fragmentation (labeled “1” vs. “2” scenarios).67
Combined, these gave four scenarios, which
were sketched in preliminary terms at the workshop. In the A1 (economic, global) scenario,
economic growth and inter-regional income
convergence continue strongly worldwide – all
developing countries grow like Japan and Korea
from the 1950s to the 1980s – while world population peaks at 9 billion by 2050. Rapid innovation yields many advanced energy sources,
while acid rain and other local and regional environmental problems are aggressively controlled. In contrast, the A2 (economic, regional)
scenario has higher population growth, lower
economic growth with more continuing regional disparities, slower innovation, and
weaker international institutions. B1 (ecological, global) has low population growth, moderate economic growth with strong convergence,
and strong reductions in per capita energy use,
mostly through higher efficiency, while B2 has
intermediate population growth, low economic
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67

See, e.g., WEC/IIASA 1995, WBCSD 1997.
Minutes, Lead Authors Meeting, Paris, April 13-15,
1997.

growth with weaker convergence, and moderate
improvements in energy efficiency and development of non-carbon energy sources.68 The
storylines were elaborated in short text descriptions with some preliminary numbers attached
in fall 1997.69
Modeling teams were asked to produce initial
quantifications of these scenarios in fall 1997,
to match specified 2100 target values within 10
percent. In February 1998, the preliminary
quantitative targets were re-confirmed and modelers asked to continue work on quantifications,
now including a breakdown of economic output
into four world regions.70 In April, one model’s
quantification was chosen as a “marker scenario” for each of the four scenarios – a particular scenario that would provide the basis for
interim reporting to climate modelers, some of
whose results other participating models would
be asked to replicate. The specifications and
models for these marker scenarios are shown in
Table 3.1.

The SRES interim
marker scenarios were
used to provide
emissions scenarios to
climate models
participating in the
IPCC third assessment.

These interim marker scenarios were used to
provide emissions scenarios to climate models
participating in the IPCC third assessment. An
IPCC climate modelers’ meeting in June 1998
agreed to use SRES scenarios and asked for
three cases, central emissions, stabilization, and
high emissions.71 The writing team initially discussed meeting this request by identifying scenarios corresponding to each of these requested
cases,72 but decided to provide only the marker
scenarios and recommend that all four be used
without identifying any as “central.”
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Arnell et al. 2004; Minutes, Lead Authors Meeting,
Paris, April 13-15, 1997.
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Minutes, informal modelers meeting, Berkeley, Feb
7-8.
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Draft minutes, informal modelers meeting, Berkeley,
Feb 7-8:4.
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Minutes of the Laxenburg meeting, July 2-3, 1998,
reporting results of June 29-July 1 IPCC Scoping
Meeting, Bonn.
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In July 1998, members decided that A1F or A2 could
be the requested high-emissions scenario (with emissions of ~ 30 GtC in 2100), B2 or A1B a central case
(~15 GtC in 2100, with two different SO2 profiles),
and B1 or an A1 variant called A1R a stabilization case
(at about 550 ppm) (Laxenburg report, July 2-3,
1998:1).
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Table 3.1.
Target Values
for 2100 in
Initial Scenario
Quantifications

SCENARIO

A1B

A2

B1

B2

Population

7.1

15.1

7.1

10.4

$530

$250

$340

$235

Final Energy (EJ)

~1,700

870

770

950

Model for
Marker scenario

AIM

ASF

GDP (trillion)

IMAGE MESSAGE

Source: Minutes of Laxenburg meeting, July 2-3, 1998.

The SRES scenarios
have been the most
comprehensive,
ambitious, and
carefully documented
emissions scenarios
produced to date.

34

The marker scenarios also provided the basis for
coordination of subsequent scenario development. Up to this point, there had been substantial discrepancy between different models’
quantifications of the same scenarios, particularly at regional level. With the adoption of the
markers, other groups were asked to replicate
(within 5-10 percent) the marker results on population, GDP, and final energy for the four
world regions, for 2100 and several interim
years.73 Achieving this requested replication
posed significant challenges for modelers.74
With a further year of work, modeling teams
produced a total of 40 scenarios that were retained in the report, of which 26 replicated one
of the marker scenarios. Although a few of the
14 non-replicates reflected a model’s inability
to match the results of a marker scenario, most
were produced because a modeling team intentionally sought to explore alternative assumptions. For example, the A1 scenario, which
originally balanced fossil and non-fossil energy
sources, was augmented by variants with different assumptions about fossil resources and
non-fossil technology development, giving
widely divergent emissions paths stressing coal,
gas, and non-fossil energy technology. Modifications of the scenario set continued until late
in the process. For example, it was decided in
October 1998 to drop several B variants with

73

Because markers were produced by different models
with different time steps, the interim years to be harmonized differed for each scenario.

74

For example, discussions in Beijing re-confirmed that
allowed deviation from markers at 4-region level would
be 5 percent for GDP and 10 percent for final energy,
but substantial discrepancies in base-year energy could
not be harmonized due to time constraints (SRES modelers meeting report, Beijing, October 6-7, 1998:2).

explicit mitigation, including one stabilization
scenario.75 At the final IPCC approval meeting,
it was decided at the request of the Saudi delegation to reduce the two fossil-intensive variants of A1 to one, a variant of the gas-intensive
scenario which was renamed A1FI (for “fossilintensive”).76

3.1.1 Significance and use
The SRES scenarios have been the most comprehensive, ambitious, and carefully documented emissions scenarios produced to date.
They represented a substantial advance from
prior scenarios, and contributed to assessments
and subsequent research on climate impacts and
responses. The SRES scenarios formed the
basis for climate-model comparisons in the
IPCC Third Assessment (2001) and continuing
work in the Fourth Assessment. Most subsequent climate-model work has used only a few
of the marker scenarios – typically A2 and B2,
sometimes with A1B added. SRES scenarios
also provided baselines for analysis of mitigation scenarios in the Third Assessment.77
Several significant insights were illuminated by
the SRES scenarios.
• Scenarios with similar emissions in 2100
can follow markedly different paths in the
interim, giving wide differences in cumulative emissions and concentrations.
• Technology and energy-resource assumptions can strongly perturb future emissions,
even with constant socio-economic assumptions. For example, the three A1 variants
show that changing these assumptions alone
can generate as wide a range of emissions
futures as substantial variation of demographic and economic futures.

75

SRES modelers meeting report, Beijing, October 67, 1998:4. At this meeting, B1 was also proposed for
removal, but was retained based on a decision that none
of the many policy interventions it presumed was an
explicit greenhouse-gas limitation, so it was consistent
with the terms of reference.
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A1FI was the gas-intensive scenario, A1G, with revisions to methane emissions and additional non-CO2
gases added from the A1 run of the MESSAGE model.
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Morita et al. 2001.
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• Highly distinct combinations of demographic, socio-economic, and energy-market conditions can produce similar
emissions trajectories, suggesting that a particular emissions trajectory can pose very
different types of mitigation problems, depending on what combination of driving factors underlies the emissions.

3.1.2 Criticisms and controversies
The SRES experience raised issues of great significance for subsequent attempts to develop
more useful climate-change scenarios: the desirability of and appropriate methods for characterizing probabilities associated with
scenarios; the quantitative representation of the
relationship between North and South; methods
for developing and using narrative scenarios
and integrating them with quantitative model results; alternative modes for coordinating use of
multiple models and their implications for the
interpretation and use of scenarios; and the relationship between scenario exercises and their
users, including the need for clarity about specific intended uses, appropriate methods for engaging users in scenario development, and how
to improve utility of scenarios when not all potential user groups are specifically identified.
These are discussed in Sections 4 and 5.

They were sharply criticized for this decision.80
Critics argued that there were no technical obstacles to assigning probabilities to emissions
ranges bounded by the marker scenarios; that
scenario developers must have made probabilistic judgments in generating and evaluating
the scenario quantifications and that not making these judgments explicit would withhold
relevant information; and that if scenario developers decline to assign probabilities, others who
are less informed will do so. Indeed, many
probabilistic emissions calculations have been
produced since the SRES, using various methods such as assigning uniform or other specified distributions over the emissions range of
the marker scenarios, counting scenarios lying
in specified intervals in the larger SRES set, unbundling and recombining alternative values of
the drivers underlying SRES emissions figures,
or sampling over parameter distributions within
a single model. In response to these criticisms,
SRES authors argued that attempting to assign
probabilities to scenarios would require assigning joint distributions to the underlying driving
factors, and that this would lead to an explosion
of combinatoric possibilities over which any attempt to assign probabilities would be spurious
and arbitrary.81

The SRES team decided at the outset to make
no probabilistic statements about the scenarios.
Their report used great care in its language to
avoid any suggestion that one scenario might be
more central or more likely than any other.78
This decision was consistent both with standard
practice in developing narrative scenarios, and
with the instruction in their terms of reference
not to favor any model.79

The situation of the SRES scenarios is in fact
more nuanced than the arguments of either their
authors or critics would suggest. It may well be
unhelpful to assign probabilities to rich, multidimensional narrative scenarios, yet still useful
to assign interval probabilities when scenarios
principally represent uncertainty in one or two
quantitative variables. And while the SRES scenarios began their lives like the former type of
storyline scenario, they finished more like the
latter. For many users, the scenarios are their
projections of greenhouse-gas emission trends.
When they are viewed in this way, a potential
user may reasonably ask, how likely are emissions to be higher than this – a distinct and better-posed question than, what is the probability
of an A1 world? The uncertainty issue has no
clear resolution in this case, and poses hard design problem for scenarios and assessments
more broadly. Although the SRES exercise has

78
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The first two of these issues were the subjects of
forceful public criticisms. We discuss these, followed by several other issues that have received
less attention but which in our view pose more
central and instructive challenges for future scenario exercises.

Assigning explicit probabilities
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E.g., Minutes of London meeting, March 1999.
Draft minutes of the Washington, DC, meeting, April
29-30, 1998:6.
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It may well be
unhelpful to assign
probabilities to rich,
multi-dimensional
narrative scenarios,
yet still useful to
assign interval
probabilities when
scenarios principally
represent uncertainty
in one or two
quantitative variables

Schneider 2001, 2002; Pittock et al. 2001; Allen et
al. 2001; Reilly et al. 2001.
Grubler and Nakicenovic 2001.
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raised this controversy most explicitly to date, the
problem is a general one that any scenario exercise
must confront. We discuss it further in section 4.6.

Exchange rates: PPP versus MER

…while MER
overstates future
income growth in poor
countries, it also
overstates future
reductions in energy
and emissions intensity.

The most prominently publicized criticism of
SRES focused on the fact that all but one of the
participating models compared GDP across regions using market exchange rates (MER), instead of the more correct purchasing-power
parity (PPP) approach. PPP comparisons correct for price differences among countries, providing a more accurate comparison of real incomes.
Because lower-income countries have lower price
levels, MER-based comparisons overstate the income gap between rich and poor countries.
In a series of letters to the IPCC chairman and
several subsequent publications, two critics argued that the use of MER caused SRES scenarios to over-estimate future income growth in
developing countries (because they over-estimated the initial income gap), and consequently
to over-estimate future emissions growth. Their
criticism was widely circulated and repeated by
prominent climate-change skeptics.82
But, although using MER does overstate future
income growth, it does not necessarily follow
that future projections of emissions growth are
also overstated. MER is universally recognized
as a flawed measure of income, whose use in
global-change scenarios is only justified by better availability of current and historical data,
and the fact that international emissions trades
in any future mitigation regime will likely be
made at market exchange rates. But changing
the measure of income also changes the relationship between income and such physical
quantities as energy and food consumption,
which determine emissions. Consequently,
while MER overstates future income growth in
poor countries, it also overstates future reductions in energy and emissions intensity. These
opposing errors are likely to be similar in size,
in which case any error in emissions projections
from using MER will be small.83
82
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Castles and Henderson 2003a, 2003b; The Economist
2003a,b; Michaels 2003b.
Nakicenovic et al. 2003, McKibben et al. 2004,
Holtsmark and Alfsen 2005, Manne et al. 2005, Gr bler
et al. 2004.

A related, more serious concern is that all SRES
scenarios assumed varying degrees of real income convergence between North and South;
this was done in response to criticisms that the
IS92 scenarios were biased in favor of the
North. But an exercise to construct potential
climate-change futures may need to consider
less optimistic and less desirable futures in
which some currently poor regions fail to solve
the development problem. Not considering less
fortunate futures, including ones that might
challenge the adequacy of current responses, institutions, and decision-making capacity, may
limit scenarios’ usefulness in supporting longterm risk assessment and planning for the societal response to climate change.

Underdevelopment
of narrative scenarios
Although the SRES storylines were produced
first and featured prominently in publications,
they remained underdeveloped and underused
throughout the process. In part due to time
pressure, in part due to the predominance of
quantitative modelers in the process, little attention was given to further development of the
storylines once initial quantifications were established and modeling work began. Nor was
significant effort devoted to integration and
cross-checking between storylines and quantitative scenarios, although a major purpose of
the narratives was to give coherent structure to
quantifications.84 Concerns raised about the
storylines included lacking specification of
characteristics other than those needed to generate emissions; imbalance between the storylines, with A1 much more developed than the
others and B2, the least developed, likely to be
heavily used as the median scenario for emissions; apparent inconsistencies within A2; and
lack of clarity regarding the distinctions between A2 and B2 – a serious enough concern
that merging them was repeatedly considered
until late in the process.85
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Minutes of the Beijing meeting, October 6-7,
1998:10.
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Draft minutes of the Bilthoven meeting, September
17-19, 1997:7-8; draft minutes of the Berkeley meeting, February 7-8, 1997:6; draft minutes of the Washington, DC, meeting, April 29-30, 1998.
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Moreover, participants disagreed over the meaning of some of the scenarios, as indicated by the
persistent difficulty they had in agreeing on descriptive names.86 These names were dropped
late in the project, in the context of a broad retreat from attempting to flesh out the storylines.
That so little integration of qualitative and
quantitative components was achieved in spite
of serious and persistent efforts suggests the
magnitude of the analytical and methodological
challenges involved.

Harmonizing scenarios, interpreting
the results
Scenario exercise that use multiple models can
coordinate them in several ways: choosing one
or a few illustrative scenarios as coordinating
devices for subsequent analyses, as was done
with the SRES marker scenarios; fixing values
of a small set of exogenous inputs to multiple
models, to characterize resultant uncertainties
and examine their origins through focused
model intercomparisons; or fixing key outputs
as targets, to reason backwards and examine requirements for achieving them.
Choosing a few quantitative variables as the initial link between storylines and models makes
these variables serve as a framework to capture
the storylines’ basic logical structure. Although
these choices are not obvious, the variables chosen here appear reasonable. But the causal
structure of a model will not generally mirror
the presumed causal logic of a narrative, so a
model cannot be expected to calculate values
for other variables that flesh out the storyline
logic. Moreover, the few key variables so chosen may not be exogenous inputs for every
model used in the subsequent quantification.
Of the three variables specified in the SRES
86

While names proposed for the “1” storylines suggest
substantial common understanding (A1 was called
“High Growth,” “Productivity,” and “Golden Economic Age,” B1 was “Green” and “Sustainable development”), names proposed for the “2” scenarios,
particularly B2, do not (A2 was called “Regional Consolidation,” Divided World,” and “Clash of Civilizations”; B2, “Regional Stewardship,” “Small Is
Beautiful,” “Dynamics as Usual,” “Gradually Better,”
and “Muddling Through”) (draft minutes of the
Bilthoven meeting, September 17-19:7-8; draft minutes of the Berkeley meeting, February 7-8, 1997;
UKCIP 1998 report summarizing SRES progress;
Pitcher 1998 presentation slides.

process, only population was exogenous for all
participating models. Because GDP and final
energy were endogenous for some or all participating models, matching their specified values
required manipulating other internal model
characteristics. Once one model run was chosen as the marker for each scenario, subsequent
attempts by other models to replicate the results
posed the same problem more acutely, since
more outputs were specified at this point.
The problems associated with attempting to harmonize model outputs are related to the underdevelopment of narrative scenarios and limited
integration of qualitative and quantitative components. The storylines were associated with
relatively restrictive numerical targets even
though the storylines did not develop the richness or coherence that would carry implications
for additional characteristics. The preliminary
targets were only slightly modified throughout
the project, despite subsequent discovery of
significant problems. For example, the United
Nations 1998 population projections, with substantial reductions in projected fertility, were
completed while the scenario development
work was underway but not incorporated.87

Clarity about uses, involving users:
The SRES scenarios were charged with serving
uses beyond driving climate models but given
little guidance on what specific additional uses
or users to serve, or how the scenarios might
best serve them, neither of which is obvious.88
Providing climate-model inputs remained the
most prominent and most clearly specified use,
as well as the only use that had an early deadline. But climate modelers were not involved in
the scenario development process, and there
was substantial divergence between their needs
and the outputs and capabilities of the SRES
process. A September 1997 briefing identified
the principal needs of climate modelers as early
availability of scenarios and greater emissions
detail.89 They wanted separate emissions trajectories for major greenhouse gases, not just

87

88
89

Minutes of the Bilthoven meeting, September 17-19,
1997:11.
Alcamo et al. 1995.
Draft minutes of the Bilthoven meeting, September
17-19, 1997:5.
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CO2-equivalent, including regional detail for
some emissions such as sulfur – even suggesting that it would be desirable to have sulfur
emissions disaggregated by stack height, to distinguish dispersed emissions from large point
sources. Although SRES provided gridded sulfur data by post-processing model outputs, in
most cases the emissions included and their spatial detail (not to mention stack height) were
limited by the capabilities and structures of participating models.
The US National
Assessment was the
most comprehensive
attempt to date to
assess climate impacts
on the United States
over 25-year and 100year horizons, and to
consider both major
sub-national regions
and sectors.

Other uses received less attention, and representatives of other potential uses were even less
involved than climate modelers in the process.
Supporting assessment of mitigation strategies
was largely deferred to the post-SRES scenarios
prepared for the IPCC Third Assessment Report, although ambiguity about the degree of
mitigation effort implied by some SRES scenarios complicated that task. Impact and vulnerability assessments depend on diverse,
small-scale socio-economic and ecological factors that a global exercise centered on energyeconomic models cannot provide.90 For the
population and economic projections that were
provided in the course of generating emissions
scenarios, the key issue for impacts and adaptation was the degree of spatial detail provided.
For consistency among scenarios, and to avoid
base-year discrepancies with national and regional datasets, SRES scenario results were reported only for four large world regions.
Greater regional detail was available from individual models, but with inconsistent regional
boundaries. Providing the greater regional detail desired for impact assessments would generate discrepancies between the global-model
results represented in scenarios and the more detailed data and projections available at national
and regional levels.91 Developing valid methods
to downscale socio-economic scenario information and integrate it with national and regional
datasets remains a key challenge for producing
useful scenarios for impact assessment.92
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The US National Assessment was the most
comprehensive attempt to date to assess climate
impacts on the United States over 25-year and
100-year horizons, and to consider both major
sub-national regions and sectors.93 Responding
to a requirement in the 1990 Global Change Research Act, the National Assessment was organized by federal agencies participating in the
US Global Change Research Program. Work
began in 1997, with various components completed between 1999 and 2003. Regional impacts were initially considered in 20 regional
workshops, followed by more extended analyses of impacts, leading to published assessments
for 12 regions, conducted by university-based
teams. Sectoral impacts were examined by national teams focusing on agriculture, water,
human health, coastal areas and marine resources, and forests. A federal advisory committee, the National Assessment Synthesis Team
(NAST), provided direction for the assessment
and synthesized its results in two published reports.94 Roughly two thousand experts and
stakeholders participated.
As an assessment focused on climate impacts,
the National Assessment needed both climate
scenarios and scenarios of potential future
socio-economic conditions over the 21st century,
since substantial changes are likely over this period in socio-economic conditions that might influence vulnerability to climate and adaptive
capacity.

3.2.1. Emission and climate
scenarios
For climate scenarios, the National Assessment
relied predominantly on data and model results
previously produced. Study teams conducted
additional checking, processing, documentation, and dissemination as needed to make these
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See, e.g., discussion with Mike Hulme on behalf of
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January 1998, meeting with Richard Moss, WG2
Technical Support Unit, described in draft meetings of
the Berkeley meeting, February 7-8, 1997.
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Pitcher 2005.
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There had been two previous assessments of US climate impacts. The US EPA (1989) did a preliminary
assessment for five representative US regions and five
sectors (agriculture, forests, water resources, health,
and coasts), while the US OTA (1993) examined impacts for six sectors – coasts, water, agriculture, wetlands, protected areas, and forests.
NAST 2000, 2001.
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usable. The assessment encouraged the use of
three types of climate scenarios: historical scenarios produced by extrapolating observed
trends or re-imposing historical climate variability or extremes; an inverse approach using
sensitivity analyses to explore the responses of
climate-sensitive systems, with particular emphasis on thresholds defining key vulnerabilities; and climate model simulations of future
climate conditions.95
Of these three approaches, the climate-model
scenarios were the most precisely specified and
the most widely used. The National Assessment
did not have the resources or time to commission new climate model runs and so had to rely
on those completed and published when it
began its work. A set of criteria was developed
by the NAST for the climate model scenarios to
be used in the assessment. Climate-model scenarios used in the assessment should, to the
greatest extent possible:96
1. Include comprehensive representations of
the atmosphere, oceans, and land surface,
and key feedbacks among them
2. Simulate the climate from 1900 to 2100,
based on a well-documented emissions scenario
that includes greenhouse gases and aerosols
3. Have the finest practicable spatial and temporal resolution, with grid cells of less than
5˚ latitude x longitude
4. Include the daily cycle of solar radiation, to
allow projections of daily maximum and
minimum temperatures
5. Be able to represent significant aspects of
climate variability such as the El NiñoSouthern Oscillation (ENSO) cycle

and interpolated to the finer time and spatial scales needed for impact studies
7. Be based on well-documented models participating in the IPCC Third Assessment (for
comparability between US and international
efforts)
8. Be able to interface results with higher-resolution regional model studies
9. Provide a comprehensive array of results
openly over the internet.
To ensure timely dissemination, the National
Assessment chose climate-model scenarios to
be used in its analyses in mid-1998. At that
time, only two groups had completed runs that
met most of the key criteria: the UK Hadley
Centre (Model Version 2) and the Canadian
Centre for Climate Modeling and Analysis
(Model Version 1).97 All participating regional
and sector teams were asked to use these scenarios. The climate sensitivity of these models
was 2.5°C (UK Hadley) and 3.6°C (Canadian),
lying in the middle of the 1.7 to 4.2°C range of
sensitivities represented by models participating in the IPCC Third Assessment.98

Of the three
approaches, the
climate-model
scenarios were the
most precisely
specified and the most
widely used.

These two models were limited in their ability to
reproduce observed patterns of inter-annual and
inter-decadal climate variability. But other climate-model runs available at the time failed to
meet essential requirements of the ecosystem
models that were the basis for an important part
of the assessment: availability of documented
results, projections to 2100, standard/comparable emissions scenarios, and explicit treatment
of the day-night cycle.
For these two climate models, model runs using
only one emissions scenario were available, and
only one ensemble run was used for each.99 The

6. Be completed in time to be quality-checked
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NAST 2001:25. It is arguable whether or not the inverse approach involves scenarios by the definition we
have adopted here, because it does not stipulate specified future climate conditions, but attempts to identify
them from presumed thresholds or breakpoints. However, we are following the usage of the NAST reports
in calling these approaches three types of scenarios.
NAST 2001:31-32; MacCracken et al. 2001; MacCracken et al. 2003:1714.

97

Johns et al. 1997; Boer et al. 1999a, 1999b; MacCracken et al. 2003.
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Cubasch et al. 2001, Table 9.1:538-540; and Table
9A.1:577.
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Ensembles of climate-model runs are repeated simulations with small variations in initial conditions which
improve the characterization of climate variability. The
Canadian group had completed only one ensemble run
at this time. The Hadley Center had completed three,
but the National Assessment was only able to use one.
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emissions scenario was IS92a, which represented the middle of the range of IPCC’s 1992
scenarios.100 In addition to greenhouse gases,
the scenario included atmospheric loadings of
sulfate aerosols, which were assumed to increase sharply through 2050 and then level off
for the rest of the 21st century.101
The applicability of these two scenarios was
tested by checking the models’ ability to replicate broad patterns of US climate change over
the 20th century when driven by historical greenhouse-gas forcings. Model results were compared against the VEMAP (VegetationEcosystem Mapping and Analysis Project)
dataset, a corrected climatic dataset for the 20th
century. This comparison showed reasonable
accuracy in reproducing the spatial distribution
of average temperatures and century-long temperature trends, but significantly weaker reproduction of observed patterns of precipitation,
mainly because the spatial distribution of precipitation depends on topographic detail that is
too fine-scale to be captured even by the 0.5degree VEMAP grid.102
With the specified scenario of future emissions,
the two climate-model scenarios projected
global warming by 2100 of 4.2°C (Canadian)
and 2.6°C (Hadley).103 These projections were
at the high end and in the middle, respectively,
of the range of warming projected for this emissions scenario by models participating in the
IPCC Third Assessment Report.104 For the continental United States, the two models projected

warming by 2100 of 5.0°C (Canadian) and 2.6°C
(Hadley), at the high end and below the middle,
respectively, of the range of projections in the
IPCC Third Assessment.105 In their projections of
precipitation change over the United States, these
scenarios both lay at the high end – the Hadley
scenario projected the highest precipitation in
2100 and the Canadian the second-highest106 – but
the Canadian model’s greater warming offset the
effect of this precipitation increase on soil moisture, which was projected to decrease over most of
the continental United States.107
Although only the Hadley and Canadian climate-model scenarios were used throughout the
assessment, several others that met some or all
of the assessment’s needs became available during its work. Several region and sector teams
were able to use these additional scenarios. In
some cases, the additional scenarios allowed
groups to strengthen their conclusions. For example, an analysis of future Great Lakes water
levels under climate change using eleven climate models found that ten of these showed
lower levels and only one higher.108 In other
cases, using multiple models allowed more detailed characterization of uncertainties in future
regional changes. For example, the Pacific
Northwest team presented distributions of regional temperature and precipitation change in
the 2030s and 2090s using seven GCMs.109
Despite the National Assessment’s aim of exploring future climate using three distinct types
of scenario, historical scenarios and sensitivity
analyses were less extensively used than GCM
scenarios and featured less prominently in the
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The IS92a scenario is described in section 3.1. There
were small differences among climate-modeling
groups in the way they converted emissions trajectories into atmospheric concentrations and radiative forcings, making the actual scenarios driving each model
run very close, but not quite identical.
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VEMAP members 1995, Kittel et al. 1995.
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NAST 2001:36, Table 2.
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Cubasch et al. 2001, Figure 9.5a:541. While the
Canadian model lies at the high end, it is not an outlier.
The GFDL model (which was more responsive than
the Canadian model, with a climate sensitivity of 4.2°
C) projected higher global warming than the Canadian
model in this scenario for the first few decades of the
century, but only had results through 2060 in time for
the TAR.
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The seven models for which these results were available clustered at the top and the bottom. Three of them
– the Canadian, GFDL, and Hadley 3 models – lay very
close together at the high end, the Canadian the highest by a fraction of a degree; three others lay close together at the low end, Hadley 2 the highest of them by
somewhat less than a degree. A seventh model,
ECHAM4, tracked the high group through 2050, the
last year for which its results were available. Since
these comparisons usually reflect only one ensemble
run of each model, small differences between runs may
reflect consistent inter-model differences, or noise reflected in a single ensemble run. See NAST 2001:547,
Figure 7.
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assessment’s publications. Two uses of historical climate data – describing observed impacts
of climate variability and using observed historical extremes as benchmarks to compare projected future changes – were made by all
groups. To support systematic use of historical
scenarios, the VEMAP 20th-century dataset was
provided to all groups, but no further guidance
was provided on how to generate climate scenarios from these historical data, e.g., on what
periods to choose or how to use them to assess
potential future impacts. Several groups used
these historical data to describe the impacts of
particular recognized patterns of climate variability, such as ENSO or the Pacific Decadal
Oscillation (PDO).110 Many groups examined
past climate extremes, but only in qualitative
ways; most did not follow the approach, taken in
some previous impact studies, of using historical extreme periods as quantitative proxies for
potential future climate.111
The third approach, vulnerability analysis, was
the least used in the National Assessment. This
“inverse” approach involves describing the
properties of a climate-sensitive system, specifying some important change or disruption, and
asking what climate changes would be required
to bring about that disruption and how likely –
based on historical data and model calculations
– such climate changes appear to be. Given the
complex dynamics of climate-sensitive systems
and models of these systems, and the multiple
dimensions of climate on which these can
depend, this approach requires a substantial program of new research, analysis, and methodological development.112 In part because of the
intrinsic difficulty of this task – and in part due
to management and resource problems – this
approach was not pursued. The NAST proposed it, but more tractable approaches to
analyzing climate impacts dominated the assessment’s work. This remains an important
area for further work in development of assessment and modeling methods.
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For an example of such efforts, see the AIACC (Assessments of Impacts and Adaptations to Climate
Change) project, information at http://www.aiaccproject.org.

3.2.2. Socio-economic scenarios
As discussed in Section 2.5 above, assessing
impacts of future climate change can require
specifying not just scenarios of future climate,
but also socio-economic characteristics of the
future society that will experience the changed
climate. Specifying future socio-economic conditions might be necessary for two reasons.
First, socio-economic conditions may influence
the demands placed on particular resources that
are also sensitive to climate change, the value
assigned to them, and the non-climatic stresses
imposed on them. For example, future flow
regimes in river systems will be influenced by
upstream demands for municipal and irrigation
water use, in addition to the changes caused by
climate. Socio-economic scenarios are also
needed to assess climate-change impacts on
human communities – e.g., economic impacts
and their distribution, human health effects, and
vulnerability to extreme events – because socioeconomic characteristics of a community experiencing a changed climate will strongly
influence the community’s vulnerability to
changes and its capacity to adapt.

Socio-economic
scenarios are also
needed to assess
climate-change
impacts on human
communities.

In contrast to climate scenarios, little prior
information or experience was available on constructing scenarios of socio-economic conditions for impact assessment. Consequently, the
assessment developed new methods, using an
approach that combined centralized and decentralized elements. Centralization was needed
because a few variables, such as population,
economic growth, and employment, are likely
to be important in all regions and sectors. For
these, consistent assumptions are required to
allow comparison of impacts across regions and
sectors, and to aggregate from separate assessments up to overall national impacts. A NAST
sub-group developed high, medium, and lowgrowth scenarios of these variables at the national level. These followed the US Census
Bureau high, middle, and low scenarios for fertility and mortality through 2030, but assumed
a wider range of values for net immigration to
account for possible illegal immigration.113
Over this period, national population, GDP, and
employment were disaggregated among regions
and sectors using a commercial regional eco113

Parson et al. 2001:102-103.
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nomic model.114 Beyond 2030, national projections of these variables followed OECD growth
rates in the SRES marker scenarios.115

More useful
assessments of impacts
and vulnerability will
require more extensive
use of socio-economic
scenarios, improved
integration of socioeconomic with climatic
and environmental
scenarios, and
substantial further
investment in
development and
testing of new
methods.

Decentralization was also needed because the
particular socio-economic characteristics that
most strongly influence climate impacts and
vulnerability may differ among regions, activities, and resources. For example, major socioeconomic determinants of climate impacts on
Great Plains agriculture may include the crops
grown, the extent of irrigation, and the technologies used to provide it, while the main determinants of coastal-zone impacts may be
patterns of coastal development, zoning, infrastructure, and local property values. The NAST
judged that those assessing regional or sector
impacts were likely to know more about such
factors than a central body. Consequently, to
support decentralized scenario development, the
NAST proposed a consistent template for assessment teams to follow in creating their own
scenarios. Teams were asked to identify two
socio-economic factors they judged most important for their impacts of concern; to identify
a range of these factors to represent roughly 90
percent confidence; and to create socio-economic scenarios by combining high and low
values of these factors, plus middle or bestguess values if they so chose.
Implementation of socio-economic scenarios in
the National Assessment was weak. Few assessment teams used the proposed approach.
Many made no socio-economic projections at
all, but rather projected only biophysical impacts based on GCM results. One assessment
team found the socio-economic scenarios were
inconsistent with superior local estimates of
current population, and so decided not to use
them.116 The teams that did use the socio-economic scenarios used only aggregate projections of population and economic growth, or in
some cases assumed continuation of present
conditions in the assessment period. None used
the proposed template for identifying and projecting additional important socio-economic
characteristics.

Several factors contributed to this limited use of
socio-economic scenarios. In addition to various managerial and communication problems,
many participants were reluctant to use socioeconomic scenarios, especially the proposed decentralized approach. Some preferred to avoid
any socio-economic projections, implicitly presuming either that socio-economic conditions
did not matter for impacts, or that those that did
matter would remain similar to present conditions. Others objected to specific contents
of the scenarios or the methods used to generate them, or judged that their team lacked
the expertise required to evaluate them. Still
others objected that uncertainties in future
socio-economic conditions made any attempt to
construct scenarios for more than a few years in
the future unacceptably speculative.117 Consequently, while the assessment attempted to advance scenario methods, weak implementation
of these methods limited its ability to identify
key vulnerabilities. More useful assessments of
impacts and vulnerability will require more extensive use of socio-economic scenarios, improved integration of socio-economic with
climatic and environmental scenarios, and substantial further investment in development and
testing of new methods.118

3.2.3. Criticisms and controversies
The National Assessment was the object of substantial political and scientific controversy.
Here, we summarize the major criticisms that
pertain to the development and use of scenarios. Criticisms focused predominantly on the
climate scenarios, especially those derived from
GCMs, probably because these were more precisely defined, widely used in the analyses, and
featured in the assessment’s publications. Three
criticisms of these were advanced.
The first, widely circulated during 2000, was
that the use of non-American climate models
for climate scenarios was inappropriate and potentially injurious to national interests.119 While
this criticism indicates a dimension of political
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vulnerability of the assessment, it does not address the assessment’s technical quality. Since
climate models represent the physics of the
global atmosphere, they contain no representation of political or economic factors. The
Hadley and Canadian global climate models
were extensively documented in peer-reviewed
scientific literature – and, moreover, were the
only models that met the most critical of the assessment’s criteria. That they were developed
by scientific groups outside the United States
has no significance for their ability to provide
scenarios to assess US impacts. Using US models would have avoided this criticism, but at the
cost of either weakening the analysis by using
scenarios that did not meet the assessment’s
needs, or delaying the work by one to two years.
In deciding to proceed with non-US models, assessment organizers judged that these costs
were too high.
The second major criticism was that the two climate-model scenarios used were at the extreme
end of available models in their projected climate change. This is partially correct. When
temperature and precipitation factors are considered together (because high precipitation in
some cases may offset the impacts of high temperature), the Canadian scenario lies at the highimpact end – although not an outlier, as other
IPCC model projections lie close to it – while
the Hadley lies at or somewhat below the middle for most analyses.
The National Assessment’s organizers and its
critics agreed that using more models would
have been preferable, but the assessment was
limited by its schedule and its technical requirements. Given a limit of only two, there can
be good reasons to choose one scenario in the
middle of current projections and one near the
top that provides a plausible upper-bound, but
the significance of the results must then be communicated with great care. Some critics suggested that presentation of results based on the
relatively high Canadian scenario should be
more carefully qualified to highlight its position
near the top of current projections.120 Such
qualifications must be crafted very subtly, however, lest they imply these results may safely be
ignored, when most analyses suggest the full
120

MIT Integrated Assessment project, comments on
National Assessment, Aug 11, 2000:15.

range of future climate-change uncertainty extends both below the Hadley scenario and – in
a long, thin tail – above the Canadian.
A related criticism of the climate scenarios
claimed that the emissions scenario driving
them was implausibly high. The issues bearing
on choice of emission scenarios are similar to
those for choice of climate models. It would be
preferable to have a wide and relevant range of
emissions scenarios driving an impact assessment – at least for the post-2050 period. Using
a wide range of emissions scenarios would also
allow comparison of projected impacts under
high and low emissions futures, and so give insights into what degree of impacts could be
avoided by what degree of mitigation effort.
Model runs with this emissions scenario were
all that were available, however. Moreover,
there is no clear basis to reject this particular
scenario, since it was the scenario most widely
used in climate-model runs at the time and lies
near the middle of the range of both the 1992
and the 2001 IPCC scenarios. Finally, there is
no support for the claim that this scenario was
chosen with the aim of making 21st-century climate change appear as frightening as possible.121 But, although using just two climate
models with one emissions scenario was unavoidable in this assessment, it still represented
a serious limitation. With more model simulations testing a range of emission scenarios already available, future assessments will be able
to remedy this deficiency.
In contrast with the preceding criticisms that the
scenarios used in the assessment understated
uncertainty, another criticism focused on the
disparities between the two scenarios’ projections. Some critics argued that such disparities
– e.g., the Canadian scenario projects the Southeastern states becoming much drier than the
Hadley model does – show that our limited
knowledge of regional climate change makes
any attempt to assess future impacts and vulnerabilities irresponsible.122 This criticism im121
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Disparities between the two models’ projections were
the basis of an unsuccessful lawsuit brought against the
Assessment under the Federal Data Quality Act (See
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paragraph 24.)
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plies that impact assessment should wait until
precise, high-confidence regional climate projections are available. Since a major purpose of
the assessment was to represent current uncertainty about climate change and its impacts,
such discrepancies between model projections
served a valuable purpose, as indications of the
uncertainty of projections at the regional scale –
particularly when the model disparities had a
clear origin, such as differences in projected jetstream location.
Future assessments
will need to invest
substantial resources
in developing the state
of underlying
knowledge, models,
and assessment
methods for
integrating socioeconomic
considerations into
assessments of
climate impacts.

In sum, the National Assessment’s use of climate-change scenarios was hampered by the
lack of available relevant runs, but reflected an
adequate attempt to represent then-understood
variation in climate projections for the United
States. Future assessments will need to use
more climate-model projections – including
multiple ensemble runs – informed by a wider
range of relevant emissions scenarios. The National Assessment attempted to advance the
state of the art in using socio-economic scenarios, but achieved only limited success in implementing its plans. Future assessments will need
to invest substantial resources in developing the
state of underlying knowledge, models, and assessment methods for integrating socio-economic considerations into assessments of
climate impacts. This includes further development of novel approaches to link climate and
socio-economic scenarios, such as the proposed
“inverse” approach to vulnerability analysis.
The experience of the National Assessment
raises three significant issues for future climatechange scenario exercises. First, like several of
the experiences reviewed here, it illustrates the
difficulty and scale of effort involved in producing scenario-based assessments. Second,
the large required start-up effort and time to
build the capacity to conduct such an exercise
illustrates the great value of sustaining analytic
and institutional capacity over time, rather than
relying on separate projects. Such continuity of
capacity will avoid wasteful repetition of startup efforts, support accumulation of learning and
experience, and develop and maintain the required collaborative networks. Finally, the assessment’s experience illustrates both the need
for consistency in large-scale assessments, and
the great specificity of information needs within
particular impact and adaptation assessments.
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This combination of centralized and decentralized information requirements suggests the
need for a cross-scale organizational structure
for developing and applying scenarios, including scenarios of both climate and socio-economic conditions.

3.3.THE UK CLIMATE IMPACTS
PROGRAMME
The UK Climate Impacts Programme (UKCIP)
was established in April 1997 as one element of
a broad program of scientific research, assessment, and support for policy-making on climate
change. The UKCIP supports research and
analysis of impacts for particular regions, sectors, and activities in the UK. The program provides common datasets and tools, as well as
ongoing support to university researchers and
organized stakeholder groups in all UK regions.
As part of its role in stimulating, supporting,
and coordinating decentralized and stakeholderdriven impact analyses, the UKCIP has produced and disseminated three sets of scenarios:
climate scenarios in 1998 and 2002, and socioeconomic scenarios in 2001.
The 1998 climate scenarios provided information only at the rather coarse scale of the Hadley
Centre’s HadCM2 climate model, with four
grid-cells over the entire UK. Four scenarios,
called “high,” “medium-high,” “medium-low,”
and “low,” combined variation in emissions assumptions with variation in assumed climate
sensitivity. The medium-high and medium-low
scenarios both used the HadCM2 model, with a
sensitivity of 2.5°C.123 The medium-high scenario was driven by a 1 percent per year equivalent-CO2 transient scenario, similar to IS92a.
The medium-low scenario was driven by a 0.5
percent per year equivalent-CO2 transient scenario, similar to the lowest IS92 scenario,
IS92d. The high and low scenarios used the
same two emissions scenarios driving a simpler
climate model, whose sensitivity was set at
4.5°C for the high scenario and 1.5°C for the
low. These scenarios were used in an initial impact assessment focusing predominantly on direct biophysical impacts.124 The scenarios did
not include any explicit statements of probabil123
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ity, although their documentation suggested that
the medium-high and medium-low scenarios
“in one sense … may be seen as being equally
likely,”125 while the high and low scenarios captured part of the tails of the distribution. Nor
did they include any potential extreme climate
events such as those associated with large
changes in the North Atlantic circulation.
The UKCIP’s socio-economic scenarios drew
on the Foresight Program, a broader exercise of
the UK Department of Trade and Industry to develop scenarios for long-range planning in several policy areas, with additional detail in areas
relevant to greenhouse-gas emissions and climate impacts.126 As in several other scenario
exercises, developers identified two fundamental uncertainties and combined two alternative
outcomes of each to produce four scenarios.
The two core uncertainties they chose were similar to those used in the SRES exercise: social
and political values, which varied from an increased focus on individual consumption and
personal freedom (“consumerism”) to a widespread elevation of concern for the common
good (“community”); and governance, which
varied from authority and power concentrated
at the national level (“autonomy”), to power
increasingly flowing to global institutions,
downward to local ones, and outward to nongovernmental institutions and civil society
(“interdependence”). The two dimensions of
uncertainty, values and governance, were assumed to be independent of each other. Other
major uncertainties such as demographic
change, the rate and composition of economic
growth, and the rate and direction of technological change, were treated largely as consequences of alternative realizations of the two
core dimensions of values and governance.127
The four scenarios built around these two
dimensions of variation were called “National
Enterprise,” “World Markets,” “Local Stewardship,” and “Global Sustainability.” Each was
initially developed as a qualitative narrative of
future conditions in UK society intended to
apply broadly to both the 2020s and 2050s.
Each scenario specified several dozen socio-

economic characteristics qualitatively, including multiple aspects of economic development,
settlement and planning, values and policy, agriculture, water, biodiversity, coastal zone development, and the built environment.128
Each scenario was also realized in projections
of multiple quantitative variables, at the national
scale only. For the 2020s, these provided detail
on population, GDP (including the governmental share and the sector split between industry,
agriculture, and services); household numbers
and average household size; land use and rates
of change; total transport and modal split; agricultural production (including such details as
chemical and financial inputs, subsidies, yields,
and organic area); freshwater supply, demand,
and quality; and several indicators of biodiversity and coastal vulnerability. For the 2050s a
smaller set of quantitative variables was projected, describing population, GDP, land use,
and transport. The plausibility of projections
was checked, mainly by comparing projected
future rates of change to historical experience.
The scenarios were published with a detailed
guidance document, which provided suggestions on how to use them together with climate
scenarios for impact studies.129

The UKCIP’s socioeconomic scenarios
drew on the Foresight
Program, a broader
exercise of the UK
Department of Trade
and Industry to
develop scenarios for
long-range planning in
several policy areas,
with additional detail in
areas relevant to
greenhouse-gas
emissions.

As of 2005, the socio-economic scenarios had
been used in six impact studies.130 There has
been some difficulty applying the national-level
scenarios in specific, smaller-scale regions.
The most ambitious use has been a preliminary
integrated assessment of climate impacts
and responses in two regions of England, the
Northwest and East Anglia.131 This study produced four integrated scenarios of regional
climate impacts, by pairing each of the four
socio-economic scenarios with one climate scenario based on a rough correspondence between
the socio-economic scenario and the IPCC
emissions scenario underlying the climate scenario132 Based on these four scenarios, the
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Regional (National) Enterprise was taken as UKCIP
High (IPCC A2); Global Markets as UKCIP MediumHigh (A1B); Regional (Local) Stewardship UKCIP
Medium-Low (B2); and Global Sustainability UKCIP
Low (B1).

45

The U.S. Climate Change Science Program

The UK program’s
experience highlights
some of the same
issues for future
scenario exercises as
the US National
Assessment, in
particular the
importance of
continuity of
institutional and
analytic capability and
the desirability of
developing and
supporting scenarios
using an organizational
structure that
combines centralized
and decentralized
elements.
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study elaborated preliminary regional scenarios
corresponding to the four national socio-economic scenarios, and conducted an assessment
of coastal-zone impacts and responses using
these scenarios and a formal land-use model.

threat assessment, a set of scenarios of flood
risk, and a set of policy recommendations. An
evaluation of this study’s effects one year later
found that it was being used by several public
and private actors to inform decision-making.133

Four new climate scenarios were produced in
2002, based on the SRES marker scenarios and
new versions of Hadley Center climate models.
These new scenarios differed only in their emissions assumptions, not climate sensitivity. The
high, medium-high, medium-low, and low scenarios were driven by the A1FI, A2, B2, and B1
marker scenarios, respectively. These were used
to drive the HadCM3 global climate model
(with a grid-scale of 250-300 km), generating
climate-change projections for 30-year future
periods centered on the decades of the 2020s,
2050s, and 2080s. For some emissions scenarios and time periods, climate projections were
processed through a nested hierarchy of three
Hadley Center climate models: the HadCM3
model at global scale, the HadAM3H model at
intermediate scale, with a horizontal resolution
of about 120 km, and the HadRM3 model for
high-resolution climate projections in the
United Kingdom and Europe, with a horizontal
resolution of about 50 km. This nested processing was done for the baseline period (19601990), and for the most distant projection period
(2070-2100) to produce three ensemble runs for
the medium-high (A2) emissions scenario and
one for the medium-low (B2). For the other
emissions scenarios and the intervening projection periods, results of the global-scale model
were downscaled using statistical patterns of
fine spatial-scale climate variation derived from
full runs using scenario A2. These scenarios
were widely distributed and supported through
a web-based interface, including map-based
graphical display of projected changes in more
than a dozen climate indicators on a fine-scale
(50 km) grid of the United Kingdom.

The UKCIP, in contrast to the US National Assessment, has built a sustained assessment capability. In addition, the central program has
less authority over the separate assessments, instead acting more as motivator, resource, and
light coordinator. Access to scenarios is to licensed users, of whom there are about 130 –
roughly half in universities, the rest about
equally split among private sector and all levels
of government. Most active users have been national officials responsible for climate-sensitive
resources, with less participation from the private sector and local governments.134

Several analyses are continuing to use the 2002
climate scenarios in conjunction with the socioeconomic scenarios. For example, a 2004 integrated analysis of flood risk and erosion control
over a 30-100 year time horizon produced a
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The program has invested in generating, disseminating, and documenting useful climate
scenarios for impacts users. The jury appears
to still be out on whether the level of effort and
success is similar for socio-economic scenarios,
which have not yet been either downscaled or
repeated. Getting scenarios used is a slow
process, but the scenarios produced by this program are starting to be used by decision-makers
in support of their practical responsibilities. A
significant limitation of the program, however,
is its exclusive reliance on just one family
of climate models. This may pose risks of
under-estimating future climate uncertainty and
over-confidence in assessments of potential climate impacts and responses. Although the UK
program followed a substantially different organizational model from the US National Assessment, its experience highlights some of the
same issues for future scenario exercises, in particular the importance of continuity of institutional and analytic capacity and the desirability
of developing and supporting scenarios using
an organizational structure that combines centralized and decentralized elements.
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3.4. THE MILLENNIUM
ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA)
was a large, United Nations (UN)-sponsored assessment of the current status, present trends,
and longer-term challenges to the world’s
ecosystems, including climate change and other
sources of stress. Conducted between 2001 and
2005, the MEA sought to assess changes in
ecosystems in terms of the services they provide
to people and the effects of ecosystem change
on human well-being. It also sought to identify
and assess methods to mitigate and respond to
ecosystem change, for various private and public-sector decision-makers, including those responsible for the several international treaties
that deal with ecosystems.135 More than 1350
authors from 95 countries participated in the
global assessment’s four working groups, and
hundreds more in about 30 associated subglobal assessments. The assessment’s goals
were broad, ranging from providing a benchmark for future assessments and guiding future
research to identifying priorities for action.136
Results of the global assessment were presented
in a March 2005 synthesis report, and in additional volumes presenting the output of the assessment’s four working groups, “Current State
and Trends,” “Scenarios,” “Policy Responses,”
and “Multi-Scale Assessments.” The current
state and trends group examined ecosystem
trends over the past 50 years and projections to
2015; the scenarios group took a longer view to
2050 and beyond. Because of time limitations,
the work of these two groups proceeded
largely independently.
All components of the assessment used a common large-scale conceptual framework, which
distinguished indirect drivers of ecosystem
change, direct drivers, ecosystem indicators,
ecosystem services, measures of human wellbeing, and response options. Direct drivers included direct human perturbations of the

environment such as climate change, air pollution, land-use and land-cover change, resource
consumption, and external inputs to ecosystems
such as irrigation and synthetic fertilizer use.
Indirect drivers included underlying socio-economic factors such as population, economic
growth, technological change, policies, attitudes, and lifestyles.137
The scenarios working group sought to apply
this conceptual framework to long-term trends
in ecosystems, looking ahead to 2050 with more
limited projections to 2100. They developed the
structure of the scenarios in an iterative process,
including consultations with potential scenario
users and experts in a wide range of decisionmaking positions around the world.138 Like several other major scenario exercises, they initially
sought to identify two basic dimensions of uncertainty in long-term ecosystem stresses,
which together would produce four scenarios.139
For the first dimension, like SRES they chose
globalization: continuation and acceleration of
present global integration trends, versus reversal
of these trends to increasing separation and isolation of nations and regions. For the second dimension, in contrast to the broad value-based
uncertainties used in the SRES and UKCIP scenarios, they chose one more specifically related
to ecosystems: whether responses to increasing
ecosystem stresses are predominantly reactive
– waiting until evidence of deterioration and
loss of services is clear – or predominantly
proactive, taking protective measures in advance of their clear need. The combination of
two polar values of each of these uncertainties
yielded four scenarios, summarized in Table 3.2.

The MEA sought to
assess changes in
ecosystems in terms of
the services they
provide to people and
the effects of
ecosystem change on
human well-being.

The Global Orchestration (global, reactive) scenario presented a globally integrated world with
low population growth, high economic growth,
and strong efforts to reduce poverty and invest
in public goods such as education. In this scenario, society focuses on liberal economic values, follows an energy-intensive lifestyle with
no explicit greenhouse-gas mitigation policy,
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WORLD DEVELOPMENT
Global

Regional

Reactive

Global Orchestration

Order from Strength

Proactive

TechnoGarden

Adapting Mosaic

and takes a reactive approach to ecosystem
problems.140 In Order from Strength (regional,
reactive) the reactive approach to ecosystem
problems takes place in a fragmented world preoccupied with security and less attentive to public goods.141 This scenario exhibits the highest
population growth and lowest economic growth.
Economic growth is particularly low in the developing countries, and it decreases over time.
In Adapting Mosaic (regional, proactive), political and economic activity are concentrated at
the regional ecosystem scale. Societies invest
heavily in protection and management of
ecosystems in locally organized and diverse efforts. Population growth is nearly as high as in
Order from Strength, and economic growth is
initially slow but increases after 2020. Finally,
TechnoGarden (global, proactive) presents a
world that is both focused on ecosystem management and globally connected, with strong
development of environmentally friendly technology. Population growth is moderate, and economic growth is relatively high and increasing.142
Each scenario was initially constructed as a
qualitative description. Population and GDP
were specified quantitatively, while all other indirect drivers – including social, political, and
cultural factors – were qualitative. Population
scenarios were derived from the International
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis’
(IIASA’s) 2001 probabilistic projections, capturing the middle 50-60 percent of the distribu-
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tion, with world population in 2050 ranging
from 8.1 billion (Global Orchestration) to 9.6
billion (Order from Strength).143 No statements
of probability or likelihood were made about the
scenarios.
From the indirect drivers, a more specific and
quantified set of direct drivers was developed,
using formal models where possible. Species
introduction and removal was the only unquantified direct driver.144 Separate pre-existing models were used of the world energy-economy,
greenhouse-gas emissions and climate change,
air pollution, land-use change, freshwater, terrestrial ecosystems, biodiversity, and marine
and freshwater fisheries. To the extent possible, these quantitative models were used to reason from indirect and direct drivers to
ecosystem effects, changes in ecosystem services, and effects on human well-being.145 In
some cases this was achieved by soft-linking
models, using outputs from one as inputs to another, but this was limited by different variable
definitions, spatial and temporal resolution, and
other model incompatibilities.146 Not all scenario elements could be modeled quantitatively,
so expert judgments were also extensively used.
The qualitative scenario process proceeded in
parallel with quantitative modeling – elaborating aspects of the scenarios that were not
amenable to modeling, filling gaps, and stipulating feedbacks between ecosystem services
and human well-being and behavior.147
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This scenario was originally named “Fortress World”
(report of first meeting of MEA global modeling
group, Jan 7, 2003). The later name reflected participants’ judgments that in such a decentralized world
preoccupied with security concerns, maintaining global
order would require democratic nations to be militarily
strong – i.e., it is a world of “realist” international affairs (MEA 2006:133)

142

48

MEA 2006:131.

143

MEA 2006:182.

144

MEA 2006:304, Table 9.2.

145

MEA 2006, Table S3.

146

MEA 2005, Table S2.

147

MEA 2006:155.

Global-Change Scenarios - Their Development and Use
The groups attempted to check for consistency
between quantitative and qualitative scenario elements through periodic consultations,
particularly for feedbacks that could not be
modeled analytically. Some of these were
interactions between direct drivers and ecosystems, but the most difficult occurred in scenarios that assumed strong socio-economic
feedbacks and regulating mechanisms. Adapting Mosaic, for example, assumed strong feedbacks from new ecosystem observations and
knowledge to changes in human behavior that
could not be incorporated into the models used.
Representing these required allowing qualitative scenario logic to override both the quantitative results and the structure of models.
Unfortunately, time limits prevented this consistency checking from being done thoroughly,
so unexamined disparities between qualitative
and quantitative aspects of the scenarios remained a significant weakness.
Many of the conclusions developed from the
scenarios are common to all four scenarios,
while in others Order from Strength is the exception. For example, one major conclusion is
that rapid conversion of ecosystems for use in
agriculture, cities, and infrastructure will continue, and that habitat loss will continue to
contribute to biodiversity loss. However, if
ecosystem services increase as projected, some
ecosystem services – although not biodiversity
– may be decoupled from ecosystem stresses.
Food security is projected to remain out of
reach for many people. Extreme, spatially
diverse changes are projected for freshwater resources, with general deterioration in developing
countries under both “reactive” scenarios. Increasing demands for fishery products are projected to increase risks of regional marine fishery
collapses.148 In sum, ecosystem services show
mixes of improving and worsening trends in all
scenarios except Order from Strength, in which
nearly all ecosystem services are projected to be
more impaired in 2050 than in 2000. The same
three scenarios also suggest that significant
changes in policies, institutions, and practices
can mitigate some negative consequences.149

In sum, the MEA scenarios project invested
substantially more effort in developing rich
qualitative and narrative scenarios than the
SRES, but also fell short on integrating qualitative and quantitative components. In part because of the greater elaboration of the
qualitative components, this limited coordination resulted in significant inconsistencies and
requirements to resolve conflicts between the
two components. These inconsistencies arose
even with just one model used for several components of the assessment, so the challenges of
harmonization among models – and the associated possibility to explore model-structure uncertainty – did not arise. A related problem was
that for many factors it was difficult to generate
the desired level of variation between scenarios.150 This raises issues of potential methodological interest, such as how to distinguish
robust results from inadvertent convergence of
assumptions or model structures, which remain
to be investigated. Finally, the great breadth of
conditions represented in the scenarios, as well
as possible concerns with logical circularity
between their presumptions and results,151
make interpreting the significance of the
results difficult.
The experience of this scenario exercise provides a different perspective on some of the
same key challenges for future scenarios highlighted by the other activities reviewed. The
quite distinct difficulties faced here in attempting to combine quantitative and qualitative scenarios highlight the central importance and the
difficulty of developing new methods to integrate these two approaches. In addition, this experience highlights the value of clarity about the
intended uses of scenarios, including clarity
about whether they are intended to address specific questions, guide decisions, or explore longterm conditions. The risk of scenarios becoming
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This concern is particularly present regarding implications of the assumption that ecosystem management
is either proactive or reactive (See, e.g., MEA 2006, Ch
8.4.2.1 and Ch 9).
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less useful due to breadth and vagueness may be
particularly acute for scenarios that attempt to
capture multiple stresses on some system – even
though such multi-stress assessment is repeatedly
advocated for climate-change and other forms of
environmental assessment.152
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SECTION

4

Challenges and
Controversies in
Scenarios for Climate Change

This section discusses several issues that have arisen in multiple scenario exercises related to climate change, issues that pose challenges for expanding the usefulness of scenarios to climate
change analysis, assessment, and decision support. Section 4.1 examines the type of information
needs of specific types of decisions related to climate change and considers the requirements and
challenges of crafting scenarios to serve these needs. Section 4.2 considers the use of scenarios
that has been more common thus far, in structuring climate-change assessments and framing
broad policy debates, and identifies the distinct challenges in enhancing the value of scenarios in
these purposes. The remaining sub-sections examine particular design challenges in crafting scenario exercises: how to structure interactions between experts and stakeholders in developing
scenarios; how to communicate scenarios to potential users not involved in their creation; how
to pursue the two, not perfectly aligned goals of consistency and integration in scenarios; and
how to represent and interpret uncertainty in scenarios. Throughout this section, we present illustrative examples of scenario activities in text boxes. These examples shed additional light on
various challenges, especially relating to scenarios’ use in decision-making.

4.1. SCENARIOS AND DECISIONS
As discussed in Section 1, the general purpose of scenarios is to inform decisions, but their connection to specific, identified decisions can be more or less close and direct. In interpreting and
evaluating present experience with scenarios and identifying key challenges in making them more
useful, it is important to distinguish scenario exercises by their major characteristics, including
their specificity, their proximity to decisions, the degree of normative presumptions embedded in
them, and where they lie in the causal chain outlined in Section 2. To consider how scenarios can
help inform climate-change decisions, we must first specify the relevant decisions and decisionmakers more sharply. This section considers the major concrete decisions that comprise a response
to climate change. Decisions related to assessment, modeling, and research are considered in Section 4.2. This discussion must be somewhat hypothetical, extending from rather thin current practice to reasonable speculation about future decisions and likely information needs.
Because the dynamics of climate change operate on multiple spatial scales from the local to the
global, there is no single global climate-change decision-maker. Rather, many distinct decisionmakers with diverse responsibilities will affect and be affected by climate change. Because of climate’s recent appearance on policy agendas and its dense connections to other issues, many of
these decision-makers’ primary responsibilities are defined as something other than climate change.
Some of them are already considering how climate change might affect their responsibilities, but
many are not.
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All three groups face
decisions under
uncertainty with longterm consequences
related to climate
change, and so might
benefit from scenarios
providing structured
information and
assumptions about the
values at stake, the
available choices, and
their consequences
under alternative
climate-change futures.
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Section 2 described climate-change decisions
using the conventional dichotomy of mitigation
versus adaptation. To consider potential contributions of scenarios in more detail, we discuss
three types of decision-maker: national officials,
impacts and adaptation managers, and energy
resource and technology managers. These can
often be identified as particular programs, divisions, agencies, organizations, or individuals,
each with different responsibilities and types of
information they might consider in making their
decisions. All three groups face decisions under
uncertainty with long-term consequences related
to climate change, and so might benefit from scenarios providing structured information and assumptions about the values at stake, the available
choices, and their consequences under alternative climate-change futures.

preparedness or public health officials; officials
making zoning or coastal development policy;
or firms in insurance or financial markets who
may bear secondary risks from impacts or seek
to develop new instruments to exchange these
risks. Unlike national officials, these actors’
decisions are purely responses to climate
change, realized or anticipated: they have little
influence over how the climate will change.
Their responsibilities will often connect with
the impacts-related responsibilities of national
officials, but are narrower in scale or scope. Impacts and adaptation managers would be concerned not with aggregate climate-change
impacts on the United States, but with more
specific impacts such as those on seasonal flows
and water-management operations on the
Upper Mississippi.

National officials’ responsibilities are the broadest and the most likely to be explicitly related to
climate change. They develop national policies
that target greenhouse-gas emissions and motivate investment in technologies that will influence future emissions trends. They negotiate
policies internationally with officials from other
nations, and with sub-national officials who
may share mitigation responsibilities or undertake mitigation measures at their own initiative.
They also have responsibilities to anticipate and
respond to climate-change impacts in their nations. Their climate-change responsibilities are
open-ended, not limited to mitigation and
adaptation: these decision-makes will determine the extent to which other responses such
as geoengineering are considered, and the design of systems and institutions for assessment. They are also responsible for overall
national welfare, including not just the environmental effects of their decisions but also other
linked national interests such as economic prosperity and security.

Energy resource and technology managers include developers and operators of fossil or nonfossil energy resources, investors in long-lived
energy-dependent capital stock such as electrical utilities, and researchers, innovators, and investors in new energy-related technologies.
These decision-makers are mostly but not exclusively in the private sector. Their decisions
may have consequences that interact with various processes operating over multiple timescales, from short-term market responses, to
decadal-scale processes of investment, resource
development and depletion, and penetration of
new technologies, to century-scale processes of
climate change.153 These actors’ decisions will
strongly influence society’s ability to control
greenhouse-gas emissions. This group also includes energy consumers such as firms or public agencies considering mitigation actions in their
own operations. While their areas of responsibility may be vulnerable to climate change and its
impacts, the largest climate-related risks for this
group are likely to come not from climate
change itself, but from climate-change policies:
national mitigation policies, and other market
and regulatory decisions that shape the outcomes
of private mitigation activities.

Impacts and adaptation managers have responsibility for particular assets, resources, or interests that might be sensitive to climate change.
They must decide how to anticipate, prepare for,
and respond to the threat, minimize its harm,
and maximize any associated benefit. They
may be private or public actors – e.g., owners
or managers of long-lived assets such as ports
or water-management facilities; managers of
lands, forests, or protected areas; emergency
52

At greatly varying levels of precision and specificity, scenarios can present two types of information to support decisions by these three types
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of actors. Scenarios can represent potential future developments that may threaten decisionmakers’ interests or values, call for decisions,
or challenge conventional thinking and practices. And they can provide a structure to assess potential consequences of alternative
decisions for things that matter to the decisionmaker. Beyond this generalization, the three
types of decision-makers will differ substantially in the specific types of information they
need, the time horizons of their decisions, and
the type and extent of causal connections between their decisions and the conditions
specified in scenarios.

4.1.1. Scenario needs:
national officials
As national officials have the broadest responsibilities related to climate change, they are also
likely to have the broadest information needs.
In their responsibilities to build national adaptation capacity and manage key vulnerabilities,
their needs are similar to those of impacts and
adaptation managers: scenarios of potential future climate change under specified emissions
assumptions and resultant impacts on particular
resources and communities in their nation, with
particular focus on areas of greatest vulnerability. They will likely have less need for fine spatial and sectoral detail in potential impacts, but
more need for consistent scenarios that allow
comparison and aggregation across sub-national
regions and sectors. These will help to prioritize, identify key areas of vulnerability, and estimate aggregate costs for planning purposes.
In their responsibilities for national mitigation
policy, national decision-makers will also need
information about the aggregate impacts of
climate change, since the more severe climate
impacts are likely to be, the greater the justification and likely political support for mitigation
measures. But mitigation decisions also require
additional information – including projections
of future emissions in the absence of explicit
mitigation efforts, and the consequences of alternative mitigation policies, in their effects on emissions, their cost, and their implications for other
dimensions of national interest.

These needs introduce a dimension of complexity into mitigation scenarios, sometimes
called “reflexivity.” Because mitigation policies
seek to reduce future emissions by altering the
socio-economic drivers of emissions growth,
the analysis of mitigation policies and their consequences must be coupled to the causal logic of
emissions scenarios. Whereas climate scenarios
can be treated as exogenous when assessing
adaptation decisions, emissions scenarios cannot be treated as exogenous in assessing mitigation decisions. Any emissions scenario
embeds some assumptions about mitigation
policies, assumptions that may have to be
changed to assess particular mitigation policies.
This effect will be strongest when emissions
projections and mitigation options are being
considered at the same spatial scale, e.g., national mitigation policies are being assessed relative to national emissions projections. The
effect of national mitigation strategies on global
emissions will be weaker: no nation controls
global emissions trends, and the effects of small
nations’ mitigation strategies on global trends
can be very small.

Any emissions scenario
embeds some
assumptions about
mitigation policies,
assumptions that may
have to be changed to
assess particular
mitigation policies.

Scenarios to inform mitigation decisions are
also likely to require considering alternative assumptions about the policy context in which
these decisions are made. The effects of national mitigation strategies – including how
much they reduce national emissions, as well as
their costs and other consequences – will depend on the economic, technological, and policy
context, including related decisions by other
major nations, individually and through international coordination. Assumptions about the
policy context will be less important in scenarios to inform international mitigation decisions,
since when decisions are globally coordinated
there is no “elsewhere” – but alternative assumptions about nations’ degrees of compliance
and form of implementation of international
commitments may still be needed.
Scenarios of emissions, climate change, and impacts inform mitigation decisions by helping to
characterize the potential severity of climate
change and therefore how important it is to control emissions. This support is indirect, serving
primarily to elevate or moderate the general
level of concern on the issue. More focused
work on mitigation has been done using con53
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structed scenarios of limited emissions, often
aiming at stabilizing atmospheric concentrations
or radiative forcing at various levels, and examining the configurations of technology, energy resources, and economic and population growth
that are consistent with the specified scenario.
Some studies have used quantitative models to
estimate costs of such scenarios, relative to an assumed baseline emissions scenario.154

4.1.2. Scenario needs: impacts and
adaptation managers
Impacts and adaptation
managers need
scenarios of potential
future climate change,
its impacts in their
areas of responsibility,
and the factors
that influence
vulnerabilities. Energy
and technology
managers will most
benefit from scenarios
that explore
alternative policy
regimes and their
consequences for the
value of energy and
technology assets and
investments.

To assess the threats and opportunities they face
and evaluate responses, impacts and adaptation
managers need scenarios of potential future climate change, its impacts in their areas of responsibility, and the factors that influence
vulnerabilities. With few exceptions, these actors’ decisions will have no effect on the climate
change to which they must respond, so scenarios of climate-change stresses can be constructed independently of the assessment of
potential adaptation decisions, without concern
for feedbacks that may modify the conditions
specified in the scenario.
Particular decision-makers’ needs will be highly
specific in the variables they require, and their
time and spatial scale and resolution. A planner
of water-management infrastructure may need
monthly or finer-scale rain and snow projections over a watershed; a designer of coastal infrastructure may need probabilistic projections
of sea level, storm intensity and frequency,
storm surge, or saltwater intrusion. But in their
climatic elements, these information needs all
rest on a common core of scenarios of global
climate change and emissions drivers. This dual
structure of information – highly particular climate variables, based on a set of common “core
scenarios” – suggests a cross-scale organizational structure for providing scenario information: commonly produced scenarios of
climate change and other components requiring consistency, specialized expertise, or highcost resources; development of decentralized
capabilities in impact assessments to adapt these
core scenario elements and develop assessmentspecific extensions; and close communication
between these groups to ensure that useful vari-

ables are generated and saved, and that data and
documentation are transferred accurately.
This is the area of climate-related decisions for
which the provision of information from climate-change scenarios is most advanced. Still,
further progress is needed in the development
and use of scenarios of socio-economic conditions, and in creation of methods and tools
to augment centrally provided scenario information with information tailored to specific
impact assessments. In addition, many impactsrelated decisions will require scenarios of climate change in the context of other linked
stresses and changes.

4.1.3. Scenario needs: energy
resource and technology managers
Energy and technology managers will most benefit from scenarios that explore alternative policy regimes and their consequences for the
value of energy and technology assets and investments. For some, the predominant concern
may be overall policy stringency, perhaps summarized as alternative emissions-price trajectories over time; for others, specific details of
policy design and implementation may need to
be considered. Scenarios of emissions, climate
change, and impacts only matter for decisions
via their likely influence on policy stringency,
and so do not need to be explicitly represented
in scenarios. These actors may have some influence on policy, but probably not such strong
influence that climate-policy scenarios would
have to incorporate feedbacks from their own
advocacy efforts.
Unlike the other two types of decision-makers,
these actors are likely to compete with each
other. If, for example, they are investors allocating research effort between higher and loweremitting energy sources, those who better
anticipate future policy will benefit relative to
those who do worse. If they use scenarios, they
may consequently choose to produce them privately, perhaps coupled with other analyses to
generate practical guidelines for investments.155
As for the other types of decision-makers, these
specialized scenarios could be based on general
scenarios of global emissions and climate
155
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change. Published scenarios produced to date
on the climate-change issue, however, have not
considered mitigation policies with the specificity necessary to inform these actors’ decisions.

4.1.4. Representing decisions
in scenarios
A major challenge to developing scenarios to
support decisions is reflexivity, that is, how to
represent decisions within scenarios without
making scenarios either circular or contradictory. In meeting this challenge, the most basic
distinction to draw is between decisions by the
scenario’s targeted users and decisions by other
actors. From the users’ perspective, decisions
by others over which they have no influence are
indistinguishable from non-choice events. If the
factors influencing these decisions are confidently understood, they might be represented
deterministically, like well-understood biophysical or economic processes. In the more frequent case that others’ choices cannot be
confidently predicted, they might be represented
as uncertainties – again, just like uncertain biophysical or economic processes. As with all uncertainties, how to treat them depends on their
judged importance for the users’ decisions: if it
is high, they can be represented in alternative
scenarios; if not, they can be fixed at some bestguess value for all scenarios. In either case,
these decisions are treated exogenously.
Representing decisions by the scenario users is
fundamentally different. Since the scenarios are
intended to inform these decisions, alternative
choices should not be represented as exogenous
uncertainties but be stipulated independently
from the scenarios. Users can then explore their
implications under conditions imposed by scenarios, including representation of major uncertainties. Various degrees of coupling can be
required between the logic of scenarios and the
analysis of consequences of the users’ decisions.
In scenarios for impacts, these can usually be
separate; in scenarios for mitigation, they may
have to be closely coupled, since emissions scenarios may change under alternative assumptions about mitigation decisions.
In scenarios to inform global climate-change
decisions, the sharpest question is how to represent mitigation decisions within scenarios.

Following the general reasoning above, how
these are treated should depend on what type of
decision is being informed. In climate scenarios to inform impact assessments and related
decisions, the scenario users are not considering mitigation decisions and have little influence over them, so emissions scenarios should
include assumptions about the likely or plausible range of mitigation efforts. The range of future climate change considered may thus be
narrowed to reflect the possibility of negative
social and political feedbacks: sustained rapid
emissions growth may generate pressure for aggressive mitigation, due to increasing signs of
climate change, alarming projections of future
change, or other environmental harms from
rapid expansion of coal or synthetic fuels.
Such a negative-feedback mechanism may not
be effective, of course. Many factors could intervene: mitigation measures may not gain
enough support to be adopted, socio-political
capacity to enact stringent policies may be diminished, policies adopted may be ineffective,
or early technology or policy decisions may
lock in high-emitting future paths. But to the
extent that such a negative-feedback mechanism
does operate, persistence of the highest emissions paths beyond a few decades would become unlikely.

In climate scenarios to
inform impact
assessments and
related decisions …
emissions scenarios
should include
assumptions about the
likely or plausible
range of mitigation
efforts.

Parallel reasoning may apply to extremely low
emission paths, if sustaining such low emissions
requires continued costly mitigation efforts that
come to be seen as unnecessary. This negativefeedback mechanism would likely be weaker
than that operating at the high end of the emissions distribution, however, because long timeconstants mean that increasing signs of climate
change are likely to continue through most of
the 21st century even if we follow a low-emissions path. If impacts assessors and managers
judge these negative feedbacks to make extreme
emissions paths sufficiently unlikely, particularly high ones, they may reasonably decide not
to consider these extreme emissions futures in
their planning for adaptation.
For scenarios to inform mitigation decisions,
particularly at the international level, the situation is different. Informing these choices requires information about potential emissions
paths and their consequences under all levels of
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…in contrast to
scenarios for impacts,
extreme emissions
futures should not be
excluded when
assessing mitigation
decisions. … Scenarios
to inform mitigation
decisions must
consider alternative
mitigation choices
explicitly, not embed
them implicitly in the
underlying logic of the
scenario.
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mitigation effort that decision-makers might
plausibly consider – including no additional
measures, or even reversal of previous measures
if this is on the agenda. Consequently, in contrast to scenarios for impacts, extreme emissions futures should not be excluded when
assessing mitigation decisions. For example, if
scenarios that truncate high-emissions futures
by assuming stringent mitigation are used to
support a decision that stringent mitigation is
not necessary, the result is contradictory: a conclusion supporting a decision is based on the
presumption of the contrary decision. To avoid
such contradictions, scenarios to inform mitigation decisions must consider alternative mitigation choices explicitly, not embed them
implicitly in the underlying logic of the scenario.
Moreover, national officials act only for their
own nations in the near term, even when they
negotiate global mitigation. They may make
choices for long-term planning and institutional
design for future mitigation as well, but it is
their successors who will decide whether to
continue, strengthen, or otherwise change measures adopted today. From the perspective of
current national officials, mitigation decisions
by other nations and in the future fall between
the two cases discussed above: they are not controlled by the scenario user, but can be influenced to some degree. For policy choices by
other nations, national officials may need to be
advised in two modes, reflecting their dual responsibilities to make national policy and to negotiate international agreements. In the latter
capacity, alternative approaches to global mitigation strategy should be represented as
choices. But when they consider national decisions separate from globally coordinated strategy, relevant decisions of other major nations
should be represented as uncertainties. This
may require use of two distinct types of scenarios to advise development of different aspects
of national mitigation policy.
How to represent future mitigation decisions
poses a still harder dilemma. On the one hand,
it appears risky or even irresponsible to assume
that the bulk of mitigation efforts can be left to
future decision-makers, even if we assume this
will be easier for them because of greater wealth
or technological prowess. On the other hand,
assuming that future decision-makers cannot be
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relied on to act responsibly at all can easily lead
to decisions that incur excessive costs, by trying to achieve rapid mitigation immediately or
tie future decision-makers’ hands.
Two approaches appear promising for integrating future mitigation decisions into scenarios to
inform current decisions. Scenarios could presume that today’s decision-makers choose the
future path of mitigation, allowing them to assess and contribute to a trajectory of effort that
considers the welfare of both current and future
citizens. Alternatively, scenarios could treat future large-scale mitigation choices as uncertainties represented in alternative scenarios,
while also considering how current choices can
seek to influence the opportunities and incentives faced by future decision-makers.
In sum, the importance of connecting scenarios
to actual decisions is widely recognized, but
there is a large gap between, on the one hand,
the value scenarios could provide to climatechange decisions and the aspirations of scenario
producers to provide that value, and current
practice on the other hand. There has been little use of scenarios to directly inform climatechange related decisions, although there appears
to be a sharp increase in the interest of decisionmakers and early attempts. The rapid increase
in interest is particularly evident for informing
decisions related to climate-change impacts and
adaptation. There are fewer indications of similarly direct use of scenarios to inform mitigation
decisions, perhaps in part because nearly all current mitigation decisions have been near-term.
Mitigation decisions at the national and international level have taken scenarios into account
indirectly. Most scenarios have been constructed to provide inputs to assessments, models, or other analyses. This has included serving
as inputs to the production of other types of scenarios, which then describe other potential future conditions that depend on those specified
in the scenario, as for example a model-based
climate scenario depends on inputs from an
emissions scenario. While these uses can be
characterized as supporting decisions (i.e., decisions about assessments, modeling, and research), their connection to concrete decisions
of mitigation and adaptation is indirect,
achieved through contributions such as sup-
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porting strategic planning and risk assessment,
providing advance analysis for potential future
decisions, exploring plausible extreme cases,
helping to characterize and prioritize key uncertainties, or educating decision-makers or the

public. This description applies to the major
scenario exercises discussed in this report, including the IPCC emissions and climate scenarios, the US and UK assessments of climate
impacts, and the MEA scenarios.

BOX 4.1. Scenarios for Climate-Change Adaptation
in the New York Metropolitan Region
Three linked activities – the Metropolitan East Coast (MEC) assessment of the US National Assessment, the New York Climate and Health project (NYCHP), and the New York City Department
of Environmental Protection (NYCDEP) Task Force on Climate Change – have used or are using
scenarios to assess impacts of climate change on the New York Metropolitan Region, identify areas
of vulnerability, and inform regional planning and decision-making.156
The MEC assessment began with a regional workshop in April 1998, involving about 150 participants,
including public agencies at all levels of government as well as climate researchers. The subsequent
assessment was conducted by sector teams of researchers and officials from agencies responsible
for the study sectors. Teams developed regional scenarios of climate change and sea level rise based
on the downscaled climate-model scenarios provided by the US National Assessment, plus two additional scenarios based on extrapolation of recent regional climate trends and historical extremes.
The scenarios were used to project climate-change impacts on beach nourishment, 100 and 500year flood heights, wetland aggregation and loss, adequacy of the water supply system under
droughts and floods, illnesses from acute air-pollution episodes, and peak energy loads. These impact projections were used for preliminary assessment of adaptation strategies and policies.
Following the MEC Assessment, the NYCHP created updated regional climate scenarios in consultation with an expert-stakeholder Advisory Board. This study further analyzed public health impacts,
focusing on air quality and extreme heat events. The updated climate scenarios used the IPCC A2
and B2 emissions scenarios driving global and regional climate models to create downscaled scenarios for the region. These were augmented with newly developed scenarios of future regional land
use and population growth based on the IPCC A2 and B2 storylines.
In response to the widespread public attention received by the MEC Assessment Report, the Commissioner of the NYCDEP established the Climate Change Task Force, a collaboration among regional researchers and the agency that manages the water system. The Task Force uses the latest
climate-model simulations from the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, as well as additional global and
regional climate models, to develop new regional scenarios. These will include probability distributions of average and extreme temperature and precipitation change, as well as sea level rise. The
Task Force is also developing qualitative scenarios of extreme sea level rise in the region. DEP is
using these results to develop a comprehensive adaptation strategy for the New York City water
system, including assessment of many specific adaptation options, that considers both uncertainties
in future climate change and managerial factors such as the time horizon of different adaptation responses and capital turnover cycles.
This is a successful example of scenario-based assessment of climate impacts and adaptation options.
The scenarios are connected with the concrete responsibilities and concerns of stakeholders, who
were involved in their design from the outset. Although officials have found the wide range of uncertainty in climate scenarios difficult to incorporate into infrastructure design specifications, particularly for precipitation, the exercise has effectively conveyed the challenges posed by future
climate uncertainty to current decisions of planning and infrastructure design. Stakeholders’ willingness to support and participate in three separate phases of these activities and NYCDEP’s incorporation of them into a strategic planning exercise provides clear evidence of the practical utility
of the exercises.
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BOX 4.2. Scenarios of Sea Level Rise along the Gulf Coast
Sea-level rise is one of several factors that contributed to the decline of coastal ecosystems along the US Gulf
of Mexico coast in the 20th century (Figure 4.1).157 In southeastern Louisiana, where the local rate of land surface subsidence is as high as 2.5 cm per year, rise in local “relative sea level” may be the most important factor in the rapid loss of coastal zone wetlands over the past several decades.158
Despite the importance of sea level rise in historical losses of coastal lands, planning projections of future
changes in coastal Louisiana used by both federal and state agencies prior to the devastating impact of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005 were based on just one scenario: no change in the rate of sea level rise. No alternative sea level scenario was considered in the plans then being developed to restore and protect the
Louisiana coastal zone.159 This assumption sharply contrasts with the IPCC projections, which state that the
global average rate of sea level rise in the 21st century may increase 2- to 4-fold over that of the 20th. Such increases will exacerbate wetland losses throughout the Gulf Coast region and obstruct restoration plans that
do not take account of likely increases in water levels and salinity.
The ecosystem modeling team working for the State of Louisiana and the US Army Corps of Engineers is
presently integrating accelerated sea level rise scenarios into planning exercises that will aid federal and state
agencies in evaluating restoration alternatives.160 The State of Louisiana is consulting with the Rand Corporation to obtain probability estimates for various scenarios of sea level change to help guide engineering decisions and the design of projects aimed at restoring levees and coastal landforms that protect coastal
communities.161 Sea level rise scenarios are also being used to assess the impacts of climate change and variability on the Gulf Coast transportation sector. To assess transportation impacts, a sea level rise simulation
model developed by the US Geological Survey generates scenarios of sea level change using over a dozen
GCMs and six SRES emission scenarios.
Sea level rise scenarios are important not just in regions like Louisiana. The Big Bend region of the Florida panhandle is experiencing very little vertical movement of the land surface, so sea level there has been rising at
approximately the global average rate of 1 to 2 mm per year. But even here, coastal wetlands positioned on
flat limestone surfaces may be subject to highly nonlinear effects as sea level reaches a threshold at which large
areas are subject to increased salinity or inundation.162
Regional scenarios of potential sea level rise are needed to support coastal management and protection activities, as well as plans for wetland restoration and post-hurricane reconstruction. Absent consideration of
such scenarios, restoration and rebuilding programs are likely to lock in errors that result in wasted resources and
avoidable increases in future vulnerability.
2

Figure 4.1. Output from a Gulf Coast
sea level rise scenario tool
Historical sea level change and projected sea level
rise under three greenhouse-gas emissions
scenarios, in meters, are shown for Galveston,
Texas. Both historical data and future projections
are smoothed from monthly data using a
12-month moving average. (Source: Thomas W.
Doyle, National Wetlands Research Center, United
States Geological Survey.)
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BOX 4.1.3. Scenarios in the California Water Plan
The California Department of Water Resources (DWR) produces an updated California Water Plan every five years. The plan projects water supplies and demands, and evaluates current and proposed demand-management programs and supply investments, to
“provide a framework for water managers, legislators, and the public to consider options
and make decisions regarding California’s water future.”163
In contrast to prior plans that constructed only one future scenario, the 2005 plan explicitly considered uncertainty in supply and demand projections. Three alternative scenarios of supply and demand conditions were constructed through 2030: one extending
current trends in population and economic growth, agricultural production, environmental restrictions on water use, and water conservation occurring without policy initiatives (e.g., through equipment replacement, technological change, and revised building
codes); and two presenting higher and lower increases in demands. The report of the
2005 plan discusses global climate change and the potential challenges it poses to water
supply and demand in California, but climate change is not explicitly represented in the
plan’s three scenarios.
In addition to adopting these scenarios, the State of California is developing data and analytic capacity to enrich the treatment of uncertainty and climate change in future plans.
In parallel with development of the three principal scenarios in this plan update, DWR
sponsored development of several analytic tools to strengthen the treatment of uncertainty in future plans. In addition, the California Climate Change Research Center with
co-sponsorship from DWR is developing fine-scale regional climate-model scenarios to
support analysis of climate-change impacts on water resources.164 The DWR plans to
incorporate these climate-change scenarios explicitly in the next plan update in 2010.

4.2. SCENARIOS IN
ASSESSMENTS AND POLICY
DEBATES
Within large-scale assessments of climate
change or other environmental issues, scenarios
can serve several roles. Most straightforwardly,
they can provide required inputs to other parts
of the analysis, as the IPCC emissions scenarios
support the controlled comparison of climatemodel runs. They can also serve as devices to
organize and coordinate the multiple components of a large-scale assessment, particularly
when much of the assessment is forward-looking. In the IPCC assessments, for example,
emissions scenarios have not just been used to
drive coordinated climate-model projections,
but have also increasingly been followed
through to coordinate characterization of climate impacts and adaptation opportunities, and
used in a more preliminary way to organize assessments of the economic and technological
implications of alternative mitigation strategies.

Similarly, the US National Assessment and UK
Climate Impacts Programme have both attempted to identify a small set of climate and
socio-economic scenarios, to coordinate and
gain comparability across multiple studies and
allow aggregate assessment of impacts and vulnerabilities at the national level.
In a broad assessment including many teams
considering separate questions of climatechange, impacts, mitigation, and adaptation,
simple coordinating devices are needed to make
teams’ work comparable and allow synthesis to
produce aggregate conclusions. Emissions scenarios are natural devices to provide such coordination, both because emissions hold the
clearest near-term opportunities for intervention, and because they have clear and recognized connections both directions in the causal
chain, to every aspect of the climate-change
issue. However, in part due to management issues, these efforts to use scenarios as broad coordinating devices have not been wholly
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satisfactory in practice. To serve as coordinating devices, scenarios must be developed and
disseminated early in the process, preferably before the work of assessment teams even begins.
Moreover, they must be documented with detailed information about the process and reasoning used to generate them, including explicit
identification of underlying assumptions and
supporting data, models, and arguments. In
practice, timely, detailed, and transparent dissemination of scenario information has rarely
been achieved.
Scenarios inevitably
become political
objects, in two senses.
They are subject to
political forces that
seek to influence their
development, and
political reactions to
them once developed.

Scenarios used in large-scale assessments can
also make other contributions that are related to
the prominent dissemination a major assessment receives. They may, for example, be used
as inputs to planning or decision-support
processes that were not part of the original assessment. In such use, they may gain a more direct connection to decision-making than they
had in their original production or use. Scenarios of global emissions and the model-based climate scenarios based on them especially lend
themselves to such derivative uses, informing
many different decisions by diverse actors.
Scenarios in prominent assessments can also
contribute to the framing of public and policy
debates. In this role, scenarios inevitably become political objects, in two senses. They are
subject to political forces that seek to influence
their development, and political reactions to
them once developed. These pressures pose
challenges and risks that differ quite markedly
from those that apply in using scenarios to inform decision-making, where we tend to assume a greater degree of commonality of
knowledge, perspective, and interest in the
process among participants and some group of
relatively well-defined users.
Within scenario exercises, various actors may
seek to bias scenarios’ content to help advance
their policy preferences or their broader political objectives, by limiting consideration to futures they judge desirable or showing some
problem in an acute state that would appear to
demand a response. While it is not possible to
eliminate biases in scenarios, unacknowledged
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normative biases in scenarios can pose the risk
of excluding consideration of futures that are
judged undesirable or that pose sharp decisionmaking challenges. Such biases can be difficult
both to detect and to correct. Beyond exhorting
developers to scrutinize scenarios critically to
avoid bias, the best protection against such biases
lies in transparency about the assumptions and
information underlying scenarios and associated
judgments of likelihood.
Other political pressures come onto scenarios in
the broader use, debate, and criticism that they
encounter after release. For impartial support
of policy decisions, scenarios should fairly present knowledge and uncertainty about potential
variation on important dimensions. This typically requires consideration of a wide range of
potential futures – often a wider range than relevant decision-makers might initially think
plausible, due to well-known habits of conventional thinking and excessive confidence.
Sometimes a scenario’s implications for decisions may be obvious. For example, a scenario
might represent developments so severe that
most people would judge it to demand intervention. Another might represent developments
that most people would judge inconsequential
or beneficial, so not meriting any intervention.
A wide-ranging set of scenarios may include examples of both such extremes. Consequently,
such a wide range of potential futures in a set
of scenarios – even if this is faithful representation of present knowledge and uncertainty –
provides opportunity for partisan distortion and
efforts to make scenarios policy-prescriptive.
In global change scenarios, conflicts and opportunities for bias arise most acutely over
emissions scenarios. Since much of the uncertainty about climate change beyond 2050 comes
from uncertainty in future emissions trends, actors with strong policy preferences can highlight
emissions scenarios that lend support to their
views. Those who advocate aggressive mitigation may highlight the highest-emissions scenarios to emphasize the elevated risk of
climate change that would follow. Those who
oppose mitigation may highlight the lowest-
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emission scenarios to suggest that no action to
limit emissions is warranted. Because scenarios
are used when knowledge of causal processes is
weak, it is easy to make any scenario appear
salient and likely, even if it is extreme. It is
equally easy to probe inside the details of any
scenario to find inconsistent or implausible implications, particularly when a scenario is rich in
detail.
But, although political actors may have legitimate reasons to highlight one extreme scenario,
it is not appropriate for any scenario to dominate assessment or consideration of decisions.
A claim that only a single scenario is plausible
– especially one near the top or bottom of the
present range – is a claim to predict the future,
which can be readily dismissed. Claims that a
particular scenario is implausible cannot be so
easily dismissed, however, since scenarios represent only the imperfect judgment of the team
that produced them. Leaving aside scenarios
that violate clear principles of science (e.g., one
whose energy assumptions violate the laws of
thermodynamics) or economics (e.g., one that
presumes a large new capital stock in a few
decades without the investments needed to create it), it is possible to construct pictures of the
next century so extreme or unprecedented that
most observers would agree they do not merit
serious consideration. But short of such an extreme – which describes no global-change scenario discussed here or known to us – claims
that a broad class of potential futures is implausible should have to pass a high hurdle. Identifying specific extreme or implausible elements
within a scenario does not suffice to make this
case, since virtually any scenario will be found
to contain these if scrutinized closely enough.
Nor does identifying ways that a scenario of future change diverges from some established
trend or pattern, since established trends can
and do change.
Historical studies of forecasting exercises such
as energy forecasts have repeatedly found them

too confident that the future will extend recent
trends.165 The threshold any single scenario
must pass is to appear sufficiently plausible or
instructive to merit consideration in planning
and analysis, and this is a judgment to be made
by developers and users – with enough transparency about underlying assumptions and reasoning that users can make an informed
judgment. A set of scenarios should be constructed so that the range of conditions they represent encompasses present knowledge and
relevant uncertainties that might influence
mitigation or adaptation decisions. Since
subjective judgments cannot be avoided in
constructing scenarios, the range provided
should err on the side of being broad rather than
narrow, at least initially. Identifying problems
with one scenario does not necessarily impugn
the credibility even of that one scenario, certainly not the whole set, because scenarios cannot be consistent in every underlying detail.

A claim that only a
single scenario is
plausible – especially
one near the top or
bottom of the present
range – is a claim to
predict the future,
which can be
readily dismissed.

In subsequent revisions as knowledge advances,
scenarios can continue to play their role coordinating assessments and framing policy debates
with more focus and less arbitrariness. Continuing research and analysis might come to
identify some scenarios as severe in their consequences and others as inconsequential, or
might revise the initial characterization of the
determinants and feasibility of particular scenarios, including suggesting that some are too
unlikely to merit serious consideration. These
judgments can feed into decisions about continuing analysis of scenarios: which ones can be
dropped and what new ones should be added.
One major basis for updates in scenarios will be
policies adopted, which can set a baseline to
focus further deliberations. Perfect attainment
of targets and success of policies should not be
assumed, but scenarios can focus subsequent
debate by posing such questions as “What if we
just meet this target; what if we fall short by this
much; and what if we exceed it by this much, or
adopt these additional measures?”
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BOX 4.4. Scenarios of Ozone Depletion in International Policy-making166

Emission scenarios of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and other ozone-depleting chemicals
substantially influenced policy debates over control of these chemicals to protect the
ozone layer. Until the early 1980s, these policy debates used a convention to project
ozone losses that originally served as a simplifying research assumption: constant emissions forever. This convention has obvious research benefits, like the simple doubledCO2 equilibrium scenarios used in climate models. It standardized input assumptions,
allowing exploration of scientific and modeling uncertainties without the confounding effect of different emissions assumptions. Moreover, this convention made no claim to realism, and so avoided distracting arguments over whether one emissions projection or
another was more realistic. Nevertheless, the resultant calculations were frequently
mistaken for projections of realistic future trends.
The question of what future emissions trends were likely only became prominent in
policy debates around 1983. World CFC production had dropped nearly a third in the
late 1970s due to both regulatory and market-driven reductions in their largest use,
aerosol spray propellants, and declined further in the early 1980s recession. It was
widely argued that further restrictions were unnecessary—CFCs’ major markets were
saturated and further growth was highly unlikely. The resumption of sharp growth in
1983 undermined this claim, making it clear for the first time that managing the ozone
risk required considering scenarios of CFC growth as well as steady-state and decline.
How much emissions might grow and what that would mean for the atmosphere remained highly controversial, however.
Emissions of other chemicals complicated the picture. Advances in stratospheric chemistry showed that future ozone loss depended not just on CFCs, but also on emissions
of several other gases, including carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide. But the
knowledge and computing capacity to credibly model interactions among all these pollutants only began to appear in the early 1980s. In 1984, a major scientific assessment
conducted the first standardized comparison of multiple stratospheric models using a
few simple scenarios of emissions trends for CFCs and other chemicals. This exercise
had the striking result that under a wide range of trends in other emissions, constant
CFC emissions would lead to only very small ozone losses, while CFC growth above
about 1 percent per year would lead to large losses.
This result, together with resumed growth in CFC production, had a powerful effect in
breaking the deadlock in international negotiations that had persisted since the mid1970s. Although not the only factor that mattered, this result was crucial in persuading
long-standing opponents of CFC controls to accept limits on their future growth. This
decisively shifted the agenda for the subsequent negotiations that in 1987 yielded agreement on the Montreal Protocol, which cut CFCs by 50 percent.
In this debate, scenarios used in model-based projections of ozone loss identified divergent trends in future risk that were robust to a wide range of assumptions about
trends in other emissions over which there was disagreement. By parsing projected futures into high-risk and low-risk cases, scenarios served to coordinate and simplify a
policy debate and so help to focus an agenda for collective decision-making.
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BOX4.2.2. Climate-Change Scenarios for the Insurance Industry

The insurance and reinsurance industries face large financial risks from climate change.
These are present in many business lines, but the clearest risk is in insurance for property damage from weather-related events, especially windstorms and floods.
In the past two decades, weather-related insurance losses have increased rapidly. By
some estimates losses have doubled, even controlling for population and insured value
– a much faster increase than that in losses from non-weather events. Climate change
is likely to increase insurance risks in multiple ways, increasing the frequency and severity of loss events and also their correlation. Historically based pricing, which is often required by regulations or market conditions, can compound insurers’ vulnerability by
preventing them from anticipating and adapting to a changed risk environment.
Insurance companies do not use scenarios of future climate change in pricing decisions,
because property and casualty contracts are written for short periods, usually one year.
Since 1992’s Hurricane Andrew, these have mostly been priced using historically based
Catastrophic Event Risk Models (Cat models). These estimate losses using a simulated
distribution of storm conditions based on historical experience, together with estimates
of the durability of insured property. While future climate change poses no risk for
these short-term pricing decisions, insurers are concerned that climate change may already have invalidated the historical distributions on which these models are based, by
increasing either the probability of severe events or the correlation among them.
Two published exercises have used climate-change scenarios to explore longer-term
risks to the insurance industry. The first, conducted for the Association of British Insurers in June 2005, examined potential impacts of climate change on the costs of extreme weather events (both insured and total economic costs) under the six SRES
marker scenarios, as well as IS92a and CO2 stabilization at 550 ppm. The analysis
calculated changes in losses due to US hurricanes, Japanese typhoons, and European
windstorms.
The second scenario exercise, conducted by Harvard Medical School researchers with
sponsorship by Swiss Re and the United Nations Development Program, used two scenarios of 21st-century climate change to examine potential impacts on human and
ecosystem health, and associated economic costs, not limited to the insurance industry.
The two climate scenarios both assumed CO2 doubling by approximately mid-century,
one with continued incremental climate changes and one with hypothesized nonlinear
impacts and abrupt events. The exercise examined potential changes in infectious and
water-borne diseases, asthma, agricultural productivity, marine ecosystems, freshwater
availability, and natural disasters (including heat waves and floods). The analysis was based
primarily on qualitative judgments.
The first scenario showed increased property losses and business interruptions relative
to recent trends, emergence of new types of health-related losses, and increasing difficulty in underwriting. The second scenario was qualitatively similar but more severe, with
substantial increases in both average losses and variability leading to large premium increases and withdrawal of insurers from many markets, particularly along coastlines. As
many insurance firms succumbed to mounting losses, those remaining established strict
limits on coverage, shifting more exposure back to individuals and businesses.
Neither of these exercises was connected to any specific, near-term business decision
faced by insurance companies. Both could serve longer-term decision-making, however,
including planning for reserve accumulation, providing supporting analysis for advocating mitigation and adaptation policies, and supporting changed regulations to allow more
flexible pricing of risks experiencing long-term increases. Such exercises can also serve
to inform firms’ long-term risk-avoidance strategies, including decisions to exit certain
areas of business.
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BOX 4.6. Scenarios of Climate Impacts in the Columbia River Basin
In conjunction with the US National Assessment, researchers at the University of Washington studied climate impacts on the Columbia River system, which is the primary
source of energy and irrigation water for the Northwest and one of the most intensively
managed river systems in the world.167 The project examined the response of annual and
seasonal flows both to existing patterns of climate variability – the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) and the Pacific Decodal Oscillation (PDO) – and to projected 21st century climate change.
The study projected climate change through 2050 using eight climate models driven by
one emissions scenario (1 percent per year CO2 concentration increase), which on average projected 2.3°C regional warming by the 2040s with precipitation increases of 10
percent in winter and a few percent in summer. In the Columbia, these changes are
projected to increase flows in winter (because there is more winter precipitation and
more of it falls as rain) and to decrease flows in summer (because there is less snowpack and it melts earlier in the spring). The impact of summer decreases is likely to be
substantially more serious than that of winter increases. Because the Columbia is a
snowmelt-dominated system, winter flows could double or even triple and remain below
the present spring peak.
Assessing the impacts of these flow changes requires assumptions about water demands
and system management. The study used a reservoir operations model that calculated
the combined effects of flow changes and alternative system-operation rules on the reliability of different water-management objectives, such as electrical generation, flood
control, irrigation supply, and preserving flows for salmon. Under historical climate variability, all objectives can achieve high reliability in high-flow years (i.e., in the cool phase
of ENSO or PDO), but conflict between them occurs in low-flow (warm) years, when
only one top-priority objective can be maintained at or near 100 percent reliability and
other uses suffer substantial risks of shortfall. Different operating rules distribute this
risk among uses.
Under the projected climate and flows of the 2040s, this model showed a pattern of
competition between uses similar but additional to what already prevails in low-flow
years, suggesting increases in already sharp conflict among uses over flow allocations.
One objective could be maintained near full reliability, but other uses suffered reliability
losses up to 10 percent from the changed climate, in addition to effects of continued climate variability.
In this analysis, scenarios helped to illustrate interactions between management decisions
and climate change and variability, and to explore opportunities and limits for adaptation
through management changes alone, with no change in infrastructure or larger-scale
policies. This analysis has not been incorporated into any operational decisions, but has
been integrated into the Fifth Conservation Plan issued by the Northwest Power and
Conservation Council.168 More detailed assessment of climate-change impacts would require extending this analysis to include projected changes in water demands, both
through direct climate effects and through scenarios of regional economic and population growth, allowing a more realistic assessment of potential effects of new water-management investments and changes in large-scale policies to alter water demand, balance
competing uses, or improve coordination among the multiple organizations involved in
managing the river system.
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4.3. THE PROCESS OF
DEVELOPING SCENARIOS:
EXPERT-STAKEHOLDER
INTERACTIONS
Scenario exercises are collaborative activities
that need to be managed. As Section 1 discussed, managing a scenario exercise includes
deciding who participates, what jobs they are
assigned and how these jobs fit together, how
disagreements are resolved, and how much time
and money are dedicated to the exercise. These
matters can be decisive for the success of an exercise. For some of them, the nature of challenges and tradeoffs they pose are fairly
obvious. For example, scenario exercises need
enough time to build a team, research scenario
components, consult with users, and disseminate results, but often too little time is available,
so various compromises must be made. Adding
participants expands the expertise and the range
of views represented, but increases the time
needed for team building and internal communication. Delegating parts of the exercise to
smaller groups can overcome this tradeoff, but
can introduce coordination problems and inconsistencies among groups. Accepting external direction on scenario exercises increases the
chance that decision-makers will take the scenarios seriously, but also increases the risk that
they are seen as biased or simply reflect conventional wisdom. These issues pose various
challenges, but the challenges are not unique to
scenario exercises.
The more central process problems for scenarios concern the relationship between experts
and stakeholders in the design, creation, evaluation, and application of scenarios. There has
been substantial experience and research in
processes for involving stakeholders in environmental decisions, in the United States and
other regions.169 In the most well-established
areas of scenario use – e.g., strategic planning
for corporations or other organizations, and military and security planning – it is widely understood that there should be close, intensive
collaboration between developers and users in
the production, revision, and application of sce-

narios. While high-level decision-makers are
not usually involved in the detailed work of scenario construction, they or their surrogates may
be intensively involved in problem definition,
identification and elaboration of key uncertainties, large-scale scenario design, evaluation and
criticism of scenario outputs, and deliberation
over lessons and implications. Their level of involvement must be high for results to be useful,
particularly if a major purpose of the exercise
is to challenge decision-makers’ assumptions
and promote creative thinking.
In these areas, scenarios typically serve a clearly
identified, relatively small and homogeneous set
of users who have some degree of agreement on
what values they are trying to advance, what issues are relevant, and what choices are feasible,
acceptable, and within their power and authority. This is most clearly the case when scenarios are developed for a single organization, but
also applies to scenario exercises for larger
groups that are sufficiently homogeneous in
their interests and perspectives, e.g., scenarios
for property and casualty insurers, for organized
labor in the United States, or for European environmental groups. In such context, the problems of deciding participation are likely to be
manageable.

Managing a scenario
exercise includes
deciding who
participates, what jobs
they are assigned and
how these jobs fit
together, how
disagreements are
resolved, and how
much time and money
are devoted to the
exercise. These matters
can be decisive for the
success of an exercise.

Intensive user involvement has also been advocated in developing scenarios for climate
change. This is obviously correct when climatechange scenario exercises serve specific, clearly
identified user groups. The strongest examples
are scenarios to support narrowly targeted assessments of impacts and adaptation in particular industries, resources, or regions, e.g.,
scenarios for coastal managers considering the
establishment or revision of setback lines for
coastal-zone construction as sea level rises,170
for rangeland managers considering the purchase of conservation lands or easements for the
purpose of providing migration corridors, or for
insurance and reinsurance firms examining the
nature of climate-change risks they may face
and potential responses. In such cases, intensive participation of users is relatively easy to
achieve and provides access to valuable expertise and assurance of practical utility.
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But climate-change scenarios typically serve
larger and more diverse sets of users and stakeholders. This is especially true for scenarios
produced in large-scale, official assessments
such as the IPCC or US National Assessment.
Climate-change stakeholders – defined by the
CCSP as “individuals or groups whose interests
(financial, cultural, value-based, or other) are
affected by climate variability, climate change,
or options for adapting to or mitigating these
phenomena”171 – are an enormous group, diverse in their interests and responsibilities.
Climate-change
stakeholders are an
enormous group,
diverse in their
interests and
responsibilities.

Even when the set of all potential users is numerous and diverse, there may be some types of
users who are clearly identified – e.g., climate
modelers who need input from emissions scenarios or impact assessors who need input from
climate-change scenarios – and who have highly
specific scenario needs, including such prosaic
factors as data format and resolution. Close
consultation with such users is clearly important, especially when their desires exceed what
scenario developers can confidently provide,
e.g., when climate modelers need emissions
data at fine spatial resolution and for specific
gases or aerosols, which are not readily available from the energy-economic models used for
emissions scenarios. These situations call for
particularly close and sustained consultation, so
the two sides can understand each other’s needs
and capabilities in enough detail to develop
workable resolutions.
Other users, however, may be numerous, diverse
in their disciplinary foundations, methods, and
tools, and not clearly identified. Their information needs may have some commonalities
but substantial differences. They may even have
points of conflicting interest in the construction
and use of scenarios. The general case for
stakeholder involvement remains strong with

such diverse users, especially in the initial design of a scenario exercise, and in the evaluation and refinement of scenarios for relevance,
practicality, and utility. In principle, the required approach is to involve a reasonably diverse and representative group of users and
stakeholders, as well as an appropriate range of
disciplinary and modeling experts, while keeping the size of the scenario team manageable.
But the judgments about participation and representation needed to carry out this approach in
any particular scenario exercise will be complex
and challenging.
Can a scenario process be completely open? In
political settings, some insulation from users
may be needed to insure consistency across participating models and analyses. Whatever approach to stakeholder participation is adopted,
numbers must be kept manageable. Despite recent progress in scenario methods allowing a
substantial increase in the number of participants, there are still practical limits. Although
requirements for expertise external to the core
scenario team increase with scenario complexity, a scenario process is unlikely to work with
a hundred people in the room. A few scenario
processes have engaged much larger numbers
of participants, but these have greatly reduced
the complexity of the scenario-creation process
by limiting it to specifying inputs to a single interactive model, or have involved large numbers
of participants in independent, parallel sessions
interacting with a computer-based model or scenario construction system.172 These tensions between representational realism, participation,
and managerial feasibility pose challenges for
design of processes of representation and consultation in scenario development, on which further progress is needed.
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BOX 4.7. Scenarios in Acid-Rain Assessments: Two Approaches
Two programs, one in the United States and one in Europe, developed scenarios in
integrated-assessment models of acid rain to inform policy decisions over sulfur emissions. Among
many other differences, the two programs differed strongly in their approaches to involving stakeholders and in their effectiveness at informing decision-making.
The US National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program (NAPAP) was created in 1980 as a 10-year
program to study all aspects of acid deposition: emissions, transport and deposition, impacts, and
control strategies.173 Managed by a committee of six government agencies and supported by a fulltime staff office, the program involved roughly 2,000 researchers.174 Although charged to conduct
both scientific research and assessment, NAPAP strongly emphasized research. Its assessment report was opaque on the origin and interpretation of its scenarios, and did not use the scenarios to
integrate across the issue or examine implications of alternative policies. Overall, NAPAP is regarded as having succeeded as a research program, but fallen critically short in providing useful information for decision-making.175
An alternative approach to acid-rain assessment was taken in Europe as part of the policy debates
under the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP). The core of this assessment was a cooperative program to monitor and model acid emissions, transport, deposition,
and impacts. In contrast to NAPAP, this program focused more on assessment than research, being
specifically established to inform the policy process.176 Scientific models of components of the
acid-rain issue were chosen to contribute to a simplified integration of the problem; scenarios of
emissions and controls were chosen in consultation with officials, in an attempt to replicate the
policy alternatives under consideration.
The culmination of this pursuit of simple, accessible, and policy-relevant analyses was the RAINS
model, developed at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Austria. As
a result of its flexibility, ease of use, and relevance to policies under consideration, the RAINS model
was used extensively by policy-makers in the negotiation of sulfur-control agreements under the
Convention, and had substantial influence over the controls adopted.177
The contrast in approach and outcome between these two programs suggests the potential value
of close interaction between experts and stakeholders in producing scenarios, at least when the
stakeholders are relatively expert officials responsible for a specific set of decisions. In the European
case, such close interaction helped to ensure the credibility of baseline emissions scenarios and the
relevance of proposed control scenarios, despite the diverse and sometimes contending interests
of the participating officials. The contrast between the two programs also suggests that there can
be significant tradeoffs between scientific and assessment objectives in programs that seek to integrate the two activities.

4.4. COMMUNICATION
OF SCENARIOS
Scenarios related to climate change must be
communicated to multiple audiences, with diverse interests and information needs. Involving users in scenario development can aid
subsequent communication in various ways –
e.g., by ensuring that scenarios are understandable and practically oriented, and helping to disseminating scenarios to their constituencies.
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But, in all likelihood, most users to whom scenarios must be communicated did not participate directly in scenario development.
Although specific needs will vary from case to
case, any communication of scenario-based information to a large, diverse public audience is
likely to require a few common elements. First,
in addition to the scenarios’ content, information should be provided about the process and
reasoning by which the scenarios were developed. This allows users and stakeholders to un-
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derstand and critique scenarios, and to determine their own levels of confidence. Second,
scenario developers should identify the uncertainties considered. A particularly important
distinction to communicate clearly is between
scientific uncertainty and scenario uncertainty,
including explicit statements of when and how
scenarios change (e.g., the reduced SO2 projections in the IPCC SRES scenarios), and clear
explanations of the effects of such changes.
Third, related to uncertainty, developers should
acknowledge the unavoidable elements of subjective judgment in developing scenarios, and
be prepared to explain and defend the judgments they made. Fourth, when particular scenarios were constructed to have specific
meanings – e.g., a reference case, a plausible
worst-case, or the exploration of a particular
causal process taken to its extreme – these
should be clearly conveyed. Fifth, if scenario
developers have articulated any indicators of the
confidence they place on scenarios or distributions of associated variables, this information
and any supporting reasoning should also be
made available.
A communication strategy should attempt to
steer users away from certain common pitfalls,
such as choosing one scenario and treating it as
a highly confident prediction, or taking the
range spanned by a set of scenarios as encompassing all that can possibly happen. An effective strategy of communicating scenarios and
their underlying reasoning can help to engage
users in the process of updating and improving
scenarios. Providing transparency rather than
claiming authoritative status for scenarios is
likely to increase users’ confidence that the scenarios have reasonably represented current
knowledge and key uncertainties. It also provides users with the tools to develop alternative
representations if they are unconvinced.
In large and complex assessments such as the
IPCC and US National Assessment, communication of scenarios and underlying information
both to various groups within the assessment
and to potential outside users poses representational and managerial challenges. Scenario developers have experimented with various visual
techniques for conveying complex information
in vivid and understandable form, including
landscape representations, maps, and pictures,

68

as well as various graphical and tabular formats.178 In the US National Assessment, climate scenarios and other related information
were provided to participating assessment teams
in several formats (e.g., tabular summaries,
models, graphic representations), through websites backed up with workshop presentations. In
the IPCC, the Task Group on Data and Scenario
Support for Impact and Climate Analysis
(TGICA) was established in 1997 to facilitate
distribution of climate scenario data, model results, and baseline and scenario information on
other environmental and socio-economic conditions, for use in climate impact and adaptation
assessments. Data, scenarios, and supporting
information are distributed over the internet by
the IPCC Data Distribution Center (DDC).179
To compactly communicate uncertainty in climate scenarios, the TGICA and several national
scenario efforts have developed various graphical methods, including scattergrams showing
the range of projected temperature and precipitation changes generated by several climate
models using four SRES marker scenarios, and
comparing these projected changes to estimates
of natural variability.180 In Figure 4.2, each data
point represents one climate-model projection
associated with a given SRES emissions scenario. Efforts to develop similarly compact representations of the distribution of scenarios for
extremes as well as annual and seasonal averages are underway.
To help users select climate scenarios for
impact assessments, an alternative to summarizing climate-model scenarios in such scattergrams is to combine various climate-model
results using statistical methods to construct explicit probability distributions for important climate variables.181 Figure 4.3 shows one such
method, which assigns weights to model results
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Figure 4.2. Regional
scattergram for
eastern North America,
2040-2069.
The x-axis shows
temperature changes in °C,
the y-axis precipitation
changes in percent. Each
point shows one model’s
projection under one
emissions scenario. A point’s
color denotes the
corresponding emissions
scenario, its shape the
corresponding model (per
legends in upper left figure).
Ovals show 95 percent
confidence bounds for
natural 30-year climate
variability, calculated from
unforced 1000-year runs of
the models CGCM2 (orange)
and HadCM3 (blue). Points
outside the ellipses indicated
projected climate change
significantly outside the range
of natural variability, most
frequently due to changes in
temperature rather than
precipitation. (Source:
Ruosteenoja et al. 2003.)
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Figure 4.3.
Constructed
probability
distributions of modelsimulated temperature
change in 2080-2099
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The x axis shows projected
temperature change in
Eastern North America from
the 1980-1999 historical
average, using 19 climate
models participating in the
IPCC Fourth Assessment
Report driven by the SRES
A2 (red) and B1 (blue)
emissions scenarios. Each
point on the x axis shows the
result from one model. The
curves above the axis show
probability distributions
constructed from these
individual model results.
(Source:Tebaldi et al. 2005.)
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based on their bias in simulating the current climate (smaller biases are assigned higher
weight) and their correspondence with other
model results (outliers are assigned lower
weights). This method compactly communicates multiple model results, clearly conveying
which ones fall at the top and bottom of the distribution (“unlikely to be higher/lower than
this”), and which fall in the middle of the range.

The current focus on
collections and
intercomparisons of
model-based
projections with
various emissions
scenarios represents a
new approach for
communicating
scenario-driven model
output to users
engaged in assessment
and adaptation
activities.

This current focus on collections and intercomparisons of model-based projections with various emission scenarios represents a new
approach for communicating scenario-driven
model output to users engaged in assessment
and adaptation activities. It has enabled users
to consider a broader range of emission scenarios and climate models than was feasible in the
US National Assessment and previous IPCC assessments. It allows users to consider all available model and scenario combinations to span
the literature, or to select only scenarios that exceed some threshold of interest or fall within
some specified probability range. Future assessments should benefit from this type of
multi-model, multi-scenario approach, which
allows users more effective and informed choice
over scenarios to consider.

4.5. CONSISTENCY AND
INTEGRATION IN SCENARIOS
One of the most often stated requirements for
scenarios is that they be “coherent” or “internally consistent.” This is clearly an important
goal. Scenarios usually specify multiple characteristics of an assumed future, whether as
multiple elements of a narrative or multiple
quantitative variables, so these elements should
fit together. Difficulties arise in the pursuit of
such consistency, however, and in some scenario
exercises the pursuit of consistency, together
with the goal that scenarios integrate many
components of a broad issue such as climate
change, may jeopardize the validity and usefulness of the scenarios.
Certain elements of internal consistency in scenarios are unproblematic, such as avoiding
gross contradictions with well known principles
of behavior of biophysical or socio-economic
systems, and not inadvertently moving far outside the bounds of historical experience. Inad70

vertently implausible assumptions can arise, for
example, when multiple elements of a scenario
are specified without cross-checking; e.g., endyear specifications of a region’s population and
GDP without checking the implied growth rate
in GDP per capita, or specifying energy-related
emissions trajectories without checking what
they imply for resource availability. Avoiding
these pitfalls requires thorough cross-comparisons of related values with each other, of terminal values with implied time-trends in the
intervening period, and of values within and
among regions. Scenario developers should not
always and necessarily avoid extreme or unprecedented outcomes, however. Presenting
extreme or seemingly implausible future conditions intentionally, with an explanation of
how they could in fact arise, can contribute to
several of the major purposes of scenarios, e.g.,
shaking up habitual thinking and broadening
expectations of what future developments
are plausible.
But statements about internal consistency in
scenarios usually claim much more than the
mere absence of gross contradictions and inadvertently implausible values. They tend to
claim that the multiple elements of a scenario
are related in a way that reflects reasonable,
well-informed judgments about causal relations,
suggesting that some events or trends are more
likely to occur together, some less. Expressing
the goal as “coherence” rather than “internal
consistency” suggests a higher level of perceived affinity among scenario elements, evoking normative or even aesthetic aspects.
Expressed in probabilistic terms, statements
about internal consistency may be interpreted
as claims that alignments of factors similar to
those in the scenario are more likely than other,
dissimilar alignments. One might, for example,
claim that a scenario with rapid growth in both
the economy and energy use is more internally
consistent than one in which the economy grew
rapidly but energy use did not. But where do
these perceptions of greater or lesser likelihood
come from, and how valid are they? In some
cases a well-founded theory or model might say
that certain outcomes tend to be related. Alternatively, explicit analyses might connect the
claim to underlying assumptions that are open
to scrutiny and criticism. But in the absence of
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such transparent foundations for judgments of
what scenario conditions are consistent and
what are not, these claims can only rest on more
diffuse judgments by scenario developers, refined and tested through various deliberative
processes – e.g., arguing about the claims,
working through their implications relative to
those of alternative specifications, and identifying additional bodies of research and scholarship that can be brought to bear.
These difficulties can be compounded when, in
addition to consistency, a goal of scenario “integration” is also pursued (although the precise
meaning of “integrated” can be difficult to ascertain). The integration of a scenario is a function of its complexity or breadth, which is
related to the number of characteristics it jointly
specifies. In global climate-change scenario applications, integration typically refers to including all major elements of the causal chain of
the issue, i.e., multiple dimensions of emissions
and their socio-economic drivers, climate, impacts of climate change, and responses.
Asking a scenario to be integrated in this way
imposes on the scenario the burden of capturing all relevant elements of the future. Such an
expansive scenario may occasionally be needed
– e.g., for preliminary assessment of a threat for
which no relevant data or current research exists. However, the risks of error, bias, and arbitrariness in such a scenario are greatly increased,
because so much of reality (with whatever unknown causal processes by which it actually operates) is being stuffed into the scenario.
More likely, an integrated scenario would be
constructed by combining exogenous assumptions about some elements with model-calculated values for others. This approach does not
avoid increasing risks of inconsistency and contradiction as a scenario is expanded, particularly
when multiple models are used. Since models
embody specific, quantitative causal relations
among variables, they do not require – or indeed
allow – all variables to be specified. Scenarios
provide only those exogenous inputs that the
model does not produce. These scenario-based
inputs should be consistent with each other, but
to a lesser extent than the precise standard that
defines consistency in a scenario. These ex-

ogenous inputs, together with model results, can
jointly comprise a scenario that is generated for
some alternative use.
Consistency problems grow when scenario exercises involve multiple models and attempts
are made to achieve model harmonization.
When scenarios are constructed partly out of
exogenous inputs provided by a scenario (made
consistent as much as possible through qualitative or intuitive causal reasoning) and partly out
of models, multiple models are often used.
Using multiple models in parallel can allow for
more extensive exploration of causal relations,
and helps to characterize uncertainty in scenarios since different models embody different representations of causal processes. It may also
enhance the credibility of the process. But
models of the same broad set of phenomena –
e.g., models of the economy and energy sector
– frequently differ in which variables they require
as exogenous inputs and which ones they calculate endogenously. In this case, some variables
must be specified exogenously for some models,
but are calculated endogenously by others.

In the absence of
transparent
foundations for
judgments of what
scenario conditions are
consistent and what
are not, claims can only
rest on more diffuse
judgments by scenario
developers, refined and
tested through various
deliberative processes.

This creates various problems for consistency.
In general, when scenario exercises are conducted in this way, some elements are assumed
and others are model-calculated. Attempting to
avoid this poses even more serious problems,
however. It is not usually possible to arbitrarily
perturb the exogenous input variables so all inputs and outputs match across all models, since
such perturbations will influence other variables
in the model. Consequently, avoiding these inconsistencies will require manipulating internal
relationships within models to make their outputs match the specified values, given the common inputs. But such reverse-engineering of
internal model relationships to match specified
outputs, in addition to being exceedingly cumbersome and arbitrary, can corrupt the internal
logic of models, obscure the interpretation and
significance of results, and make it impossible
to use model variation to illuminate uncertainty.
For example, in an exercise to generate
non-intervention scenarios of potential future
emissions, little insight is likely to be gained
from defining scenarios in terms of the resulting
emissions and forcing the different models to
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are used to generate
scenarios, the most
useful way to pursue
consistency may be to
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model structure can
make even this
approach to
harmonization
challenging.
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generate these emissions targets.182 It may be
equally fruitless to define scenarios in terms of
GDP and energy consumption trajectories and
to force multiple models to reproduce these.
For this reason, multi-model exercises such as
the Energy Modeling Forum usually seek to
harmonize only a few of the most essential and
commonly used inputs.183 When multiple models are used to generate scenarios, the most useful way to pursue consistency may be to develop
common assumptions for the variables furthest
back in the causal chain, but the wide variation
of model structure can make even this approach
to harmonization challenging.
In addition to consistency within a scenario,
consistency across scenarios within an exercise
also requires attention. Ideally, factors not explicitly recognized as the basis for inter-scenario
differences should be consistent across scenarios. Or alternatively, all bases for differences
between scenarios should be explicitly recognized and stated.
When models are used in a scenario exercise,
significant variation in model structures suggests less mature underlying knowledge, or at
least greater recognition of knowledge gaps,
than when model structures converge and all remaining uncertainty is over exogenous input parameters. For scenarios to provide faithful
representation of present knowledge and uncertainty, this variation should not be suppressed or
concealed. Consequently, when scenarios are defined over variables that include outputs of some
participating models as well as inputs, it is crucial
not to pursue false consistency by forcing models to match the target outputs through manipulation of their internal causal processes. This is
suppressing model uncertainty.
One preferable alternative would be for the results of scenario exercises involving both exogenous inputs and multiple models to
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explicitly distinguish between three classes of
variables: (1) a minimal set, exogenous to all;
(2) those specified exogenously for some models, but generated by others; (3) model outputs,
whose variation reflects partly model and partly
parameter uncertainty.
An alternative way to use multiple models is to
let each model produce one scenario, as was
done in the selection of the SRES marker scenarios. With this approach, each scenario represents a particular realization of uncertainty
over both exogenous inputs and model structure. But this approach confounds model uncertainty with parameter uncertainty. It may be
preferable to cross exogenous inputs with models to produce a larger number of scenarios from
which subsets can be extracted as needed, perhaps organizing these as a nested hierarchy of
scenarios similar to the SRES: six marker scenarios, 40 SRES scenarios in total, and hundreds of scenarios in the literature review.
There are good reasons to combine narrative
with quantitative approaches, as scenario exercises have increasingly sought to do. But the
connection between qualitative and quantitative
aspects of global-change scenarios has been inadequate, diminishing the usefulness of the exercises due to inconsistencies within each type
of scenario and between the two types. This
problem has partly been due to limited time and
resources, but has also reflected substantive difficulties in linking the two types of scenario,
difficulties that have not been understood or
managed well. Narrative scenarios typically
specify deep structural characteristics like social values and the nature of institutions, which
are associated with structural characteristics of
models such as the determinants of fertility
trends, labor-force participation, savings and investment decisions, and substitutability in the
economy. Consequently, the differences among
alternative narrative scenarios, reflecting different basic assumptions about how the world
works, correspond more closely to variation of
model structure than to variation of parameters.
Better integrating the two approaches will require developing ways to connect narrative scenarios to model structures, rather than merely
to target values for a few variables that models
are then asked to reproduce. This has not hap-
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pened because scenario exercises have not had
the capability or resources to direct new model
development, or to induce modelers to undertake substantial structural changes to their models. This would require substantial efforts,
including getting modelers to interact with scenario exercises in a new way, but might hold
more promise for allowing scenarios to usefully
inform discussions about large-scale policy
choices for mitigation and adaptation.

4.6.TREATMENT OF
UNCERTAINTY IN SCENARIOS
Representing and communicating uncertainty is
perhaps the most fundamental purpose of scenarios. This section discusses how scenarios
represent uncertainties, how these methods connect scenario exercises to simpler formal exercises in the analysis of decisions under
uncertainty, and what challenges are posed in
how uncertainty is represented. It also addresses several important debates in the treatment of uncertainties.
In most scenario exercises, uncertainty is represented not in a single scenario, but in variation
across several scenarios considered together.184
The choices to be made in deciding how to represent uncertainty include the following:
• What characteristics are varied
• By how much these characteristics are varied, separately and together (e.g., should extreme values of multiple characteristics be
combined, or extremes of some combined
with the middle cases of others?)
• How many scenarios to create and consider
together
• What description, documentation, or other
information is attached – including whether
and how specifically measures of likelihood
are assigned.
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When a scenario exercise uses just one scenario, this
usually presents some specific threat or challenge
posed to existing procedures or decision-makers. In
these cases, uncertainty is still represented by differences among scenarios, but the single scenario is implicitly contrasted to the status quo.

4.6.1. Uncertainty in simple
quantitative projections:
basic approaches
How these choices are made and their implications for scenario use and effectiveness are
closely related to the large-scale decisions in designing a scenario exercise outlined in Section
2.1. In particular, the role of uncertainty in a
scenario exercise is strongly linked to scenario
complexity, richness, and use. In the simplest
case, a scenario exercise may be dominated by
a single quantitative variable, so all uncertainty
could be represented by alternative future levels or time-paths of that variable. This case is so
simple that many scholars and practitioners
argue it should not be considered a scenario at
all.185 Still, even this simple and extreme case
raises significant issues. We begin here and
then move to more complex cases.

Representing and
communicating
uncertainty is perhaps
the most fundamental
purpose of scenarios.

If we also assume that the probability distribution is known, the situation reduces to a formal
exercise in analysis of decision-making under
uncertainty. Given a known set of choices and
outcomes of each choice under each uncertain
outcome, alternative choices can be evaluated
by formal methods such as seeking the best outcome on average or under some risk-averse valuation scheme, or seeking robust strategies. This
decision-analytic approach can be extended to
situations of a few uncertain variables with a
known joint distribution, multiple decisionmakers who evaluate outcomes differently, or
(with somewhat more difficulty) decision makers with different probability distributions.
Further relaxation of these simplifying assumptions moves us toward activities that are more
widely recognized as scenario exercises. First,
if a scenario exercise is addressed to more than
just a few decision-makers with known choice
sets and outcome valuations, scenarios can no
longer simply be inputs to an analytic exercise,
but rather become descriptions of potential future states that must be communicated directly
or indirectly to decision-makers for their reflection and deliberation. Second, if distributions
of important quantities are unknown, it is necessary to exercise judgment regarding how to
185

E.g., Wack (1985a:74) states that such a scenario is
just “quantification of a clearly recognized uncertainty.”
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draw on relevant knowledge to construct and
describe alternative future values of the quantities, and how to represent these values to users
with a manageable number of scenarios.

Probabilistic
statements about
future conditions
always incorporate
elements of subjective
judgment. Many
forms of current
knowledge – including
data, models, and
expert judgments –
are relevant to
forming these
judgments about
future conditions.

Since scenarios describe future conditions, the
distributions of quantities in scenarios cannot
be known in the same sense that the distribution
of current characteristics – e.g., the November
daily high temperature at O’Hare Airport – can
be known through repeated observations. Probabilistic statements about future conditions always incorporate elements of subjective
judgment. Many forms of current knowledge –
including data, models, and expert judgments –
are relevant to forming these judgments about
future conditions. In constructing scenarios of
population growth, for example, the distribution
of observed past growth rates can be used to
construct a range or distribution of plausible future values. But while scenarios can draw on,
and be made conditional on, such knowledge,
this does not overcome their unavoidable reliance on subjective judgments as well.
Scenarios can also be based on model representations of knowledge of causal processes.
For example, instead of simply extrapolating
past population growth rates, one could use a
demographic model that represents trends in
fertility rates, lifespan, and migration to calculate a resultant population trend. Formal modeling can represent the structural relationships
transparently, reducing the risk of generating inconsistent projections. Structural models can
possibly also perform better in extrapolating to
conditions beyond the observed range of behavior. Because models represent causal relationships among multiple variables, these
models can extend the range of current and historical data that are relevant to projections, although this may result in an expansion of data
needs. Models can also help characterize uncertainty in future quantities of interest, by allowing the uncertainty to be attributed to input
parameters – explored through sensitivity analysis or simulation techniques such as Monte
Carlo – or to model structure.
Estimating output distributions based on assumed
distributions of uncertain input parameters does
not capture all uncertainty of importance for
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assessment and decision-making. The input
probability distributions are not known with
certainty, nor are the structural assumptions that
determine the mapping of inputs onto outputs
within any particular model. Uncertainty analysis can embrace this additional level of uncertainty, sometimes called “meta-uncertainty,” by
stepping up one more level of abstraction –
considering not just uncertain quantities, but
uncertainty about their uncertainty, or alternatively, probability distributions over probability
distributions of unknown quantities. Methods
to represent and process such meta-uncertainty
mirror those used for first-order uncertainty.
This is an active area of research, but its importance for assessment methods and their application is unclear. This level of abstraction
increases the difficulty of communicating scenarios and their underlying reasoning transparently and comprehensibly to non-specialists.
Moreover, since any step of analysis represents
an act of potentially fallible judgment, taking
the step to meta-uncertainty still does not capture all possible uncertainty. It is not clear
whether, for purposes of constructing and using
scenarios, the explicit separation of uncertainty
in outcomes from uncertainty in probability distributions brings more benefit than could be
gained from simple heuristic guidance to assume distributions are wider than initially seems
necessary.
A major risk in all scenarios is subjective bias,
which can be reduced but not eliminated
through use of existing data and formal modeling. Judgment is an essential element in constructing scenarios, both to apply relevant data
and models when these are available, and to
build future descriptions using less formal
methods when they are not. The expert judgments supporting such less formal projections
may be better founded than mere uninformed
speculation, since there is typically much relevant knowledge available beyond what is explicitly captured in present datasets and models.
Approaches to developing expert-judgment
based projections vary widely in their structure
and formality, from simply asking one or more
experts to state their best estimate of some unknown quantity, to highly structured elicitation
exercises that provide multiple cross-checked

Global-Change Scenarios - Their Development and Use
estimates of the same quantity.186 Such methods must attend to risks of overconfidence and
bias, which are well documented in experts as
well as laypeople. Carefully designed elicitation protocols can reduce the effects of such biases, e.g., by prompting experts to broaden their
estimates of uncertain quantities, but cannot
eliminate them.187 An additional challenge to
these methods is that there is no generally accepted method for selecting or aggregating estimates from multiple experts.

4.6.2. How many scenarios, over
what range?
In communications of scenarios, limited time,
resources, and attention usually require that
only a few discrete values or time-paths are
specified, not a complete distribution. Scenario
developers must decide how many scenarios to
provide and how to space them.
How many scenarios to provide rests on a judgment of the value provided by each additional
point from the underlying distribution relative
to the burden of producing and using each new
scenario. If the use made of each scenario is expensive – e.g., consuming large quantities of
time of busy senior people, or running a large
model – then the number of scenarios that can
be adequately treated may be very few. The
1992 IPCC scenario exercise provided six separate scenarios, of which nearly all subsequent
analyses used just one or two. Of the 40 scenarios
produced by the SRES process, only 6 (initially 4)
were highlighted as “marker” scenarios, while
most subsequent analyses used just 2 or 3.188
Deciding how many scenarios to provide also
involves some element of attempting to avoid
predictable errors in their use. While the most
obvious and frequent choice in providing scenarios of a quantitative variable has been to provide three – one high, one low, and one in the
middle – it has been widely noted that this practice runs the risk that users will ignore the top
and bottom, pick the middle, and treat it as a
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Initially A2 and B2 were most widely used. More recent work has used A2 and B1, sometimes with A1B.

highly confident projection, suppressing the uncertainty that scenario developers tried to communicate by providing, and carefully spacing,
three scenarios. The same risk applies to any
odd number of scenarios, leading many developers of quantitative scenarios to the informal
guideline that the number provided should always be even, so there is no “middle” scenario
that users can inappropriately fix on.
More specific guidance on the appropriate number and range of scenarios must reflect both
scenario developers’ sense of the underlying distribution from which scenarios are drawn, and
their intended use. One must consider whether
departures in both directions from the middle are
of similar importance, or whether only departures
in one direction need be represented. For example, one might judge that in an assessment of impacts of climate change a scenario drawn from
the lower tail of potential climate change is likely
to provide little substantive insight, since in most
cases the impacts of a small-change scenario are
predictably small.

Similarly for global
environmental change,
low-probability risks
might need to be
considered if their
consequences or their
effects on preferred
decisions are large
enough.

One must also consider how far a set of scenarios should extend toward including extreme or
unlikely futures. In estimating unknown quantities, many fields of empirical research draw
intervals to capture from 90 percent to 99 percent probability, but in constructing scenarios
to inform decisions there may be good reasons
to consider more extreme and less likely possibilities, whether these likelihood judgments are
expressed quantitatively or qualitatively. Assessments and policies in both regulation of
health and safety risks and national security, for
example, routinely focus on high-consequence
risks that are judged much less than 1 percent
likely. Similarly for global environmental
change, low-probability risks might need to be
considered if their consequences or their effects
on preferred decisions are large enough.
It is often suggested that a set of scenarios
should “span the literature” of prior scenarios
or projections of the same quantities. However,
there may be good reasons for a wider or different range, or even a narrower range – although developers should be cautious about a
set of scenarios that spans a much narrower
range than published estimates of the same
quantities. A published scenario may have been
75
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constructed to serve various purposes other than
providing an independent new estimate of a
quantity of interest. Previous scenarios developed to serve some particular purpose may or
may not be relevant to a new scenario exercise,
depending on the relationship between their intended purposes. Moreover, previously published scenarios can be highly self-referential,
since many published analyses use prominent
pre-existing scenarios as inputs to a new study,
or examine a new model by forcing it to reproduce some pre-existing scenario. For all these
reasons, previously published scenarios are better regarded as one input to the judgment of developers of new scenarios than an authoritative
picture of present knowledge that new scenarios
must follow.

4.6.3. Bifurcations and major
state changes
While many uncertainties may be treated as a
continuous range of possible values, some uncertainties may capture large-scale bifurcations
or abrupt changes. For climate change, potential abrupt changes include melting of major
continental ice sheets or shifts to some new
mode of ocean circulation.189 Large-scale bifurcations may also arise from breakthroughs in
energy technology. Such possibilities are typically not captured in either historical data (because they are by assumption novel), or models
(because they would represent a change in the
causal structure represented in models).
Abrupt changes can pose particular challenges
for deciding the number and range of scenarios
to include in an assessment or decision-support
exercise, either because their consequences are
so extreme or because they would fundamentally change our understanding of how the system operates. The decision of whether and how
to consider these uncertainties consequently
turns on the balance between their probability
– which is believed to be low but not well characterized – and their high consequences, which
must be evaluated relative to the scenarios’ intended use. This will be a particularly difficult
choice when only a few scenarios are being generated. For example, in a coastal impacts assessment the enormous consequences of the
189
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difference between a half-meter and a fivemeter sea level rise over this century – and the
well-identified mechanism by which such a
large rise could occur – may suggest the importance of explicitly considering a scenario involving loss of one of the major continental ice
masses. But including such a scenario runs the
risk that users will assign it a much higher probability than is appropriate, either because of its
vividness and extremity or because they presume that developers’ decision to include the
scenario meant that they assigned high probability to it. When such a scenario is included,
scenario developers have a serious responsibility to communicate, loudly and consistently, its
different status.
A further challenge in representing large-scale
or discrete changes in scenarios is that there
might be many such possibilities, all of them
high-consequence but believed to be unlikely.
Including any particular one may mislead both
by exaggerating its likelihood and by strengthening users’ tendency to ignore others, when
these all represent “unknown unknowns” that
should receive some consideration. The more
there are, the more the right approach might be
to shift all scenarios further out to reflect the
various mechanisms by which conventional understanding may under-represent the tail of the
distribution, rather than highlighting any particular abrupt-change mechanism by giving it a
scenario of its own.

4.6.4. Uncertainty in multivariate
or qualitative scenarios
As the characterization of future conditions
within scenarios grows more complex, so does
the process of representing uncertainty within
them. While many of the issues discussed above
in the simplified context of scenarios on a single
variable also apply to multi-dimensional scenarios, several additional issues arise.
The most basic of these is that with multiple
dimensions of variation in scenarios, it is necessary to decide which uncertainties are represented. Even when scenarios include only
multiple quantitative variables, it is no longer
possible for a few scenarios to span all corners
of the joint distribution of these variables.
Rather, they must combine variations in ways
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that are most illuminating and important for the
purpose at hand, massively reducing the dimensionality of the problem to make it intelligible
for users. In addition, increasingly detailed and
realistic scenarios often specify characteristics
that are qualitative, or described less precisely
than cardinal variables. For example, alternative scenarios might specify that current trends
of globalization increase, stagnate, or reverse,
or that decision-making capacity on climate
change increases or decreases. Such characteristics may be judged crucial to include because they may be among the most important
drivers of preferred choices or consequences
of concern.
Scenarios of this kind pose substantial further
challenges in representing uncertainty and interpreting its meaning. Relative to the simple
quantitative scenarios we have considered up to
this point, these lie in a much higher dimensionality space of future possibilities; they may
not lie in any ordinal relationship to each other;
and they may include characteristics whose definitional boundaries are not precisely specified.
Defining a small set of scenarios to reasonably
span the most important uncertainties is consequently even more difficult than for simple
quantitative scenarios.
The approach most widely proposed to represent key uncertainties in such scenarios is to
seek underlying structural uncertainties that satisfy two conditions: they appear to be most important in influencing outcomes of concern or
relevant decisions; and they are linked with variation in many other factors. These underlying
uncertainties can be simple discrete states such
as peace or war, prosperity or stagnation; or, as
in several major global environmental scenarios, they can be deeper societal trends, such as
more or less globalization or shifts in societal
values toward greater environmental concern,
from which variation in many factors is assumed to follow.
This approach, formalized in the Shell scenarios
method,190 involves two steps: first identifying a
small number of fundamental uncertainties and
a small set of alternative realizations of each;
and then elaborating additional future charac190
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teristics associated with each realization
through both qualitative reasoning to fill in a
narrative, and assembly of data and model results to build a parallel quantitative description
to the extent this is judged useful. Repeated,
critical iteration between the qualitative and
quantitative elements is conducted, to bring additional relevant knowledge and expertise to
bear and to check for consistency.
Even rich narrative multivariate scenarios must
imply certain claims of likelihood. Every scenario included must be deemed likely enough
to merit the resources and attention spent on developing and analyzing it. This applies even to
extreme-event scenarios that are intentionally
constructed to capture the low-probability tail
of the distribution, since even they must be perceived likely enough to merit time and attention
given their severity. Since users would reject
any scenario that they persistently judged too
implausible to consider, when decision-makers
find a scenario exercise useful, it validates developers’ judgment that each scenario was
likely enough to consider.
In a purely mathematical sense, any one specific
rich multivariate scenario must be arbitrary and
of vanishingly small probability. There are,
however, ways in which it may be reasonable to
assign non-zero probabilities to multivariate
scenarios. First, if scenario designers in fact
succeed at identifying a few deep structural uncertainties that strongly condition outcomes on
many other characteristics in a scenario, then
the richness of a scenario description need not
imply that it is vanishingly unlikely. Whether
this is true or not is a judgment to be made by
scenario developers and users in each application. If they are sufficiently careful in their development and critical examination of
scenarios, their judgment may well be correct.
But there will often be no way to further test
these judgments, so it is of course possible that
the proliferation of additional detail in scenarios
– even detail that developers and users recognize is crucial for determining valued outcomes
and preferred choices – is arbitrary or erroneous.

The approach most
widely proposed to
represent key
uncertainties in
scenarios is to seek
underlying structural
uncertainties that
satisfy two conditions:
they appear to be
most important in
influencing outcomes
of concern, and they
are linked with
variation in many
other factors.

A second way in which rich, detailed scenarios
may be judged sufficiently likely to consider
concerns the precision with which scenario
characteristics are specified. In rich multivari77
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ate scenarios, many characteristics are often
specified diffusely: economic growth may be
merely “high” or “low,” rather than being stated
as a particular value. Even when a characteristic is stated quantitatively, its particular value
may be treated as merely illustrative of a range
of similar values; e.g., annual GDP growth
might be set at 4 percent because a user needs a
numerical model input, but it is understood to
represent a broad range of similar values that all
count as “high” growth. Interpreted in this way,
a multivariate description may remain likely
enough to merit examination – and indeed, a
modest number of scenarios may exhaust the set
of potential futures that matter for the issue at
hand. Here one is not assigning likelihood to
the precise numerical assumptions used to flesh
out the details of a scenario, but rather to a thick
slice of future conditions that resemble that scenario more than the other scenarios in the set.

4.6.5 The debate
over quantifying probabilities
A major debate in the use of global-change scenarios has concerned whether or not to specify
quantitative probabilities associated with scenarios. This debate is central to the meaning
and use of scenarios, and has been sharpest over
the IPCC’s SRES scenarios. Developers of the
SRES scenarios decided at the outset of their
process that they would make no attempt to assign probabilities to scenarios, in part because
they were adopting the Shell approach of developing scenarios from storylines, in which
quantitative probabilities are usually avoided.
After the scenarios were published, several critics argued that since the most prominent and
important outputs were the projections of emissions under the six marker scenarios, it was natural – and essential for development of rational
climate-change policy – to describe the distribution of emissions in probabilistic terms. For
example, how likely are 2100 emissions to lie
above the 30 GtC of scenario A2 or below the
5.2 GtC of B1? Should the range spanned by
all 40 SRES scenarios be understood to comprise 90 percent of all probability? 99 percent?
All of it?
Developers of the SRES scenarios stood by
their initial decision not to quantify probabilities. Since the controversy only became promi78

nent long after the decision had been made by a
writing team no longer in operation, it would
have been virtually impossible for the group to
retrospectively assign such probabilities. But
rather than rely on this argument of managerial
infeasibility alone, SRES organizers offered a
vigorous substantive defense of their initial decision. This defense relied in part on the statement that the six marker scenarios were all
“equally sound,” without providing any guidance regarding what this meant other than explicitly denying that it meant “equally likely.”
Describing each of the six marker scenarios as
“equally sound” represents the entirely reasonable case that in the developers’ judgment these
all needed to be considered seriously – without
making any further judgment as to their likelihood. While clearly frustrating to those wanting
to use the scenarios as a basis for policy, the result is entirely consistent with the IPCC mandate to do assessment, but not to reach policy
conclusions.
However, this debate will continue; it rests in
part on different conceptions of the meaning
and typical contents of a scenario. The simpler
the contents of scenarios, the more readily they
lend themselves to explicit quantification of
probabilities. When scenarios consist only of
alternative time-paths of a single quantitative
variable, or one such variable is of predominant
importance, it is straightforward and sensible to
understand the intervals between those timepaths to have probabilities associated with them
and there are several strong arguments for being
explicit about these probabilities. First, stating
probabilities allows comparative risk assessment between scenarios and explicit exploration
of risk-reducing strategies.191 Second, sophisticated decision-makers whose choices depend
on uncertainty in these variables need probability information about possible values, not just a
set of alternative values, to evaluate choices –
whether their approach to decision-making is
based on expected values, risk-aversion, seeking robust strategies, or some other approach.
Finally, when such scenarios are presented without probability judgments, users may attach
their own, often via simple heuristic devices that
may misrepresent the developers’ understanding. For example, many subsequent users of the
191
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SRES emissions scenarios have simply assumed
the probabilities they needed to conduct further
assessments, using such simple devices as
counting scenarios or assuming a uniform distribution over the entire range.

ture all the uncertainty of concern to the decision-maker – i.e., scenarios are intended to be
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive –
there may even be a reasonable basis for numerical probability.

Opponents of explicit quantification of probabilities do not dispute that such probabilities can
coherently be assigned to simple scenarios in
one or two quantitative variables. Rather, they
raise principled objections to the appropriateness of attempting to quantify probabilities for
more complex scenarios, particularly those involving socio-economic conditions, as well as
practical objections to the use of probabilities
even in the case of simple quantitative scenarios.

The second argument for rejecting probabilistic
description of socio-economic conditions is
based on “reflexivity” – the proposition that
scenarios may influence the behavior or decisions driving the scenarios, so probability judgments about scenarios could reflect back on
themselves, becoming either “self-fulfilling” or
(more plausibly) “self-denying” prophecies.
Section 4.1 addresses this issue in some detail,
in particular in the distinction between how to
treat mitigation decisions in scenarios to inform
mitigation decisions and impacts or adaptationrelated decisions. We might only add here that
for scenarios of global emissions, reflexivity
could only operate if both the influence of scenario judgments on their users’ behavior and the
influence of their users’ behavior on global
emissions were extremely strong. Moreover, it
is not evident why scenarios with explicit likelihood judgments should raise this concern,
while scenarios presented without such judgments – which also presume some claims of
plausibility or likelihood – should not. Concern
about reflexivity appears more serious for scenarios prepared in close consultation with national mitigation policy-makers, and it is for this
reason (among others) that we judge explicit attempts to assign probabilities less valuable for
scenarios prepared in such settings.

Many researchers are less comfortable using
probabilities for complex scenarios that include
explicit socio-economic elements than for uncertainties that are purely bio-physical, such as
probabilities of different rates of climate change,
conditional on a particular emissions scenario.
Four main arguments are advanced against the
use of probabilities for such scenarios.
First, some argue that the large multivariate
space of possibilities from which such scenarios
are drawn, and the vague and qualitative way
that some scenario characteristics are specified,
make it impossible to coherently define the
boundaries of the outcome space to which probabilities are being assigned. There is no way to
clearly define the interval “between” one scenario and another; and if probability is attributed to a slice of possibilities around each
scenario rather than to the intervals between
them, is it not possible to define clearly the
boundaries of the slice to which the probability
is assigned. To the extent that scenarios describe different types of worlds, which are distinguished from each other by alternative
resolution of a few key uncertainties – e.g., high
or low growth, high or low globalization –
where the location of the boundary is not precisely specified, it may be difficult to create a
shared understanding of these boundaries between users and creators. But if assigning a precise numerical probability is judged too difficult
in these cases, less precise descriptions such as
“highly likely,” “more likely,” “less likely,” or
“roughly equal” could be assigned. In some applications where scenarios are intended to cap-

Concern about
reflexivity appears
more serious for
scenarios prepared in
close consultation
with national
mitigation policymakers, and it is for
this reason (among
others) that we judge
explicit attempts to
assign probabilities
less valuable for
scenarios prepared in
such settings.

Third, some argue that it should not be scenario
developers or experts who make judgments
about likelihood of alternative scenarios, but
users – particularly when scenarios are used to
inform high-stakes public decisions. But this
depends on the details of the content and use of
scenarios. For some scenario elements in some
settings, particularly use of scenarios to advise
specific policy decisions, the scenario users
may be as expert as the developers in associated
uncertainties and risks, or more so. But in such
settings, the use of scenarios normally highlights critical examination of these assumptions,
and users have the knowledge and assertiveness
to probe, critique, modify, or reject scenario elements that they find weak, including probability judgments. When scenarios are produced to
79
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serve many diverse users and consequently cannot rely on intensive interplay with representative, well-informed, and challenging users,
scenario developers frequently have the best access to available knowledge relevant to forming
probability judgments. Not making these judgments explicit is withholding information that
users may need to understand and interpret the
scenarios. If scenarios and their underlying reasoning and assumptions are presented clearly
enough, users can make informed choices
whether or not to use probability judgments that
are provided.
Finally, some argue that probabilities cannot
be known, or even sensibly estimated, for
socio-economic futures – perhaps because
socio-economic processes and mechanisms are
intrinsically less knowable than biophysical
ones, perhaps due to the unpredictable effects
of human creativity and leadership, and perhaps
because causation does not operate in the
human domain as it does in the bio-physical domain. Although these arguments raise deep
philosophical questions, as a practical matter
probabilistic projections are routinely done in
some socio-economic domains, including projections of population and economic growth,
but not, or not well, in others, such as projecting
technological innovation. Provided the basic
concept of subjective probability is accepted,
weaker knowledge and deeper uncertainties can
be accommodated by broadening the relevant
uncertainties rather than declining to make
probabilistic judgments, but the question remains
of whether the resultant broad uncertainty ranges
are meaningful or operationally useful.
Several practical objections have also been
raised to associating explicit likelihood judgments with scenarios. These include the difficulty of developing probability estimates from
multiple information sources that can achieve
sufficient agreement from diverse experts, and
the non-intuitive nature of probability distributions in using scenarios to communicate with
non-expert users. These are both valid concerns, although active areas of research and development in expert elicitation techniques and
in simple intuitive devices to communicate uncertainty are making some progress in mitigating them.
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An additional practical argument against quantifying probabilities is that attempting to do so
may represent a distraction that uses time, generates conflicts, and is of little value to scenario
users. Whether this is indeed the case, however,
is in part a judgment to be made by scenario
users, not developers. Opponents of quantified
probability argue that users typically only need
scenarios to pass some probability threshold.
Beyond this threshold, they will seek robust
choices that yield acceptable outcomes under all
possibilities, so further refinement of probability serves no purpose. This argument has merit,
but only to the extent that it accurately describes
how these scenarios will be used. Quantitative
assignment of probabilities to scenarios when
high-stakes decisions are implicated is clearly
difficult and contentious, as the SRES controversy illustrates. Even if this argument correctly characterizes how scenarios are used,
users might still be able to profitably exploit
more detailed probability information if it were
available – although one must also consider the
risk that non-technical users might somehow be
more likely to misunderstand scenarios with explicit probability judgments attached (perhaps
by taking a stated probability distribution as the
“true” distribution) than to misunderstand a
simple collection of scenarios presented with no
such probability information (perhaps by taking
the range presented to embrace the totality of
all possibilities). It is also possible that engaging scenario users in an attempt to assign probabilities, even only illustratively, could both
draw on relevant knowledge of uncertainties
that they possess more than scenario developers, and provide a valuable device to probe and
sharpen their understanding of the situation.
Any argument based on the information needs
of specific users becomes less persuasive as the
set of potential uses and users, and the likely diversity of their information needs, grow larger.
Overall, we find the arguments in favor of quantifying probabilities to be strongest for scenarios whose major outputs are projections of one
quantitative variable (or very few), and weakest
for complex multivariate scenarios with substantial qualitative or narrative elements. The
controversy over probabilities in SRES reflected
in part different perceptions of what type of scenarios these were. SRES initially followed a
storyline-based process and rejected quantifi-
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cation of probabilities on that basis. Subsequent
efforts, however, consisted predominantly of developing quantitative emissions projections and
neglected further development of the storylines.
Moreover, with a few significant exceptions,
subsequent applications of the scenarios have
principally used their emissions figures, sometimes together with population and GDP, and
made little or no use of the underdeveloped storylines that lay behind them. The controversy
over quantitative probability in this case suggests that when quantitative projections are a
major output of a scenario exercise, developers
may have a responsibility to go further in characterizing the likelihood of the resultant emissions intervals than would be appropriate for the
more complex underlying storylines.

Moreover, even for rich narrative scenarios, the
arguments against rendering probability judgments are strongest when the exercise is produced for a small number of users with similar
responsibilities and concerns. In such a setting,
intensive interaction between scenario developers and users can provide whatever additional
detail about, or confidence in, the scenarios that
users may require to benefit from the scenarios.
When scenarios serve potential users who are
more numerous and diverse, however, such intensive interaction is not possible. As a result,
the value of explicit likelihood judgments increases. To the extent that future global-change
exercises continue to strengthen their qualitative aspects and the integration between qualitative and quantitative – valuable directions for
future efforts – they should still seek to move further toward explicit characterization of likelihood
than has been done thus far.

BOX 4.8. The Global Business Network Abrupt Climate Change Exercise
In 2002, the Office of Net Assessments (ONA), a small strategic planning office in the Office of the
US Secretary of Defense, asked the Global Business Network (GBN), a consulting firm expert in
scenario methods, to develop a scenario of potential national-security implications of abrupt climate
change. This request was stimulated by widespread scientific interest at the time in abrupt climate
change, particularly shifts in North Atlantic circulation, including a 2002 report by the National
Academy of Sciences.192 In addition, several scientific papers had reported changes in Atlantic circulation and salinity that some scientists thought might indicate impending larger disruption, as well
as new evidence of rapid climate shifts in the past.193
GBN staff developed the scenario by reviewing scientific literature and informally consulting with
climate and ocean scientists.194 They reviewed three past climate events of diverse severity and decided to base their scenario on the one in the middle, the century-long period of strong cooling
8,200 years ago. Coming after an extended warm period, this event brought cooling of about 5 °F
over Greenland, with cold and dry conditions extending around the North Atlantic basin and substantial drying in mid-continental regions of North America, Eurasia, and Africa.195
For their future abrupt-change scenario, the authors constructed a path of climate change to reach
these conditions by 2020. The pathway involved rapid warming through 2010, as high as 4 – 5 °F
per decade in some regions,196 followed by a rapid turn to cooling around 2010, as melting in Greenland freshens the North Atlantic and substantially shuts down the thermohaline circulation. By
2020, hypothesized conditions have approached those of the 8,200-year event – cooling of 5 °F in
Asia and North America and 6 °F in Europe, with widespread drying in major agricultural regions
and intensification of winter storm winds. The authors acknowledge that the scenario pushes the
boundaries of what is plausible, both in the rapidity of changes and in the simultaneous occurrence
continued on next page
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BOX 4.8., continued from previous page.

of extreme changes in multiple world regions. They contend that this is defensible and useful,
however, for an exercise focused on sketching the nature of challenges posed by a plausible
worst case.197
The socio-economic and security implications of the climate scenario were developed judgmentally,
in consultation with ONA. Incremental changes are projected for the first 10 years, with general
increase in environmental stresses and approximate maintenance of present disparities between
rich and poor countries. After 2010, catastrophic cooling in Europe and drying of major agricultural
regions worldwide brings widespread shortages of food, due to decreased agricultural production;
of water, due to shifted precipitation patterns; and of energy, due to shipping disruptions from increased sea ice and storminess. These shortages produce 400 million migrants over the period
2010-2020, as desperate scarcity generates violent conflict in Europe, Asia, and the Americas. Extending their speculation on security implications into the 2020s, the authors hypothesize widespread southward migration of Europeans and near-collapse of the European Union, sustained
conflict in East and Southeast Asia including struggles between China and Japan over access to Russian energy supplies, and increasing political integration of a fortress North America to manage security risks and refugee flows.
Controversy and criticism
The project was completed in October 2003, its report published in February 2004 and reported
in Fortune Magazine the same month.198 A few weeks later, the London Observer claimed to have obtained the report secretly and used the scenario to criticize US refusal to join the Kyoto Protocol.199
Subsequent news coverage took up the theme that the report was secret or suppressed, and suggested the reason was that the scenario called for more urgent action on climate change.200 In the
resultant controversy, ONA stated – correctly – that the report did not represent US policy, but
was merely a speculative consultant’s study. Although the controversy subsided after a few weeks,
interest and concern about the possibility of abrupt climate change, although not of this precise character, have continued to grow.201
This scenario is a sketch of an abrupt climate-change event, with little fine-scale detail about the hypothesized changes or underlying reasoning and no attempt to suggest how likely or unlikely such
an event is. Rather, it seeks a preliminary answer to the question, what might the worst case look
like? Such questions are more often posed in security studies than other fields, because of the
unique nature of responsibilities of military organizations – responding to diverse, novel, unknown
threats with extremely high cost of failure. Many climate-change decision-makers could likely benefit from such upper-bound scenarios too, but this exercise is the only example of a worst-case scenario produced for climate change. Major official assessments have focused overwhelmingly on
average or best-guess projections.
But the response to this report vividly illustrates the risks of worst-case or extreme scenarios.
Produced in consultation with a sophisticated user – and in this case, one closely connected to senior decision-makers – who thoroughly understands the outer-bound nature of the underlying assumptions, they can be valuable devices for preliminary risk assessment and threat identification. But
in a wider and polarized policy debate they are hard to explain and may be misunderstood or misrepresented. Attempting to manage the process through secrecy appears counterproductive, foregoing the potential value such analyses could provide to multiple decision-makers. More promising
might be to integrate extreme-case scenarios explicitly into analyses that also present multiple midrange scenarios.
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SECTION

5

Conclusions and
Recommendations

This section presents our conclusions regarding the present state of development and use of scenarios for climate-change applications, and some recommendations for specific changes or initiatives to advance current practice to make scenarios more useful.
Before doing so, we briefly reprise some key definitional points, because uses of the term scenarios
are so divergent. We have defined scenarios as descriptions of future conditions produced to inform decision-making under uncertainty. This definition distinguishes scenarios from assessments,
models, decision analyses, and other decision-support activities. Scenarios may be developed and
used in conjunction with these – for example, scenarios can provide descriptions of potential future conditions used as inputs to such activities – but are not identical to these, and not alternatives to them.
We have also distinguished scenarios from other types of future statements intended to inform
decisions, such as projections, predictions, and forecasts. Relative to these, scenarios tend to be
more multivariate (but still schematic), tend to be developed in groups, and tend to presume
lower predictive confidence. The last condition is the case in part because scenarios tend to be
used in situations where the basis for forecasting is less established because of deeper uncertainties, or for situations that pertain to further in the future beyond the range for which there
is high confidence in specific projections, even contingent ones.
Having distinguished scenarios from these related activities, we consider a broad set of scenarios
of diverse characteristics and uses, including simple and complex scenarios, quantitative and qualitative scenarios as well as various combinations of the two, and scenarios whose primary use and
interpretation is positive or normative. Where we intend our conclusions and recommendations
to apply to only certain types or uses of scenarios, we state this explicitly. Unless stated otherwise, they pertain to all types of global-change scenarios we are considering.
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5.1 USE OF SCENARIOS IN
CLIMATE-CHANGE DECISIONS
Scenarios can make valuable contributions to climate-change decision-making.
Many of the decisions that will comprise
society’s response to climate change –
whether mitigation, adaptation, or other responses – involve high stakes, deep uncertainties, and long time horizons. Scenarios
can help inform these decisions by structuring present knowledge and uncertainty,
prompting critical examination of present
assumptions and practices, stimulating new
insights, identifying key pitfalls and opportunities, or providing a framework for the assessment of particular decisions. For some
decisions, which involve irreversible nearterm commitment to choices whose consequences extend over a horizon involving
substantial uncertainties, some form of scenario-based reasoning may be essential.
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of background scientific knowledge, we expect this trend to continue, and to broaden
to other types of climate-related decisions.
Scenarios of global emissions and resultant changes in atmospheric trace-gas
concentrations and climate are a core
requirement shared by many diverse
climate-related decisions. Although climate-change decision-makers and their
particular information needs are highly diverse, many will need scenarios of global
emissions and resultant climate change,
and many more will need information that
depends on these. Consistent scenarios of
global emissions and climate change, provided centrally at the national or international level, can serve these diverse needs –
if they are presented with enough transparency and documentation of their underlying reasoning and assumptions.

There is a big gap between the use of scenarios in current practice and their potential contributions. Despite their evident
value and capability, many climate-related
decisions that could benefit from scenarios
(e.g., many decisions regarding long-term
management and investments in climatesensitive areas such as freshwater systems
or coastal zones) are not using them. Indeed, many such decisions are still being
made without considering climate change
at all. Conversely, many climate-change
scenarios have only weak and indirect connections to practical decisions related to
climate-change mitigation or adaptation.

Beyond global emissions and resultant climate change, decision-makers’ needs
from scenarios are highly diverse. Different climate-change decision-makers will
have highly variable needs from scenarios,
in the factors and variables included, the
time and spatial scale at which they are provided, and the nature of uncertainties represented. The means for meeting these
additional needs will likely be diverse, too.
Some will call for separate, specialized scenario production capabilities. A major distinction in scenario-related needs can be
drawn between impacts and adaptation
managers, mitigation policy-makers, and
energy resource and technology managers.

Interest in considering and using climatechange scenarios is sharply increasing.
There is increasing interest in considering
climate-change scenarios in diverse decision and planning processes. This trend is
strongest for planning and decisions concerned with climate-change impacts and
adaptation. The trend reflects advances in
scientific understanding of climate change,
gradual maturation of models and analytic
tools, and increasing recognition by decision-makers of the potential importance of
climate change. Given the high general concern about climate change and the advance

Impacts and adaptation managers need
scenarios that project impacts relevant to
their specific responsibilities, and the
major determinants of vulnerability and
adaptive capacity. Impacts and adaptation
managers include both national officials
and others responsible for more specific
domains of impact. These decision-makers need climate-change scenarios, driven
by specified global emissions scenarios, to
provide information about potential climate-related stresses on their areas of responsibility. In addition, they need other
environmental and socio-economic infor-
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mation specific to their areas of responsibility, at appropriate spatial and temporal
scales. Meeting these needs will require
both easy access to centrally produced climate scenario information with associated
tools and support, and development of decentralized capabilities for developing and
applying additional scenario-related information. Many of these specific information needs are likely to be similar in
character for many particular locations and
types of impact.
Meeting information needs for impacts
and adaptation requires a cross-scale organizational structure. These decisions’
combination of centralized and decentralized information needs suggests the need
for a linked network of institutions at national and sub-national levels to develop
scenarios. Such a structure would combine
central provision of globally consistent
emissions and climate change scenarios;
decentralized elaboration of these scenarios with additional variables required for
regional impacts and adaptation analyses;
and provision of tools and resources to support development and use of scenarios.
Scenarios for impact and adaptation managers should be based on emissions assumptions that include a likely range of
mitigation interventions, now and in the
future. The emissions assumptions underlying scenarios for impacts managers
should be based on the likely range of future global emissions trajectories, including explicit assumptions about what
degrees of further mitigation effort are
likely over time. This will typically imply
a narrower range of emission futures than is
considered in scenarios to support mitigation decisions.
Mitigation policy-makers need scenarios
that project alternative emissions trends in
their own jurisdiction and others, and the
major factors that will influence mitigation opportunities, constraints, and costs.
Mitigation policy-makers are usually officials who make national policy and participate in international negotiations, but this
group also includes sub-national officials

when they share mitigation responsibilities
or undertake mitigation initiatives. Serious
pursuit of greenhouse-gas mitigation will
require major policy innovations that carry
significant risks of many kinds, including
the effectiveness and cost of the policies
but also their effects on government budgets, competitiveness of particular industries,
opportunities for national technological capabilities, etc. Decision-makers considering such policies will need scenarios of
global and national emissions trends, resultant climate change, and aggregate impacts. In addition, they will need to
consider many factors specific to their jurisdictions – e.g., national policies, institutions, economic structure, technological
capabilities, and the detailed structure of national emissions – and information about the
policy environment for their choices, including alternative scenarios of other nations’ mitigation strategies, international
mitigation decisions, and implementation
and compliance.
Scenarios for mitigation decisions should
include a wide range of baseline emissions assumptions and should not prejudge the likely level of mitigation effort.
Scenarios used to inform mitigation decisions should consider the full range of potential mitigation choices on the agenda,
defined relative to baseline assumptions
that, as much as possible, reflect only efforts already enacted or committed, including a range of reasonable assumptions
about implementation and compliance.
This assumption typically implies a wider
range of emissions futures than is considered in scenarios to support impacts and
adaptation decisions.
Mitigation decision-makers can use target-driven scenarios for backcasting. Mitigation decision-making may also benefit
from scenarios that impose explicit future
environmental targets such as limits on
emissions or atmospheric concentrations,
together with assumptions about policy and
implementation elsewhere, and reason
backwards to explore alternative paths to,
and implications and requirements of attaining that goal, including feasibility, costs, and
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tradeoffs. These must be defined in ways relevant to the level of decision-making being
informed, i.e., alternative national targets
to inform national policy-making, in the
broader context of alternative global baselines or global targets.
Informing mitigation decisions requires
capacity for scenario development at the
national level. While core scenarios of
global emissions and climate-change can
provide some of the required input into mitigation decisions, these decisions require
additional information that must be provided at the national or sub-national level
where the decisions are being considered,
generated in consultation with relevant decision-makers or their surrogates.
Energy resource and technology managers need scenarios that represent the
political and economic environment for
energy investments, including mitigation
policies. Energy resource and technology
managers concerned with private responses
to mitigation policy primarily need scenarios that represent alternative policy
regimes. Emissions and climate change
underlie these as influences on policy decisions, but do not capture the most important uncertainties for these decisionmakers. While many actors may wish to
generate these scenarios privately to keep
their assumptions and analyses confidential, there may also be value in multi-party
collaborative scenario-building exercises in
which today’s policy-makers and corporate
planners jointly examine what range of policy, economic, and energy regimes is plausible or likely over the 30- to 50-year time
horizons relevant for investment and technology-development decisions.
Scenarios must be periodically revised and
updated. For all types of decisions and decision-makers, developing scenarios, applying them to inform decisions, and
refining scenario methods, are iterative
processes. Limitations to present scenarios or methods do not in general justify delaying consideration of such decisions, any
more than scientific uncertainties do. Still,
scenarios must be periodically updated,
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based on new knowledge, experience, and
priorities, as well as further developments
in scenario-related methods. Such updates
are needed much more frequently than the
decision time horizons.

5.2 USE OF SCENARIOS
IN CLIMATE-CHANGE
ASSESSMENTS
Large-scale, official assessments are the
major use for scenarios at present and are
likely to remain an important use. Largescale, official assessments represent the
most prominent demand for climate-related
scenarios at present, and are likely to remain major users, particularly for coordinated scenarios of global emissions and
resultant climate-change.
Within assessments, scenarios mainly
serve to support further analysis, modeling, and assessment. When scenarios are
used in assessments, certain users are
clearly identified: e.g., climate modelers
are major users of emissions scenarios,
while impacts assessors and modelers are
major users of climate-change scenarios.
These users have specific scenario needs,
and close consultation is possible between
scenario producers and users to meet these
needs. Substantial progress has been made
in providing useful scenarios for these
groups, at both the national and international level. These efforts should be continued and expanded.
The presentation of scenarios in assessments leads to many additional, unforeseen
uses. Scenarios presented in large-scale assessments gain prominent dissemination
that results in their being put to many uses
their developers did not foresee. Scenarios
should pursue clarity of documentation and
transparency about underlying reasoning
and assumptions, to improve the ease of use
and reduce the risk of misunderstanding in
such derivative uses, although they cannot
anticipate all information needs of an openended set of diverse potential uses.
In assessments, scenarios can strongly influence issue framing. Also because of

Global-Change Scenarios - Their Development and Use
their prominent dissemination, scenarios
presented in major assessments can exercise substantial influence over the framing
of policy discussions or provide simple,
widely used metrics of the seriousness of
the issue. They may consequently exercise
broad influence over many decisions that
depend upon such aggregate perceptions of
seriousness. The prospect of such influence further heightens the responsibility for
transparency in production of scenarios.
Scenarios contain unavoidable elements
of judgment in both their production and
use. Although they draw on relevant data,
knowledge, and analysis, scenarios inevitably contain elements of judgment. In
addition to putting serious responsibilities
onto scenario developers, this implies that
there is no authoritative way to resolve arguments over whether a scenario is plausible or not. When a wide enough range of
potential futures is considered, some scenarios are likely to draw criticism, in part
motivated by opposition to their foreseeable implications for action. Any scenario
can be attacked as unreasonable, speculative or unlikely, and close enough scrutiny
of any scenario can usually reveal inconsistencies, but these do not provide sufficient basis for excluding a scenario from
consideration. Indeed, scenarios designed
to represent extreme events, or to lie near
one end of a distribution of potential outcomes, should by definition appear unlikely. The most productive response to
such criticisms lies in transparency about
the process, reasoning, and assumptions
used to produce scenarios. Such transparency can shift arguments to underlying
uncertainties, and help limit biases in the
production of scenarios.

5.3 CHARACTERISTICS
OF “CORE” EMISSIONS AND
CLIMATE SCENARIOS
Centrally provided scenarios of emissions
and climate change can help inform mitigation and adaptation decisions at national and sub-national scale, but these
will usually require additional information as well. Central scenarios can provide

information about trends in world emissions, underlying socio-economic conditions at the scale of major world regions,
and the large-scale pattern of global policy
response. They can also provide access to
climate-model scenario output, plus tools,
data, and support for producing finer-scale
scenario information needed for particular
impact and adaptation applications. Mitigation and adaptation decisions and associated assessments at national or smaller
spatial scale will need more detailed and
finer-scale climate and socio-economic information than can be provided by centralized scenarios, so these must be extended
and/or modified by national and sub-national scenario processes.
Scenarios of emissions and resultant climate change should be global in scope
and century-scale in time horizon. Core
emissions and climate-change scenarios
should specify major climate-relevant
emissions and other perturbations, globally
and for major world regions. They should
extend over a time horizon of at least 100
years (including some that extend 200-300
years to support assessments of sea level
rise), with interim results at roughly
decadal resolution.
Emissions scenarios of several distinct
logical types will be needed to serve diverse purposes. These will include some
combination of alternative baselines, alternative levels of incremental stringency of mitigation effort, and specified future targets to
support backcasting and feasibility analysis.
For some uses, emissions scenarios should
be coupled to explicit scenarios of alternative socio-economic futures. For these
scenarios, the range of potential socio-economic and policy futures considered should
be wider than has been considered to date,
including scenarios of policy failure and
conflict, and a wide range of stringency and
timing of mitigation effort. For example,
what if development stagnates in major
world regions? What if world emissions
grow sharply for several decades with little control effort, followed by a subsequent
shift to stringent mitigation efforts? What
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if part of the world makes a lot of effort and
part makes very little? Considering such
varied future histories is crucial for considering long-term risks and opportunities
from major mitigation choices.
Scenarios should reflect various explicit
degrees of coordination, depending on
their intended uses. Some uses will require groups of simple coordinated scenarios to provide standardized inputs for
downstream modeling and analysis – e.g.,
standard emissions scenarios as inputs to
climate models and standard climate scenarios as inputs to impact assessments – for
exploring present uncertainties and tracking developments of knowledge over time.
Other scenarios should be based on multiple
models using common input assumptions.
Non-standardized scenarios produced at the
initiative of researchers and modelers should
also be produced, which explore alternative
assumptions or meet specific user needs,
provided these meet basic standards of
quality control, transparency, and documentation.
Some scenarios should seek to link qualitative and quantitative elements. Some
scenarios of socio-economic conditions,
whether produced to support global emissions scenarios or impacts assessments,
should include both qualitative and quantitative elements and sustained analytic efforts to link the two. Qualitative or narrative
scenario elements can provide a vehicle to
explore major historical uncertainties with
large implications for global emissions, climate change, and vulnerability to climate
impacts; provide a coherent rationale and
logical structure to connect assumed trajectories for multiple variables, including
both quantitative and qualitative ones; and
provide guidance to other analysts or users
who may wish to extend the scenarios by
elaborating additional detail. Achieving
these benefits will require more sustained
effort to integrate model-based projections
of quantitative variables with qualitative
and narrative scenario elements, to iterate
between these, and to critically examine
each element in light of the other, than has
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been made thus far. These efforts should
seek to connect alternative qualitative and
narrative scenarios not just to alternative
parameter values in quantitative models,
but also to alternative forms of causal relations and model structures. Generating
multiple alternative model quantifications
based on the same narrative and associated
causal logic is one promising route to enriching understanding of uncertainties in
key quantitative variables such as future
economic output and emissions.

5.4 SCENARIO PROCESS:
DEVELOPER-USER
INTERACTIONS
There is value in collaboration between
scenario developers and users, particularly at the beginning and ending stages
of a scenario exercise. The appropriate degree and means of this collaboration vary
substantially among scenario exercises.
User engagement is most important in the
initial scoping and design of a scenario exercise, and in the evaluation and application of the scenarios generated. The value
of user engagement in details of scenario
development, quantification, elaboration,
and checking, depends on the specific case.
The ease of achieving such collaboration
and its value are likely to be greater when
scenario users are clearly identified, few
in number, and similar in their interests
and perspectives. When potential scenario
users are identified, relatively few, and relatively homogenous, close and intensive
collaboration between users and developers is likely to be most productive. When
potential users are numerous and diverse,
intensive engagement may be infeasible
and more structured processes for consultation, representation, and information exchange are needed. While progress has
been made in new methods to allow larger
numbers to participate in scenario exercises, further development of such methods
is needed.
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5.5 COMMUNICATION
OF SCENARIOS
Effective communication of scenarios is
essential, in forms useful to audiences of
diverse interests and technical skills. Scenarios must be communicated effectively to
their potential users, including both technical and non-technical audiences. In addition to the contents or outputs of scenarios,
communication should include associated
documentation, tools, and support for their
use. Various methods should be used to
promote broad dissemination of scenario
information; for instance, presentations, reports, websites, and centralized data distribution centers.
To facilitate user
understanding of results, various methods
should be used to communicate numerical
and technical information, including multiple tabular, summary, and graphical formats,
ideally with user-interactive capabilities.
Transparency of underlying reasoning
and assumptions is crucial. Scenario communication should include transparent disclosure of underlying assumptions, models,
and reasoning used to produce the scenarios, to support the credibility of scenarios,
to alert potential users to conditions under
which they might wish to use or modify
them, and to inform criticism and improvement of scenarios. This should include explicit identification of the major
uncertainties represented in each scenario
and the sources of underlying information,
whether drawn from the scientific literature, formal expert-elicitation exercises, or
informal judgments of the scenario team.
It is possible in virtually all cases to formulate simple, accessible, honest descriptions of why a scenario was undertaken,
why it was necessary, what was done, how
and why, and why it merits respect as a reasonable judgment.

5.6 CONSISTENCY AND
INTEGRATION IN SCENARIOS
Any scenario should be internally consistent in its assumptions and reasoning, to
the extent this can be established given
present knowledge. Carefully pursuing

consistency within individual scenarios
can be an intensive and time-consuming
process, but is crucial to avoid problems
that can discredit a scenario exercise.
In scenario exercises that use multiple
models to explore potential uncertainties
in future conditions, consistency between
models should be pursued primarily
through coordination of inputs, not outputs. Use of multiple models in parallel to
produce alternative descriptions of future
conditions can improve understanding of
uncertainties, if models are run under
consistent assumptions about exogenous
inputs. Forcing models to generate consistent trajectories for endogenous outputs
poses several risks, including suppressing
variation from alternative causal structures
that could provide valuable insights into
uncertainties, and encouraging over-confidence from spurious precision. For quantities that are exogenous in some models and
endogenous in others, the appropriate treatment varies case by case, but it is not generally desirable to force multiple models to
convergent values of such variables without more detailed examination of the underlying uncertainties.
Imposing consistent outputs in multimodel exercises can be useful, however,
when these outputs represent common
goals for policy evaluation. For example,
consistent constraints on some environmentally relevant target such as emissions,
atmospheric concentrations, or radiative
forcings, can be used to examine intermodel uncertainties in the technological,
economic, and resource conditions associated with meeting the specified targets.
Transparency in reporting scenario and
model differences as well as underlying
assumptions and reasoning can help mitigate the effects of inconsistencies among
scenarios. Ideally, multiple scenarios in an
exercise should differ only on those elements intentionally chosen to distinguish
them, and be consistent in all other factors.
However, this is not always possible, particularly when scenarios are produced
using different models. Pursuing maximal
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transparency about the models, assumptions, and reasoning underlying each
scenario – perhaps by issuing detailed diagnostic reports that include explicit discussion of points of weakness, uncertainty,
and disagreements, and the means used to
resolve them – can mitigate any resultant
confusion.

5.7 TREATMENT OF
UNCERTAINTY IN SCENARIOS
Some scenario exercises should include
more explicit characterization of likelihood judgments than has been practiced
so far. The advantages of being more explicit about the probability judgments that
underlie scenario exercises are likely to
outweigh the disadvantages. Such specification should be pursued further than has
been done in major global-change scenario
exercises to date, although not necessarily
in all scenario exercises. The means available to express these judgments are of
widely varying specificity, ranging from
agreed terminology202 to explicitly quantified probability distributions. All such
judgments should include explicit acknowledgement of their inevitably subjective elements and appropriate caveats to
help users avoid mistaking them as objectively true.
Explicit probability judgments are easiest
to produce and least controversial in scenarios generated using quantitative models of climate change or specific impact
domains. Scenarios generated using such
models can be conditioned on specific assumed values for socio-economic inputs
such as emissions, and can represent explicitly and quantitatively the effects of
specified variation in initial conditions or
unknown parameter values. These devices
are also available, although in less widespread use, in economic models used to
project emissions. These devices aid in
constructing distributions of key quantitative characteristics, such as measures of
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global or regional climate, or of prominent
quantitative impact measures, such as
changes in river flows or sea level, although they neither capture all relevant
uncertainty nor avoid the inevitably subjective nature of such probability judgments. Explicit probability judgments are
more difficult and controversial when they
involve socio-economic factors for which
quantitative models are not available, and
that do not depend in well understood ways
on identified quantitative parameters. Such
factors include major technological innovations, large-scale changes in attitudes or
norms, or policy response.
Attempting to include explicit probability
judgments is likely to be most useful and
successful when key variables are few,
quantitative outcomes are needed, and potential users are numerous and diverse.
The case for assigning explicit likelihood
judgments is strongest when scenarios’
most salient components are quantitative
projections of a few key variables, such as
emissions or average temperature change
over the globe or some region, because the
technical barriers to assigning probabilities
are least severe in this case. The case is
strongest when a primary purpose of the
scenario exercise is to provide inputs to
other quantitative assessment activities, or
to inform decisions that primarily depend
on one or a few key quantitative variables,
because such uses are most likely to require
probability judgments.
The case is
strongest when the set of potential scenario
users and uses is large and heterogeneous,
because this situation provides the least opportunity for informal communication of
implicit judgments of likelihood or priority
through intense, sustained collaboration between scenario developers and users.
Attempting to include explicit probability
judgments is likely to be least useful and
successful when scenarios specify multiple characteristics, including prominent
narrative or qualitative components; when
the purpose of a scenario exercise is sensitivity analysis or heuristic exploration;
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and when potential users are few, similar,
and known. When scenarios are primarily
construed as rich, qualitative narratives that
present major alternative historical and
socio-economic trajectories, the technical
obstacles to explicit probability assignment
are greatest and the likely confidence in
scenario developers’ subjective probability
judgments lowest. When the main purpose
of a scenario exercise is to stimulate critical
or creative thought, to probe the limits of a
model or decision strategy through sensitivity analysis, or to explore ways of meeting a specified target, explicit probability
assignment provides little or no benefit.
When users are few, similar, and specifically identified, they can be intensively involved in scenario production, allowing
effective informal communication of likelihood judgments without stating them explicitly. Under these conditions, scenario
exercises can also be structured to engage
users in the potentially instructive activity
of assigning and discussing their own probability judgments, rather than putting that
responsibility exclusively on the researchers
or analysts developing scenarios.
Centrally provided scenarios of global
emissions and climate change should attempt to include explicit probability judgments. Because of the large, diverse set of
users for these scenarios, explicit likelihood
judgments should be provided for ranges of
key quantitative outputs, including global
emissions and global-average temperature
change. Scenarios should typically include
several paths that span a wide range of
judged uncertainty, e.g., 95 percent to 99
percent. The associated probability judgments may include some that are unconditional and some that are conditioned on
specific assumed prior conditions. Such estimates should be provided by multiple
groups using diverse methods. As for all
such probability judgments, their unavoidably subjective nature and the specific assumptions on which they are conditioned
should be stated explicitly and prominently
.

Providing explicit probability judgments allows scenario users to choose whether to
use them or not. Some users may choose
to use these explicitly in their subsequent
analysis or decision support, while others
may use them only to help decide which scenarios to use, and still others may disregard
them entirely. Users may select a different
group of scenarios or a different subset of
the uncertainty range for various reasons, including differences in risk aversion, differences in the scope of their decision authority, or differences in their assumptions
about decisions by other actors (present or
future). Presenting complete descriptions of
scenarios together with underlying assumptions and reasoning, including probability judgments, preserves all these options
for users.
Scenario exercises should give more attention to extreme cases. Some uses of scenarios require consideration of low-probability,
high-consequence extreme cases, such as loss
of a major continental ice sheet or major
changes in meridional ocean circulation.
Consequently, such scenarios should be included in large, general-purpose scenario exercises producing emissions or climatechange scenarios, together with more likely
middle-case scenarios. When extreme scenarios are included in an exercise, it is especially critical to be explicit and transparent
about the reasoning and assumptions underlying each scenario, and scenario developers’
judgments of relative likelihoods.
In addition to enhancing the utility of scenario outputs, probabilistic methods can
contribute throughout the scenario development process. Developing scenarios requires making many judgments about unknown characteristics and developing many
arguments and pathways to link these. Scenarios based on quantitative models typically
require specifying many exogenous inputs
and parameters. Even narrative scenarios require specifying values of multiple characteristics, both qualitative and quantitative.
Explicit discussion of uncertainties and associated probabilities can help structure
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and facilitate many aspects of the scenario
development process, including deciding appropriate ranges of variables to consider,
defining boundaries of what outcomes are
considered plausible, elaborating associated causal mechanisms and linkages, discussing and integrating knowledge and
judgments from multiple participants, and
clarifying disagreements. Explicit conversation about probabilities can support insights throughout these processes, in addition to supporting communication of scenario
judgments to users.

5.8 EXPANDING AND SUSTAINING CAPACITY FOR PRODUCTION AND USE OF SCENARIOS203
Present scenario capacity is inadequate. Although scenario-based reasoning is required
for many aspects of global change assessment
and decision support, the present capacity to
produce, disseminate, apply, evaluate, and
adapt scenarios is inadequate. There has not
been enough continuity to enable effective
learning, because scenarios are typically
produced de novo for each major application.
There has not been enough transparency about
methods, reasoning, and assumptions. Constructing integrated scenarios and exploring
alternative methods has been difficult, in part
because scenario exercises have tended to be
dominated by use of quantitative models, separated along disciplinary lines. Inadequate resources have been devoted to methods development, for scenarios and related decisionsupport tools Finally, there has been no systematic evaluation and critique of scenarios
or their application.

203

Recommendations made in this report regarding programmatic and organizational changes, and the adequacy of current budgets, reflect the judgment of the
report’s authors and the CPDAC and are not necessarily the views of the U.S. Government.
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To help fulfill these presently unmet
needs, CCSP should establish a
program to:
• Commission scenarios for use in assessments and decision-support
activities. This task includes facilitating agreement among relevant
producers and users on standard scenarios in cases where multiple assessment activities require standard scenarios for comparability, and
convening and supporting a diverse collection of more extensive
and detailed scenario-related exercises, by multiple groups using a
wide range of models and approaches.
• Disseminate scenarios with associated
documentation, tools, and guidance
materials. This task includes multiple forms of support and program-building for diverse groups
seeking to apply, modify, and extend
existing scenario-based information at various regional and sectoral
scales, through providing data,
models, tools, resources, and associated documentation and technical
support, in multiple forms and
through multiple media.
• Commission various groups to evaluate scenarios and their applications and to develop improved
methods. This task includes defining and promulgating standards for
quality control – which, given the
need for diverse approaches, would
principally concern matters of
process such as transparency, documentation, evaluation, and dissemination of results and supporting information. The task also includes broad efforts to develop scenario-related skills, tools, and methods, e.g., by providing resources for
methods development and evaluation projects; conducting and establishing procedures for evaluation
of particular activities and programs; and convening workshops,
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conferences, etc., to evaluate
progress overall, or in particular
methodological areas.
• Archive results and documentation related to all these tasks, to provide
historical perspective and institutional memory for future scenariorelated activities. This task includes preserving for retrospective
scrutiny a wide range of materials:
not just the methods, contents, and
results of scenario exercises, but also
the progressive evaluations of particular activities and approaches, and
of the entire program. In its ongoing development and evaluation of
methods, the program should not
draw rigid boundaries between scenario development and application
and other related methods of assessment and decision support for
long-term global change issues.

Several conditions in the design and
management of this new program
would be required to ensure its effectiveness.
• The program should build and maintain strong connections with outside relevant expertise, and analytic
and modeling capability. While
the program must develop enough
internal expertise to be a full participant in debates over scenarios
and assessment methods, it cannot
and should not attempt to impose a
unilateral vision of preferred scenarios, methods, or approaches.
Rather, it must build and maintain
close collegial connections with
outside networks of researchers
and analysts in multiple fields of expertise, including emissions modelers, climate scientists and modelers, impacts researchers, and resource managers. These relationships would be facilitated by establishing governing mechanisms,
such as a senior advisory board,
drawn from the broad communities
of researchers, modelers, and ana-

lysts who are developing and using
scenarios and related methods. Although established as a US national program, it must also support, collaborate, and coordinate with parallel activities in other nations and
internationally, and with relevant
sub-national activities.
• The program should integrate and balance goals and criteria related to
scientific and technical quality,
and those related to utility and relevance to users. This balance is
needed for the program to support
promising but speculative activities,
to encourage creativity and diversity
of approach, to avoid being captured
by any particular discipline or modeling approach, and to be willing to
make and explain judgments about
quality and promise that reflect
both scientific and practical considerations. To achieve this, the program needs broad discretion over the
type of projects supported, including sponsoring fairly sharply targeted activities, supporting speculative activities, and investing to develop and assess capabilities that do
not yet exist.
• The program should be insulated from
political control. For the scenarios
and analyses based on them to be
perceived as credible by their diverse
users, the program needs enough insulation from political control, at
both the national or international
level, to prevent scenarios from
becoming proxies for conflict over
near-term policies, and to allow
exploration of the implications of alternative futures that represent plausible risks but that some political actors would find objectionable.
• The program should strive for maximum transparency in its own activities, in addition to demanding
it from activities it supports. The
program should strive for maximal
transparency regarding inputs, mod-
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els, assumptions, and reasoning
employed in developing scenarios,
as well as any significant disagreements that arose and how they
were resolved and any remaining
weaknesses recognized by the developers. The broader and more diverse the collection of intended
uses and users, the more crucial is
transparency of the scenario-production process – because different
users may require scenarios produced using different underlying assumptions, and they must be able to
track the underlying logic to exercise this choice. This would enhance
credibility in the scenario-development process. While calls for such
transparency are widely made, experience suggests it is difficult to
achieve, particularly for such matters as disagreements or recognized
weaknesses that may risk professional embarrassment. Still, achieving more transparency and more
widely informed debate on such matters is essential for advancing scenario methods.
• The program will require the authority
and resources necessary to articulate and promulgate standards for
transparency, consistency (e.g., of
units and formats), and quality control. This task involves facilitating
discussions among the community
and formulating persuasive guidelines and supporting arguments. It
also requires use of incentives such
as seals of approval, access to participation in particular processes, ac-
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cess to particular dissemination
outlets, and access to resources. A
weak “clearinghouse” that solicits,
supports, or publicizes scenarios but
cannot exercise quality control,
propose and stimulate new directions, or convene critical reviews, of
the whole enterprise and of particular exercises, is not an adequate
model for the program.
• The program will require an adequate
sustained resources. The program
must build and maintain a sophisticated analytic capability, and develop skills and institutional memory regarding prior experiences,
successes, and failures. This requirement precludes the program
being a series of ad hoc one-time activities or a part-time, unfunded burden imposed on people and organizations with other full-time responsibilities.
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MEA

Millennium Ecosystem Assessment

names of specific emissions scenarios
published in the IPCC Special Report on
Emissions Scenarios

MEC

Metropolitan East Coast assessment of
US National Assessment

MER

market exchange rates

CCSP

Climate Change Science Program

NAPAP

CCTP

Climate Change Technology Program

National Acid Precipitation
Assessment Program

CFCs

chlorofluorocarbons

NAST

National Assessment Synthesis Team

NRC

National Research Council (U.S.)

A1, A2, B1, B2, A1FI

DDC

Data Distribution Center (IPCC)

DOD

Department of Defense (U.S.)

DWR

Department of Water Resources
(California)

EMF

Energy Modeling Forum

ENSO

El Ni o/Southern Oscillation

EPA

Environmental Protection Agency

NYCDEP New York City Department of
Environmental Protection
NYCHP New York Climate and Health Project
OECD

Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development

ONA

Office of Net Assessments (Office of US
Secretary of Defense)

OTA

Office of Technology Assessment,
United States Congress

PDO

Pacific Decadal Oscillation

GBN

Global Business Network

GCM

general circulation model

GDP

gross domestic product

PPP

purchasing-power parity

GFDL

Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory,
US National Oceanographic and Atmos
pheric Administration (NOAA), and
climate model produced by this
laboratory

SRES

Special Report on Emissions Scenarios
(IPCC)

gigatonnes (billion metric tons) of carbon

TGICA

Task Group on Data and Scenario
Support for Impact and Climate
Analysis (IPCC)

UKCIP

United Kingdom Climate Impacts
Program

GtC

HadCM2 UK Hadley Centre climate model,
Version 2
IIASA

International Institute for Applied
Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria

IPCC

Inter-governmental Panel on
Climate Change

VEMAP Vegetation Ecosystem Mapping and
Analysis Project

IS92

series of emissions scenarios produced by
the IPCC in 1992, including specific
scenarios named IS92a through IS92f

VOC

LRTAP

Convention on Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution

olatile organic compounds
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